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The 
Evolution of Knowledge 

A Review of Philosophy 



By 
Raymond St. James Perrin 



New York: The Baker & Taylor Company 
33-37 East Seventeenth Street, Union Square North 



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two Copies riau::ve:i 

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Copyright, 1905, 

BY 

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY 
Published March, 1905 



The GRfiENwicH Press 

NEW YORK CITY, U. S. A. 



IN MEMORY OF 

AUGUSTINE VERGNES PERRIN 

FROM HER I LEARNED THE SECRET THAT THE DEEPEST 

TRUTHS OF LIFE ARE COMMUNICATED 

IN SILENCE BY EXAMPLE 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/evolutionofknowlOOperr 



PREFACE 

In the year 1881 there appeared in Chicago an anony- 
mous satire entitled, "The Student's Dream." My aim 
was to show that the most general terms of existence, 
namely: space, time, matter, and force, can be resolved 
into motion. Four years later "The Religion of Phil- 
osophy," or "The Unification of Knowledge" was pub- 
lished in New York and London, in order more fully 
to prove the same thesis. To this one aim many studi- 
ous years have since been directed, resulting in the pres- 
ent revision of the above mentioned work, in which I 
have endeavored to show that motion is the ultimate 
reality, 



CONTENTS 



PART I 

THE PRE-EVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 
CHAPTER PAGB 

I. The Dawn of Philosophy. .... 1 
Thales — Anaximenes — Diogenes of ApoUonia 
— Anaximander — Pythagoras. 

II. The Pre-Socratic Period. . . . . 18 

Xenophanes — Parmenides — Zeno of Elea — 
Heraclitus — Empedocles — Democritus — 
Anaxagoras. 

III. The Climax of Greek Thought. ... 37 

The Sophists — Socrates — Plato. 

IV. Aristotle, the Cynics, the Stoics, and the 

Skeptics of the New Academy. , . 57 
Aristotle — Diogenes — Zeno tlie Stoic — Epi- 
curus — Pyrrho — Arcesilaus — Cameades. 

V. The Alexandrian School, Scholasticism, 

AND the Revival OF Learning. . . 82 

Philo — Plotinus — Abelard — Bruno — Bacon. 

VI. Modern Philosophy. ..... 121 

Descartes — Spinoza — Hobbes — Locke — Hart- 
ley — L ebnitz — B erkeley — Hume. 

VII. German Philosophy. ..... 153 

Kant — Fichte — SchsUing — Hegel — Herbert — 
Haeckel. 

VIII. The Eclecticism and Positive Philosophy 

OF France and the Scotch School. . . 198 
Gassendi — Malebranche — Condillac — Cabanis 
Gall — Royer-CoUard — Cousin — Comt« — 
Reid — Hamilton. 



Contents 



PART II 

THE EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER PAGB 

IX. Herbert Spencer ..... 224 
Knowledge, a Form of Motion. 

X. Herbert Spencer (continued) .... 238 
The Interdependence of Thought, Feeling and 
Action. 

XI. Herbert Spencer (continued) .... 248 

The Analysis of Reason. 

XII. Herbert Spencer (concluded). . . . 259 

The Principles of Sociology. 

XIII. George Henry Lewes ..... 268 
The Principles of Psychology. 

XIV. George Henry Lewes (continued) . . . 280 

Experience and Belief. 

XV. George Henry Lewes (concluded) . . . 294 

The Unity of Mind and Matter. 

XVI. Conclusion . 305 



INTEODUCTION 



In the following pages the chief systems of ancient 
and modern thought are compared, the object being to 
measure the approach of each system to the goal of 
philosophy which is the demonstration of the unity of 
all things. The most difficult unity to explain is that of 
mind and matter. Prior to the discovery of evolution 
this explanation was generally considered impossible, 
but now the problem can be dealt with scientifically. If 
by reducing the intellectual and the physical to a 
single principle, the various schemes of philosophy are 
rendered more intelligible, those who believe that meta- 
physical speculation leads only to mystery may again 
take heart. 

This attempt to simplify the problem of being would 
be of wide interest were it more generally under- 
stood that philosophy is not only a last analysis, but a 
commanding sjoithesis; that its purpose is not alone 
to resolve the most general terms of existence into a 
single principle, but to reveal the harmonies of life and 
the universe as the most direct way of increasing hu- 
man happiness. 

The discovery that all the sciences spring from a 
centre of reality reminds us that unity was the ideal 
of the ancient Greeks. Their art and letters proclaim 
a knowledge of natural proportion, or an appreciation 



X Introduction 

of the law of unity in variety. This sublime intui- 
tion enabled them to perceive that the powers of the 
intellect and the ideals of righteousness move in unison 
with nature. They reasoned with singular power con- 
cerning general principles, for they saw that the true 
and the good are evolved from nature, while their sense 
of proportion crowned their knowledge with beauty. 

All thoughtful persons classify experiences, forming 
them into general views of life, perceiving more or less 
distinctly that all ideas centre in an ultimate relation. 
The trend of social progress is from indefinite to def- 
inite ideas; that is to say, from a supernatural to a 
natural theory of knowledge. Society will have reached 
its zenith when it realizes that thought is a development 
of feeling, and that both are evolutions of nature. 

Since there can be no reliable definition of truth or 
of right until knowledge is unified, we naturally look 
for this most important achievement to the universities, 
those centres of intelligence designed for the enlighten- 
ment of the world. But at the chief seats of learning, 
although investigations progress in many departments, 
there has been thus far a failure to co-ordinate the sci- 
ences. The cause of this lack of harmony among the 
various departments of research is not far to seek, for 
the prevalent philosophy, instead of reducing mind and 
nature to unity, maintains that the true and the good 
are not accounted for by physical laws. 

The aim of this book, therefore, is to demonstrate the 
fact that knowledge can be unified by co-ordinating the 
sciences, or, in other words, that the most general terms 
of existence can be reduced to a single principle. 

Ever since man has essayed to form definite ideas 



Introduction xi 

of existence the problem of motion has occupied the 
highest place in his thoughts. The effort to solve this 
problem can be traced from the dawn of philosophy to 
the present day, each age showing an advance toward 
the solution. 

Now every science builds its system upon an ultimate, 
which resolves itself at last into motion. Thus, mathe- 
matics is the study of motion, expressed in number 
and quantity, or in time and space ; physics is the study 
of force ; biology, the study of life ; psychology, of mind ; 
law, of justice ; and religion, of God. It will be found 
upon investigation that all these terms have the same 
fundamental meaning, for they unite the subjective and 
the objective aspects of existence in motion. But, if it 
is necessary for each department of research to assimi- 
late all universal terms before the sciences can be co- 
ordinated, we shall wait indefinitely for this most needed 
reform. Let us for the present, therefore, consider only 
those terms which are generally conceded to be univer- 
sals, — ^namely space, time, matter, force and motion. 
To identify the last fact in each science with one or 
more of these principles is to unify knowledge, as the 
axiom holds true that things which are equal to the 
same thing are equal to one another. 

The advantage to be gained by co-ordinating the sci- 
ences is as yet scarcely appreciable. When it is demon- 
strated that one relation accounts for mental as well as 
for physical existence, each discovery will throw new 
light upon all preceding ones. For example, if the 
principles of existence and of devotion are one, it fol- 
lows that our most general ideas govern our religious 
beliefs, for the divine signifies the universal, or the most 



xii Introduction 

general; that is to say, deity is the order of nature, 
reached through generalization. 

One of the characteristics of our age is a reaction 
from skepticism or a demand for a justification of 
religious faith. To satisfy this greatest of human needs, 
we require a scientific theory of knowledge. In other 
terms, we need more than anything else, an explanation 
of the origin and development of general ideas. 

There can be no liigher revelation than philosophy, 
for it discloses the interdependence of mind and nature. 
The deepest truths are appreciated not by reason alone, 
but also by sympathy. As thought is a development of 
feeling, philosophy is a refinement of religious senti- 
ment. 

The highest use of philosophy is to strengthen religi- 
ous faith, by giving to our devotional instincts the 
sanction of reason. Those who have never submitted 
themselves to the discipline of thought, or who have yet 
to employ the safeguards of investigation and verifica- 
tion with regard to their religious convictions, are apt 
to accept devotional symbols literally, mistaking them 
for the true meaning of their faith. The devout mind 
has nothing to fear from reason, since it reveals no fate 
that is not compensated by the peace of eternal and uni- 
versal truth. 

As above indicated, there can be no reliable defini- 
tion of the true and the good until mind and matter 
are reduced to a single principle. Science, quite as 
much as religion, is responsible, therefore, for prevalent 
superstitions. So long as the universities teach that in- 
telligence and s}Tnpathy are inscrutable, or that the 



Introduction ' xiii 

deepest meaning of truth and of right is unknowable, 
just so long will religion veil itself in mystery. If those 
who presume to educate our theologians cannot agree 
concerning the meaning of ultimate terms, how can the 
Church enlighten us as to the principles of existence ? 

Eeligion, or consecrated devotion, is the mainspring 
of social progress. Society organizes for righteousness, 
because righteousness is a necessity. All organizations 
having this aim are religious, whether their temples are 
reared to a personal deity or to the principle of justice. 

If by disclosing the interdependence of ultimate terms 
knowledge can be unified, justice will appear in its true 
light, as the order of nature, commanding obedience be- 
cause it is universal, and inspiring emulation because it 
is beautiful. 



PART I 
THE PRE-EVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 



CHAPTER I 
The Dawn of Philosophy 



Tholes — Anaximenes — Diogenes of Apollonia 
Anaximander — Pythagoras 



There is a general belief that our origin and 
destiny are wrapped in impenetrable mystery. We do 
not realize that these questions can be solved by study- 
ing the nature of consciousness and of justice. The 
evolution of consciousness reveals the beginnings of life 
and the evolution of justice its purpose or end. 

Toward the close of the first period of Greek philos- 
ophy, Anaxagoras endeavored to correlate the spiritual 
and the corporeal, which is the present aim of psychol- 
ogy. A century earlier Solon laid the foundations of 
ethical science by proclaiming the interdependence of 
human and divine justice. Thus it is clear that the 
theories of the ancients were fraught with the deepest 
meaning. Their attempts to comprehend mind and 
nature brought them face to face with the very prob- 
lems occupying us today. 



2 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Nothing will conduce more to the solution of these 
problems than a comprehension of the nature of lan- 
guage. The increase of definiteness in language 
marks the progress of humanity. The power of 
expression is the first fruit of social life. Thought is 
not a thing apart from language; the spirit of the race 
breathes in the words and sentences that have grown up 
to express the common life. "Language," says Ampere, 
"begins with being a music, and ends by becoming an 
algebra." Reason and its expression develop together; 
they advance from the incoherent to the coherent, or 
from vague metaphor to definite comparisons. Reason 
is comparison, and its vehicle, language, is a system of 
metaphors, arising from the same source. 

In order to elucidate their theories Plato and Aristotle 
found it necessary to compare them with previous 
cognate thought. Almost all subsequent writers on 
metaphysics have followed this example ; in fact the only 
feasible method of metaphysical demonstration is the 
historical, because the principles of existence can be 
simphfied only by reviewing the discussions by which 
they have been evolved. As Professor Mahaffy re- 
marks, "Conclusions alone are remembered, but the 
process by which they are reached, the antecedent 
doubts, difficulties and failures, are a necessary part of 
the demonstration." 

Each metaphysical system portrays the growth of 
some individual representing a period of thought and 
is modified by those changes of opinion which are 
incident to progress. Thought can be accurately de- 
lineated only when it is clear, but with such profound 
problems as are attempted by philosophers this ideal 
is seldom reached. The chief advantage of the his- 



The Dawn of Philosophy 3 

torical method of demonstration is that of addressing 
each logical sect in the terminology of its chosen 
master, for almost every thoughtful person is attached 
to some form of dialectical art which he deems it his 
duty to support. It is true that an agreement as to 
the meaning of universals would remove this sectar- 
ianism from philosophy, but the great difficulty is that 
universal terms can be defined only by performing in 
advance an ultimate analysis. In the following review 
of philosophical systems, therefore, the endeavor will 
be made to measure the approach of each metaphysical 
school to that goal of thought known as a last analysis 
of existence. 

Although there is no doubt that Hellenic science and 
philosophy owe much to earlier nations, it is conceded 
that the Greeks founded the most accessible schools 
of ancient thought, and have transmitted to us the 
present types of ontological inquiry. For this reason 
Greek philosophy assumes a peculiar interest, affording 
as it does a view of the development of the art of gener- 
alization, the only means by which we are to gain a 
comprehension of the origin and the destiny of man. 

THALES 

The earliest Hellenic philosopher was Thales, born at 
Miletus, a Greek Colony in Asia Minor, about 640 B. C. 
His mathematical and astronomical knowledge was 
acquired, according to Eudemus, in Phoenicia and 
Egypt. An evidence of this knowledge was his predic- 
tion of the solar eclipse 585 B. C. In common with 
many great thinkers of antiquity, Thales took part in 
public affairs. With the Greeks, wisdom meant famil- 
iarity with civil as well as with natural laws. It was on 



4 The Evolution of Knowledge 

account of statesmanship, therefore, as well as of scien- 
tific acquirements, that this philosopher was placed at 
the head of the seven wise men, 

Thales believed that water is the source of all things. 
In assuming that a substance is the most general of 
facts, or the ultimate reality, the quest was begun 
which has since resulted in the discovery of evolu- 
tion. 

To the thoughtful Greek, six hundred years before our 
era, the universe was an infinity of unexplained and 
irreconcilable changes. The physical forces had not as 
yet been distinguished from the substances manifesting 
them. To the mind of Thales, matter and its attributes 
were one. How significant it is that the highest enlight- 
enment has finally coincided with this earliest of intui- 
tions. It is now well known that matter and force are 
indistinguishable one from the other. Some modem 
physicists, however, are so much impressed with the 
distinctions made between the physical forces and 
the substances manifesting them, that they unfortunately 
consider the separation as absolute. They neglect to 
restore to phenomena that fundamental unity which the 
ancients perceived intuitively. 

It is difficult for us to realize the darkness that en- 
shrouded all nature at the time of Thales, and yet, by 
assuming the identity of matter and force, the earliest 
Greek thinkers came near to that universal unity which 
has so long escaped us. How often has it happened 
that the last word of science has come to the support of 
primitive theory. 

The method of mental procedure is constant. Thought 
establishes its base line, triangulating its advances 
toward a universal principle, or toward that most 



The Dawn of Philosophy 5 

general fact by which all others may be explained. 
Thales, the founder of the line of ancient physicists 
known as the Ionian school, was the first among the 
Greeks to seek in nature a primal cause. In fixing upon 
a physical antecedent of all that he saw about him, his 
induction was far greater than would at first appear. 
It was during his time that a spirit of investigation 
first appeared among the Greeks. Hitherto men had 
contented themselves with the familiar aspects of 
tilings, remanding all obscure phenomena to the realm 
of superstition. 

The choice of water as the ultimate or formative 
principle was the result of extended observation and 
thought. Even at that epoch, to the investigator of 
nature, the omnipresence of moisture was manifest. 
Moisture abounded in animals and plants, on the earth 
and in the sky, and by it seeds were apparently nour- 
ished. To the presence of water all hfe seemed due. 
Nor did this first attempt to discover the ultimate princi- 
ple of nature escape the prevailing influence of myths, as 
indicated by the tradition that the earth floated upon 
the waters. To Thales, therefore, the evolution of seed 
germs, vivified by moisture, seemed to account for the 
universe. 

ANAXIMENES 

Anaximenes, who was born in the same Greek Colony 
as Thales, about 588 B. C, agreed fundamentally with 
his predecessor. Rejecting water as the first cause, he 
conceived air to be life. To him, air appeared to be 
infinite, and in its pure state invisible, and he, therefore, 
regarded it as the origin of all things. He maintained 
that only through its qualities, heat, cold, moisture and 



6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

motion, could it be known. To its eternal motion he 
attributed all change. Reasoning that motion is the 
only agency manifested in the transformations of nature, 
he concluded that the condensation of air had produced 
the earth, which was flat and supported by air. He 
believed that all the heavenly bodies were also flat, 
although he saw that the moon shone by the sun's 
light. 

Going a step farther than Thales, Anaximenes deduced 
general, from individual life. He viewed the cosmos as 
a living organism. The profundity of his thought is 
attested by his attempt to evolve consciousness from 
nature. 

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA 

About a century later, Diogenes* of Apollonia (B. C. 
440), offered another theory of the universe. Following 
the suggestion of Anaximenes, Diogenes reasoned that 
air is the origin of all things, but, giving it a deeper 
significance, compared it to the soul. This identification 
of physical and psychical energy has strong support 
from the recent investigations of German biologists in 
cellular psychology. Diogenes believed that universal 
energy accounts for mind as well as for matter. He 
defended the monism of Anaximenes against the doc- 
trine of Anaxagoras, who held to a world ordering spirit. 

According to Thales, the primary substance was more 
than moisture; it was water endowed with vital energy. 
To Diogenes air was more than atmosphere; it was that 
tenuous force which we now call ether, such as light 
and radiant heat — the soul of nature. 

Diogenes conceived intelligence as a form of uni- 

* Not Diogenes the Cynic. 



The Dawn of Philosophy 7 

versal energy. "Without reason," he said, "it would 
be impossible for it to be so ordered that one should find 
the proportion of all things, of winter and summer, 
night and day, rain and fair weather, ordered in the best 
possible manner."* 

Thus to Diogenes ether and intelligence meant the 
same thing, because to him both seemed to represent the 
order of nature. "That which has knowledge is what 
men call air. By it all things are governed and regulated, 
and so it seems to me its use is to pervade all and to be 
in all, and there is nothing which has not some share in 
it."t The belief of Diogenes that intelligence is a mani- 
festation of the order of nature is now generally con- 
ceded to be the most advanced theory of mind, far 
nearer the truth than the Kantian idea that mind ac- 
counts for the order of nature. 

ANAXIMANDER 

Thus the ancient physicists, Thales, Anaximenes 
and Diogenes, endeavored to explain the universe from a 
dynamical basis, citing respectively living water, air, 
and air-life, as the cause of all things. There was a con- 
temporary of Thales, however, who divined perhaps 
more clearly than the other lonians, the great truth that 
nature itself is ultimate or, in other words, the life or 
motion of the universe. Discussions concerning the 
meaning of matter, such as occur in the writings of Aris- 
totle, were unknown to these early Greeks, so that we 
have no choice but to admire the penetration of Anaxi- 
mander in taking a position in harmony with the most 
advanced modern theories of the cosmos. It is true 
that many teachers of physical science still affirm that 

*Simpl. Phvs. 1,4,32-v. 

t Simpl. Phys. III.. 5 and Diog. Laert. 112 



8 The Evolution of Knowledge 

inert matter is the final fact. To assume that atoms 
have absolute weight and extension is to believe 
in absolute rest, whereas the best authorities now agree 
that substance, which is our symbol for rest, is itself a 
form of motion. 

Anaximander, who was born about 610 B. C, taught 
that the infinite (rb direLpov) is the ultimate reality. This 
principle, he said, "is the origin of all things." 

In thus recognizing a relation as the ultimate gener- 
alization, Anaximander rose above materialism, for he 
intuitively perceived the interdependence of the dynami- 
cal and the statical aspects of existence. The relation 
which he conceived as ultimate he called infinite in order 
to express the endless evolutions of the world. He 
reasoned that the primary cause must be infinite in order 
to suffice for the variety of phenomena. 

Although Aristotle long afterwards characterized this 
infinite as a multiplicity of primary elements, to the 
mind of Anaximander it was evidently an ever-producing 
energy. 

It is alleged that among the earliest philosophical 
writings of the Greeks was a treatise by Anaximander 
upon the size and distance of the heavenly bodies. 
His introduction of the sun-dial and his invention of 
geographical maps place him among the pioneers of 
science. 

When Anaximander proclaimed that being is a rela- 
tion, he struck the keynote of philosophy, that is to say, 
he reached a generalization that all subsequent research 
has failed to overthrow. When it is remembered, how- 
ever, that the doctrines of Anaximander, as well as those 
of his contemporaries, had analogies in earlier philoso- 
phies, as will appear by reference to the EgyjDtians, the 



The Dawn of Philosophy 9 

Hebrews, the Chaldeans and the Hindus, we reahze how 
remote and how widespread are the origins of ontological 
inquiry. 

PYTHAGORAS 

Pythagoras, about the time of whose birth there is a 
dispute, opinions varying from 586 to 569 B. C, founded 
the first systematic school of thought. To him we owe 
the term philosopher, for it was in declaring himself a 
lover of wisdom that the word was coined. "A philoso- 
pher," says Pythagoras, ''is one who seeks wisdom for 
its own sake."* This great teacher maintained that 
thought is the noblest exercise of man, because the im- 
provement of social conditions depends upon the pro- 
gress of science and religion. It never occurred to him 
that our discoveries in natural phenomena were any- 
thing less than divine revelations. His life was devoted 
to investigating the methods of the architect of the 
universe. This was the avowed aim of his secret 
society, the influence of which survived among the 
Greeks long after the death of its founder. 

Ancient accounts depict a spirit of exclusiveness as 
prevailing among early scientists. The general lack of 
education prevented all but a favored few from divining 
the secrets of nature. From remotest antiquity the 
profoundest suggestions of the cosmos have been held 
sacred. In order to guard these treasures of knowledge 
from sacrilege, secret religious orders were inaugurated 
with elaborate ceremonies and a ritual. These pre- 
historic attempts to preserve and to develop the germs 
of knowledge still survive in the form of religious and 
masonic worship, all of which celebrate the early dis- 

* Iambi. Vita. pp. 58, 59. 



lo The Evolution of Knowledge- 

coveries of science, the rapture of the dawn of knowledge. 
As the Psalmist says, "The Heavens declare the glory of 
God and the firmament showeth His handiwork." 

The constitution of the Pythagoreans was probably 
derived from the religious orders of Egypt and of the 
Orient. It provided that initiation was to follow years 
of probation devised as a test of character. So severe 
were these trials, chief among them the injunction of 
secrecy, that many novices surrendered in despair, 
"unworthy to enter the sanctuary of science." 

The motto of the Pythagoreans was: "Not unto all 
should all be made known." Although the accounts of 
this fraternity are richly embellished with fable, we 
are not without reliable evidence concerning its teach- 
ings. As above indicated, the Pythagoreans appealed 
to the devotional instincts in behalf of better methods of 
government. The principles of harmony which they dis- 
cerned in nature they endeavored to apply to civil insti- 
tutions, just as in our time, we would identify right- 
eousness with the order of the universe. They taught 
that justice is the chief end of man and that its pre- 
cepts constitute the highest of religions. This sublime 
rationalism, however, did not save the founder of the 
sect from the charge of being a miracle worker, for then, 
as now, the populace attributed intimacy with the prin- 
ciples of existence to the favor of a personal deity.* 

The Pythagoreans perceived that it is necessary to 
classify ultimate terms as a means of solving the prob- 
lem of being. Their co-ordinates, consisting of ten pairs 
of antithetical terms, no doubt suggested to Aristotle 



* Iambi. Vita., pp. 68, 80, 226-228. Diog. Laert. VIII. 6.8. 
Gell. Noct. Att.j.9. 



The Dawn of Philosophy ii 

his categories, which, being single principles, came 
nearer to universals. 

In the Metaphysics Aristotle says that the Pythago- 
reans, who were nurtured in mathematics, believed that 
number is the principle of all things. They saw in nature 
a greater analogy to number than to such elements as 
fire, earth and water, for in the relations of numerals 
they discerned the harmonies of the universe. They 
even said that consciousness and justice could be arith- 
metically represented. 

The Pythagoreans, continued Aristotle, believed that 
the number ten is capable of expressing not only the ar- 
rangement of the heavenly bodies but the causes of all 
existence. In number they saw both unity and 
variety. They identified the even and the odd with the 
finite and the infinite. They connected the most gen- 
eral principles of existence with the number ten, postu- 
lating the following series of co-ordinates; 
"Finite and Infinite- 
One and Many. 

Even and Odd. 

Right and Left. 

Male and Female. 

Rest and Motion. 

Square and Oblong. 

Straight and Curved. 

Light and Darkness. 

Good and Evil." 
"In these ten co-ordinates," continues Aristotle, "the 
Pythagoreans saw the principle of universal harmony; 
whereupon they affirmed that number is the substance 
of all things."* 

*Arist. Met. 1,5,3. 



12 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Until the time of Socrates all knowledge of the Pytha- 
goreans was in the form of tradition. We are told 
that these prehistoric scientists understood the ro- 
tation of the earth on its axis, and advanced a 
theory of atoms with a world-ordering spirit; and that 
they also advocated the doctrine of contraries, so highly 
developed in recent times by Hegel. 

The somewhat contemptuous attitude of Aristotle 
toward the mysteries of the Pythagoreans has been 
since imitated by many learned authorities, but it is now 
known that this secret religious association possessed 
a knowledge of natural proportion more profound than 
that enjoyed even at the present time. 

The wisdom religions from which descended the 
ancient mysteries inculcated principles of natural pro- 
portion. This ultimate analysis of form stands at the 
very threshold of the sciences. It is the law of unity in 
variety or the law of natural beauty, and was consciously 
exercised by ancient and medieval artists as the chief 
inspiration of their work.* When its universality is 
understood it will unite science and religion. 

"I undertake to prove," says Kepler in the preface of 
his great work, "that God in creating the universe and 
arranging the order of the cosmos had in mind the five 
regular geometrical bodies known since the days of 
Pythagoras and Plato, and that He has fixed, according 
to their dimensions, the number of heavens, their pro- 
portions and the relation of their movements." Whether 
this quaint phraseology of Kepler was due in part to 
dread of the Inquisition, or wholly to the innate dis- 

* See address by Jay Hambidge before the Hellenic Society, 
London Athenaeum, November 15, 1902; also "Nature" of 
same date. 



The Dawn of Philosophy 13 

position to regard the powers of nature as divine, will 
perhaps never be known. The fact remains, however, 
that the highest conception of nature and of deity are 
the same, namely: the infinite and the eternal order of 
the cosmos expressed in proportion or beauty. 

In regard to their capacity for solving the problems of 
existence, the ancient Greeks were our peers. If intro- 
spection alone could have achieved the solution, we 
would have inherited it from them in the same perfection 
as that in which their art has reached us. Neither with 
ancients nor with moderns has there been lack of intellec- 
tual acumen. The cause of the failure, thus far, to unify 
the principles of existence, is to be found in the arbi- 
trary restrictions placed upon our conception of 
knowledge. In its deepest sense, knowledge is life. 
Adequately to conceive the unity of mind and nature 
it is necessary to identify knowledge with life, and life 
with universal change, a generalization which the dis- 
covery of evolution has at last made possible. 

Although psychology and ethics are interdependent 
inquiries, they are still taught separately because the 
psychologist and the moralist have not as yet come to 
an agreement concerning the meaning of universals. 
The definition of universals, therefore, is the reform 
most needed in educational work, for there can be no 
real comprehension of the true or of the good until we 
have reduced mind and nature to proportion or beauty, 
or, in other words, until we have reduced those univer- 
sals known as the categories of thought, or the most 
general terms of existence to a single principle. 

The ancients were aware that deity represents a 
principle, not a person. The best thinkers of all ages 



14 The Evolution of Knowledge 

have perceived that we Hve, not under the tutelage of 
an individual, but in an empire of cause and effect. 

As will later appear, the trend of human progress is 
toward the identification of mental and physical force, or 
toward the development of psychology from biology. 
Even without the aid of biological analysis, however, the 
ancients penetrated to the underlying principle of exist- 
ence, which is, that reality is more general than mind or 
language, or that facts express themselves, which is the 
same thing. The failure to interpret experiences aright 
is a want of harmony between the individual and his 
surroundings, a mal-adjustment of inner to outer re- 
lations. Knowledge is an organization of changes, 
expressing relations which have their terms in other 
changes, and so on to infinity. The deepest meaning of 
change is motion, that ultimate relation expressed in 
terms of time and space. In analyzing terrestrial 
phenomena to determine affinities or proportions, we 
compare one change with another, measuring them by 
a unit. In comparing the phenomena of the heavens, 
we enlarge the scale, but preserve the same method. In 
studying humanity to determine the principles of its 
development, we use the same method and the results 
are expressed in the same terms of force or motion. 

Philosophy has always essayed to comprehend exist- 
ence. Forgetting that knowledge and life have neither 
beginning nor end, it has striven to look beyond them. 
Eesolutely it has maintained this attitude, but in the 
meantime the distances it has approached, as through 
a mist, have become gradually filled with facts; for 
science has steadily enlarged the sphere of the known, 
until we now contemplate a field of experience wide 
enough to challenge the greatest efforts of the mind^ 



The Dawn of Philosophy 15 

An unrelated entity or absolutely independent individ- 
ual is a fiction. There are no unrelated facts; no abso- 
lute persons; no unconditioned being. Mind and nature 
express alike the principle of activity; the universal fact 
of motion. Both the spiritual and the material are at 
last recognized as phenomena, that is to say, as rela- 
tions having for their terms other relations. 

Throughout ancient and modern thought a single pur- 
pose can be recognized. The aim has always been to re- 
duce diversity to unity, the many to the one. This unity 
is not a time or a place but a relation. To discover this 
relation, which is the end of analysis and the beginning 
of synthesis, is to accomplish the object of phil- 
osophy. 

In a broad sense science is classified experience; 
symbols never having been more than an attempt to 
represent experiences. As above indicated, the differ- 
ence between the enlightenment of the past and the 
present is the degree of scientific development attained. 
The attempt to perform an ultimate analysis is as evi- 
dent with Thales and Pythagoras, as with Descartes, 
Spinoza and Kant. They all strove to reduce diver- 
sity to unity, the many to the one. 

This final unity has been variously denominated rela- 
tion, truth, fact, cause, principle, energy, force, substance, 
matter, being, reality and motion. In the paucity of 
their scientific acquirements, Thales thought that it was 
living water; Diogenes of Apollonia, that it was living 
air; and Anaximander, that it was the eternal motion of 
the infinite. Descartes believed it to be thought ex- 
pressed both as mind and as matter. Spinoza called it 
God. Kant found this ultimate reality in reason alone, 
and Herbert Spencer in the "Persistence of Force." 



i6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Wherever we turn^ this relation confronts us as an 
inseparable quality of our existence. It will be demon- 
strated that each science in its particular sphere of 
investigation postulates as ultimate, a principle having 
for its terms the subjective and the objective aspects of 
existence, known as time and space. As before men- 
tioned, mathematics calls this principle motion; physics, 
force; biology, life; psychology, mind; grammar, the 
verb; law, justice; ethics, action; and religion, God. As 
will later appear all these terms have the same final 
meaning, for the last fact in each of the sciences sig- 
nifies the same thing as the verb, the symbol of action 
or being, and finds expression in terms of its aspects, 
time and space. 

The chief difficulty in the way of demonstrating 
the universality of motion is that of identifying matter 
and space as synonymous terms. Matter is the generali- 
zation of the statical aspect of phenomena. Space 
or extension is also the generalization of the statical 
aspect of phenomena. It will be found that whether 
considered subjectively or objectively these concep- 
tions are ultimately one. As is shown in the analysis 
of these conceptions by Herbert Spencer, the idea of 
matter and of space spring from our sense of resistance. 
The definitions of these relatively distinct terms when 
logically produced converge in motion. 

The effect upon philosophy of the identification 
of matter and space can hardly be over-estimated. 
The categories of thought, or the generally accepted uni- 
versals, are space, time, matter, force and motion. Some 
writers add cause, but it is now admitted that cause 
stands for merely one aspect of every phenomenon, the 
opposite being effect. Others, again, assume that con- 



The Dawn of Philosophy 17 

aciousness is an ultimate reality, or an irreducible prin- 
ciple, but this error is met and set aside by Lewes and 
Haeckel, who affiliate consciousness with vital activity. 

The identification of matter and space overcomes the 
difficulty of unifying the categories, because both sub- 
stance and extension are then recognized as forms of 
motion. Motion is the ultimate; time its subjective 
(internal), and space its objective (external) aspect. 
Otherwise expressed, time is motion, considered apart 
from space; space is motion, considered apart from time. 

Some scientists reject this ultimate analysis because 
they cannot conceive of '' motion without something 
to move," on the same principle that some religion- 
ists are unable to conceive God as the all, the divine 
principle, but insist that deity is a person which means a 
limited existence. They cannot understand that matter, 
space and infinity are terms having the same ulti- 
mate meaning. Never having analyzed our conception 
of matter and of space they fail to perceive their inter- 
dependence. They do not realize that the definitions 
of these relatively distinct terms converge in motion. 

Thus, after remaining separate throughout the history 
of thought, the categories are at last correlated. The 
term infinite has no signification beyond that of space, 
which is the most convenient name for the statical 
aspect of motion. Co-existence, extension, and unlim- 
ited, are synonyms of space. On the other hand, the 
term absolute has no signification beyond that of time. 
Sequence, invariable Auction, and unconditioned, stand 
for the dynamical aspect of motion, the most con- 
venient name for which is time. Thus it will be found 
that the categories of thought or the most general terms 
of existence can be reduced to a single principle. 



CHAPTER n 

The Pre-Socratic Period 



Xenophanes — Parmenides — Zeno of Elea — Heraclitus 
Empedocles — Democritus — Anaxagoras 



Xenophanes was the first Greek philosopher to lend a 
devotional character to thought. His contention was 
that religious sentiment may be refined by harmonizing 
our ideas with nature, or by bringing belief into accord 
with experience. The theory of divine unity or, as he 
expressed it, 'The Unity of all things" was the basis of 
his philosophy. Among the surviving fragments of his 
poem on nature is the dictum ''God is the One." 

This great teacher was born at Colophon in Ionia early 
in the sixth century B. C., and was, therefore, a contem- 
porary of Solon and Croesus. During youth he was 
banished from his native city on account of unorthodox 
beliefs, and for the remainder of a long life wandered 
over Sicily and through the cities of lower Italy, teaching 
as poet and rhapsodist. At Elea, in Southern Italy, he 
founded the school afterward so renowned. 

Xenophanes opposed the superstitious beliefs of his 
time by advocating a pure monotheism in place of the 
worship of many gods. The theologians of the ancient 
Greeks were their poets and artists. This joyous race 
held in adoration the creations of genius. No people of 
antiquity united so great a desire for knowledge with 



The Pre-Socratic Period 19 

such enthusiasm for proportion or beauty. Occupying 
on the main land the path between Europe and Asia, 
and maintaining intercourse with all parts of the Archi- 
pelago, they led a life of singular activity and freedom, 
Untrammeled by dogmatic systems, and without a 
priesthood, they evolved a flexible but deeply natural 
theogony, and as an accompaniment an unrivaled 
philosophy. 

Almost all the devotional ideas of the Greeks were as- 
sociated with the Homeric and Hesiodic divinities. Xeno- 
phanes protested against the worship of these gods, for 
although not indifferent to the beauty of the great epics, 
he resented such characterizations of divine conduct. 
This view was shared by Plato, as can be seen by the 
second and third books of the "Republic." Indeed, 
we are still admonished by the lines of Xenophanes: 

"Such things of the Gods are reported by Homer and Hesiod, 
As would be shame and abiding disgrace to any of mankind; 
Promises broken and thefts, and the one deceiving the other." 

The Eleatics conceived all phenomena as resolved 
into unity.* In the words of the founder of the school 
they worshipped the 

"One God of all things, divine and human, the greatest; 
Neither in body alike unto mortals, neither in spirit ; 
Without labor he ruleth all things by reason and insight."t 

Xenophanes considered that it was idolatrous to be- 
lieve in a multiplicity of ultimate elements just as much 
as in a multiplicity of gods. All laws, whether civil or 
natural, he regarded as forms of one universal relation, 
or, in other terms, he conceived the universe as governed, 
not by a person, but by principle, which is the highest 
conception of righteousness and power. 

*Simpl. Arist.,fol. 6. a. f Clems. Alex., Strom., V. 601. C. 



20 The Evolution of Knowledge 

PARMENIDES 

Plato says more than once that Socrates, when a boy 
at Athens, came under the influence of Parmenides. 
This renowned sage belonged to a powerful family of 
Elea. His early life was wasted in dissipation. Not 
until his friends, Aminias and Diochaetes, persuaded 
him to join the Pythagoreans did he embrace philosophy, 

Parmenides taught that to perceive truth we must 
rely on reason alone, trusting not to the senses, which 
lead to variable opinion. The division of perception 
into the elements of sentiency and thought at so early 
a period is of historic interest as foreshadowing the 
now familiar doctrine of innate ideas. 

Like Xenophanes, Parmenides advocated the doctrine 
of the eternity and the infinity of God, which he conceived, 
not as a person, but as the ultimate reality. Being, he 
contended, fills space, while the fullness of all being is 
thought or mental force. Non-being can not be, 
because nothing can come of nothing. He regarded the 
senses as the cause of error, for, as he said, they reflect 
plurality and mutability, obliging us to follow many 
impressions, concealing the One, the divine truth in its 
reality. 

To Parmenides is ascribed a treatise entitled "Nature," 
divided into two principal parts. The first dealt with 
truth disclosed by the reason which he regarded as 
absolute. The second attempted to explain the differ- 
ence between facts disclosed by the reason and those 
reached through the senses. Here we have one of the 
earliest instances of formal idealism, or the theory of 
absolute ideas. This theory was afterward developed 
by Plato, and in modern times has been revived by the 
Transcendentalists. The question of the origin of ideas 



The Pre-Socratic Period 21 

or of the relation of sense to intellect will receive atten- 
tion in the second division of the present work, which is 
devoted to psychology. 

Both Aristotle and Plato regarded Parmenides as the 
greatest of the Eleatic philosophers.* So wise and 
salutary did his code of laws prove to be that his fellow 
citizens yearly renewed a vow to abide by them. 

Considering how incomplete were their investigations 
of nature, the intuitions of the ancients were wonder- 
ful. So famihar to us are the disclosures of modern 
science that it is with difficulty that we realize how 
desolate the mind was when without them. Parmenides 
held that man originated in the lowest organic substance 
or in "terrestrial slime," and that his development has 
been an evolution of nature. He contended and with 
justice, that thought is a form of physical organization. 
In his opinion the generation of the greatest activity 
or heat in the body was connected with the highest 
reason, t The modern scientific definition of mind, as 
"that part of the sensorium capable of the greatest 
molecular activity," is in accord with these intuitions. 

The chief tenet of Parmenides was that we should not 
trust the senses but must rely upon reason alone. This 
theory, afterward exaggerated by the idealists of the 
Platonic school, did not prevent Parmenides from 
perceiving the organic nature of the intellect. He held 
that thought is composite, or made up of co-operating 
parts, reducible by analysis to the simplest organic 
reactions, a theory admirably expressed in his great 
dictum, "Such as to every man is the nature of his 
many jointed limbs, such also is the intelligence of each 
man; for it is the nature of limbs (organization) which 
* Plat. Theat., page 183, Arist., Met. 1, 5. t Diog. Laert. IX, 3. 4. 



2 2 The Evolution of Knowledge 

thinketh in men, both in one and all. . . . The 
highest degree of organization gives the highest degree 
of thought."* An advanced psychological theory as 
viewed even from this century. 

Parmenides explained the plurality of existence as a 
mere appearance. He agreed with Xenophanes that the 
unity of all phenomena, including mind, is a necessary 
inference from universal unity. 

The capital error of Parmenides was that he defined 
the ultimate reality as unmoved and unchanging; 
whereas being can be reduced by analysis to motion or 
change. 

ZENO OF ELEA 

Zeno,t who was the pupil and adopted son of Par- 
menides, did not essay such sublime heights as did his 
master, but by means of parodoxes, penetrated farther 
into the constitution of being. He silenced the critics 
of Parmenides by demonstrating the impossibility of 
reducing nature to absolute number and quantity. 

There are two theories of the universe. One views 
existence as an ultimate duality, the other as an ulti- 
mate unity. The former is the theory that mind and 
matter are absolutely distinct, the latter postulates 
their unity. Ontology began by attempting to measure 
and count existence, which resulted in the discovery 
that number and quantity are merely other names for 
time and space, the opposite aspects of motion. 

To count is to establish relations of time or sequence. 
To measure is to establish relations of space or co-ex- 
istence. Number and quantity therefore are the sub- 
jective and the objective aspects of the ultimate reality 
or unity. 

*Arist.,Afei. 111,5. t Not Zeno the Stoic. 



The Pre-Socratic Period 23 

All theories of an ultimate duality can be reduced to 
the relative distinction between time and space, the 
subjective and the objective aspects of motion. 

Although inheriting social as well as political power, 
Zeno manifested early in life a disdain for rank and 
office, preferring the seclusion necessary to thought. 
Some accounts charge him with misanthropy, but it was 
the corruption in public office that repelled him. "If the 
blame of my fellow-citizens," said he, "did not cause me 
pain, their approbation would give me no pleasure." 

The death by torture of this patriot, for complicity in 
the conspiracy against the tyrant of Elea, is still held 
as among the highest examples of civic devotion. 

Zeno was the first of the Eleatics to write in prose and 
to employ dialogue as a method of instruction. Credited 
by Aristotle with the invention of dialectics, and classed 
among the Sophists on account of the subtlety of his 
arguments, he was esteemed the greatest of Pre-Socratic 
thinkers. Believing in the unity of mind and nature, he 
taught that all phenomena, whether spiritual or mate- 
rial, were forms of one ultimate relation. The data 
necessary to complete this generalization were lacking, 
but Zeno maintained it as a necessary conclusion, the 
contrary being inconceivable. Had he known that 
number and quantity are relative, he might have suc- 
cessfully combated the idea of an ultimate plurality 
of being. He postulated the infinite divisibility of 
space, but neglected the correlative theory of the 
infinite divisibility of time, afterward propounded by 
Aristotle. Time and space are alike infinitely divisi- 
ble because continuous. Through their continuity 
they can be recognized as aspects of motion. 

By means of his parodoxes Zeno supported the theory 



24 The Evolution of Knowledge 

of divine unity propounded by his master, Parmenides. 
These famous paradoxes gave a powerful impetus to 
the discussion of the problem of motion. 

His argument against the possibility of one body 
passing another in space, as presented in the imaginary 
race between Achilles and the tortoise, was until recent 
times considered unanswerable.* The difficulty of this 
problem arises from the neglect of the time consumed 
in the progress of the race. It is true that the initial 
space between the contestants can be indefinitely 
divided, but where is the time to be had for this endless 
process? Refusing to wait for infinite subdivisions of the 
intervening space the swifter of foot moves in triumph 
past his opponent. 

Zeno believed that motion exists only in appearance. 
He contended that every object filling a space equal to 
its size is at any given moment at rest in that space, as 
an arrow flying through the air is at each moment at 
rest in each successive space occupied.! This theory is 
disposed of by the discovery that there is no absolute 
rest. Of course space is here reduced to its most minute 
particles, and therefore Zeno concluded that motion is 
not, but is only an appearance or a number of spaces in 
which the object is momentarily at rest. 

If it be assumed that matter and space are one, the 
question of motion is simplified. What Zeno tried to 
prove was that a body in motion never moves away 
from the position that it occupies, which is equivalent 
to saying that a thing cannot move away from itself, a 
postulate so sensible, that we do not wonder at the force 
with which it struck the ancients. If matter and space 
are one, the motion of an object is in a sense the object 

* "Bayle's Dictionary of the Sciences." t Diog. Laert. IX, 5, 8. 



The Pre-Socratic Period 25 

itself. There is no hard and fast line between its sub- 
stance and its extension nor between its molecular and 
its molar action. There is no essence more real than 
activity, which implies substance as well as extension. 
It is through their activity that all things have their 
being. 

Since mental action is indissolubly connected with 
nature, that is to say, since it is the function of an 
organism, it is for the most part unconscious. The con- 
ditions of thought can be recognized in every living 
being, for they are a form of the adjustment of organism 
and environment. The bee is a practical geometrician. 
Although without language, and therefore incapable of 
making extended generalizations, it displays the instinct 
of calculation, or the faculty of adjusting means to an 
end. For want of words its thoughts and actions are 
indistinguishable; they are alike an expression of the 
necessities of its existence. In the construction of its 
cell the bee employs the best angle for saving space and 
securing strength, because it has inherited a nervous 
structure embodying the habits of its race. The em- 
ployment of this best adapted angle may be viewed 
either as an instance of the Darwinian theory of the 
"survival of the fittest" or of Spencer's theory of the 
"direct adaptation of organism and environment." 
From the point of view of either theory, however, it is 
undeniable that the actions of the bee are determined 
by the necessities of its existence which have become 
latent in its structure. The formation of the proper 
angle for its cell is the logical expression of its molecular 
and mechanical constitution. As Parmenides said, "It 
is the nature of limbs (organization) that thinketh in 
men, both in one and all." 



26 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Thus it is evident that there is no absolute difference 
between intelHgence and other forms of action. Organic 
action produces our reasoning faculties, our apprecia- 
tion of truth. So deeply practical is intelligence that 
it is now conceded that the only justification of thought 
is the illumination of conduct. The degree of com- 
plexity in structure is the only difference between 
gravitation and reason. 

What surprises us in Zeno is the facility with which 
he followed out the intricacies of introspection. Such 
distinctions as he made were possible only in a commu- 
nity familiar with all the artifices of dialectical argument. 
His reasoning is so profound that it will always confuse 
those who have not discerned the organic nature of mind. 

HERACLITUS 

Heraclitus, so widely known as "the weeping philoso- 
pher/' is coupled in fable with Democritus, to whom 
the follies of mankind were an unfailing source of 
amusement: — 

"One pitied, one condemned the woeful times; 
One laughed at follies, and one wept o'er crimes." 

These characterizations, although conceded to be 
mythical, are not without foundation in fact. 

Heraclitus was born at Ephesus about 503 B. C. 
Melancholy and haughty of temperament, he held in 
contempt the ordinary pursuits of men. The legend 
that he was too proud to accept the office tendered by 
his native city, ascribes his refusal to an aversion for 
the society of politicians. 

The following letter to Darius, in reply to an invita- 
tion to visit the Persian Court, throws light upon the 
character of the Philosopher : 



The Pre-Socratic Period 27 

"Heraclitus of Ephesus to the King Darius, Son oj Hystaspes, 

health: 

"All men are far removed from truth and justice. They are 
given to folly which leads them to covetousness and vain ambi- 
tion. I, however, forgetting all their unworthiness, shunning 
satiety and wishing to avoid envy and all appearance of arro- 
gance, can never go to Persia. Content with a little, all my 
desires are gratified."* 

In opposition to the mathematical school, which held 
that reason is the origin of truth, and that the senses are 
the source of all uncertainties, Heraclitus taught that we 
imbibe all knowledge through the organs of sense. 
Only the ill-educated sense gives false impressions. 

With Heraclitus, as well as with Parmenides, the 
question was the origin of truth or reality. From 
remotest antiquity thinkers upon this subject are 
divided under two sects, those who, with Parmenides, 
lean toward idealism, or the theory that mind is the 
source of truth, and those who hold Mdth Heraclitus, 
that all knowledge is derived through the senses or 
from nature. 

The nature of mind can be discerned only through the 
identification of subject and object. From these op- 
posite points of view are evolved the opposite aspects 
of general existence known as time and space. 

In ancient Greece the questions of ontology were de- 
bated substantially as at the present time, excepting 
that the ancients were perforce more original than 
we are. They did not find every variety of metaphys- 
ical opinion ready-made at hand. Such a redundency 
of exploited theories makes the modern metaphysician 
seem a delver in an exhausted soil. Nor can we 
complain of this opinion concerning metaphysicians 
* Diog. Laert. Bk. IX. Life of Heraclitus. 



28 The Evolution of Knowledge 

when we consider that the current understanding of 
consciousness at the present time shows no appreciable 
advance beyond that of the Aristotehan epoch. Some 
modern writers hold with Herbert Spencer that meta- 
physics is an effete science. These very writers, how- 
ever, are compelled to take up the question of the 
relation of subject and object as the only means of 
solving the problem of mind. 

By reducing both mind and matter to the "persist- 
ence of force," Spencer identified subject and object 
with nature. But because he failed to identify the 
"persistence of force" with motion he was driven to 
the conclusion that time and space, which are the sub- 
jective and objective aspects of motion, are inconceiv- 
able or unknowable. 

Reasoning intuitively that heat is a form of motion, 
Heraclitus conceived the human mind, as a portion 
of that universal energy which he called the soul. It 
was, therefore, an emanation of infmite reason or of fire. 
The individual, being only a part of the whole, must 
necessarily be imperfect and transient. Hence the ag- 
gregate called Society approaches nearer to the truth, 
just as many parts approach nearer to the whole than 
one part. The intelligence of society which is higher 
than that of the individual finds expression in that or- 
ganic growth called language, which is the first con- 
dition of civiUzation. 

To Heraclitus fire or heat was God, or the One from 
which all things emanate and to which all finally return. 
Life he conceived as a constant change, all things fol- 
lowing one another in a perpetual flux and reflux; the 
quicker and fuller the motion the higher and fuller the 
form of existence. 



The Pre-Socratic Period 29 

Thus it appears that Heraclitus, as well as other Pre- 
Socratic thinkers, conceived both life and knowledge as 
forms of motion. In their opinion the infinite and eternal 
energy tends toward an end which they viewed as a tran- 
sition. This vital energy or ceaseless change they in- 
terpreted as phenomena, and they consequently denied 
that there is absolute rest. Since the harmony of the 
world is evolved from its ever-conflicting impulses, they 
regarded consciousness itself as a system of highly 
co-ordinated changes. It is scarcely necessary to say 
that these conclusions are in harmony with the results 
of the latest psychological research. 

EMPEDOCLES 

Empedocles, a native of Agrigentum in Sicily, belonged 
to the fifth century, B. C, during which his native city 
rose to splendor as the rival of Syracuse. A member 
of the governing class, he further increased his influence 
by espousing the cause of the people. His father, Meton, 
had been leader of the Agrigentum democracy. The 
son, however, inclining more to religion than to poli- 
tics, became famous as a prophet, a physician and 
a worker of miracles. So great was his love of distinc- 
tion that he permitted a belief in his divinity. Arrayed 
in gorgeous robes, with golden girdle and the Delphic 
crown, he surrounded himself with a train of courtly 
attendants. Some of his biographers calmly assert that 
he controlled the winds and could call the dead to life. 
It can be discerned, even through the glamour of fable, 
that he possessed a profound knowledge of nature, and 
that he was disinterested and generous. He declined 
the government of Agrigentum, when tendered by the 
citizens, and it is said that he employed his wealth in 



30 The Evolution of Knowledge 

bestowing dowries upon young girls so that they might 
marry men of rank. 

The mystic theology of Empedocles is allied to the 
Orphic-Pythagorean doctrines. Alcidemas called him 
a disciple of Parmenides. Like Leucippus, he ex- 
plained genesis as a combination, and decay as a sepa- 
ration, of the elements foreshadowing the atomic 
theory of the universe. The primordial substances he 
conceived as related elements, qualitatively distinct 
and quantitatively divisible. 

In his didactic poem '' On Nature," Empedocles posits 
as the origin of all things the four elements, earth, water, 
air, and fire, to which he adds love and hate as respec- 
tively the uniting and separating forces. In his 
opinion, therefore, the formative periods of nature 
could be simulated by a conflict of emotions. 

To present the operations of nature in terms of 
emotion is to follow to its logical consequence the theory 
of idealism. Any theory that represents individual 
sentiment or thought as universal is a species of ideal- 
ism, for it disregards the limits of organic life, or, in 
other terms, it attempts the impossibility of transcend- 
ing nature. 

DEMOCRITUS 

The atomic theory founded by Leucippus, a contem- 
porary of Empedocles, is still the faith of the scientific 
world. The modern chemist speaks of absolute atoms 
with ingenuous confidence. His science is founded 
on the relations of substances, but he forgets that all sub- 
stances are relative. Oblivious that structure and func- 
tion are only other words for quantity and quality, he 
insists that the latter are absolute. A plurality of 



The Pre-Socratic Period 31 

immutable (or absolute) substances cannot be recon- 
ciled with the principle of evolution or of universal 
change. 

Democritus, who was a contemporary of Plato and a 
pupil of Leucippus, first applied the atomic theory to 
natural science by postulating an ultimate plurality, or a 
variety of unchangeable substances. This theory im- 
plies that matter is composed of unchangeable particles, 
having an absolute void in which to move. The modern 
physicist is convinced that there is no absolute vacuum, 
and that, since matter is a form of motion, there is no 
absolute rest. It is true that the chemical elements 
have not been as yet fully correlated, but all competent 
authorities are now convinced that they are constant 
types of energy or relatively fixed forms of motion. 

By some historians Democritus is classed with the 
lonians. Hegel refers to him as the successor of Hera- 
clitus, while Ritter places him with the Sophists. The 
attempt of this great thinker to apply the atomic theory 
of the universe to the natural science of his time is not 
to be judged by modern standards. How could he have 
formed a conception of nature such as is possible to us 
who are able to generalize all phenomena, cosmical and 
social, recognizing even mind and duty as forms of 
motion? How could Democritus have known that light 
and radiant heat are different aspects of one energy; 
that the ray of light reaching us from the farthest star is 
not a fluid passing from space to space, but a definite 
agitation of infinite extension, proving that the differ- 
ence between resistance and non-resistance, or between 
matter and space, is only relative? How could he have 
known that all words signifying unlimited, such as 
infinite, co-existence, extension, or matter considered 



32 The Evolution of Knowledge 

apart from force, are simply outgrowths of the concep- 
tion of space, meaning nothing more than is imphed in 
the objective aspect of motion? Or, how could he have 
known that all words meaning unconditioned, such as 
absolute, sequence (or force considered apart from 
matter), are conceptions of time, and that they signify- 
nothing more than is given in the subjective aspect of 
motion. 

This deepest of truths, the idea of three in one, or of 
existence viewed from its subjective and its objective 
aspects, was dimly present in the minds of the earhest 
thinkers. All cosmologies as well as all theologies 
present more or less distinctly this fundamental truth. 
It is the unification of knowledge, or the co-ordination 
of time and space as terms of the ultimate relation. 

Democritus declared that being consists of an infinite 
number of minute invisible bodies moving in the void. 
These were the primary elements, all production being 
caused by a change of relation among them. Non- 
being, or an absolute void, he maintained, is a necessary 
environment of these ultimate particles, for, absolute 
in size, they must occupy absolute space. Motion he 
accepted as something eternal but did not attempt to 
explain it. He said that atoms exist because they are 
indivisible. All nature consists of atoms and the void.* 

Although impossible to sustain, this theory of Demo- 
critus was indeed profound. He assumed that every 
substance perceptible to the senses is divisible, change- 
able and of determinate quality. In his opinion, magni- 
tude directly involves weight, for weight belongs to 
every mass. According to his theory, therefore, matter 
being homogeneous, weight must belong equally to all 

* Simpl. Phys. 1. 2. 5. r. Simpl. Phys. Ill, 4. 106. v. 



The Pre-Socratic Period ^;^ 

bodies. That is to say, all bodies of the same mass are 
of the same weight. 

Briefly stated, the theory of Democritus is that the 
weight of particular bodies is exclusively conditioned by 
their masses and corresponds entirely therewith. When 
a large body appears to be lighter than a smaller one, it 
is because it contains more empty space, and therefore 
is really less in mass than the other. Thus, according 
to Democritus, atoms have weight, and an equal specific 
weight; for they must differ in magnitude in the same 
ratio as in weight. 

It is difficult to perceive what progress the modern 
physicist, who postulates absolute quantity and quality, 
has made beyond this belief of Democritus. 

The theory of ultimate particles of absolute size differs 
from that of evolution in the same manner that 
the arithmetical differs from the geometrical method 
of measurement. The first exact notions of quantity 
were founded on the consideration of number, because 
concrete quantities are measured and calculated by the 
help of numbers, but number is discontinuous, whereas 
the geometrical method of measurement represents the 
continuity of Nature. Both spectrum and mental analy- 
sis prove that quantity and quality are not absolute 
but relative, or in other terms all structure and func- 
tion are types of energy or forms of motion. 

ANAXAGORAS 

The age of Pericles had now dawned. Great commer- 
cial and military activity marked the approaching 
zenith of Athenian power. In ancient Greece the 
highest development of art and letters was reached 
just as the State began its decline. This brilliant period 



34 The Evolution of Knowledge 

was ushered in by a reign of doubt ensuing upon the 
efforts of the Pre-Socratic thinkers to solve the problems 
of existence. Philosophy, discouraged, had fallen into 
a profound skepticism from which, however, it was 
soon to be aroused by a new era of investigation. 

Should the reader complain of the monotony of onto- 
logical inquiry, he will do well to recall how little the 
thinkers of only a generation ago expected from investi- 
gations into the nature of being. The application of the 
theory of evolution to the problem of existence now 
promises definite results; but it is only a generation 
since Lewes wrote: "Philosophy has ever been in 
movement, but the movement has been circular; and 
this fact is thrown into stronger relief by contrast with 
the linear progress of science. There is not a fact dis- 
covered but has its bearings upon the whole body of 
science; not a mechanical improvement in the construc- 
tion of instruments but opens fresh sources of discovery. 
Onward and forever onward, mightier and forever 
mightier, rolls the wondrous tide of discovery, and the 
'thoughts of men are widened by the process of the suns.' 
While the first principles of philosophy are to this day 
as much a matter of dispute as they were two thousand 
years ago, the first principles of science are securely 
established, and form the guiding lights of European 
progress. Precisely the same questions are agitated in 
Germany at the present moment as were agitated in 
ancient Greece; and with no more certain methods of 
solving them, with no nearer hopes of ultimate suc- 
cess."* 

The first period of Greek philosophy was brought to a 
close by Anaxagoras. After a long struggle against the 
* See Introduction to his "History of Philosophy." 



The Pre-Socratic Period 35 

prejudices of the people, this teacher estabhshed at 
Athens a revival of the Ionian school of thought which he 
expounded as follows : "The Greeks are wrong regarding 
the beginning and end of things, for nothing comes into 
being or is destroyed but is formed in combination or 
through separation by existing forces. So that they 
might more rightly call the coming into existence 
'becoming combined/ and the being destroyed 'becom- 
ing separate.' " This idea recalls Spencer's definition of 
evolution, "The progress from the simple, indefinite and 
homogeneous to the complex, definite and heterogen- 
eous." 

The nous of Anaxagoras is emplo5''ed as the creative 
principle or ultimate fact of both mind and nature. 
The mistake which the critics of this system generally 
make is to imagine that this nous is similar to human 
intelligence. Anaxagoras meant by it the ultimate 
relation of which intelligence is only a form. He con- 
ceived the nous as the order of the universe, and iden- 
tified it with universal change. The rarest and pur- 
est of all things, it was above the confusion of pheno- 
mena, its characteristics being singleness, power and 
life. Fate and chance he rejected as empty words. 

Anaxagoras, who was named with distinction among 
the most ancient mathematicians and astronomers, de- 
voted himself to science to the neglect of his property. 
A short time before the Peloponnesian war, he was 
accused by his enemies of impiety, and was tried and 
condemned to banishment. Far advanced in years. 
he retired to Lampsacus where, upon his death, which 
occurred about the time of the birth of Plato, the 
public authorities erected to his memory a sepulchre 
with the inscription: 



36 The Evolution of Knowledge 

"This tomb great Anaxagoras confines, 
Whose mind explored the heavenly paths of truth."* 

Democritus, who was the chief advocate of the atomic 
theory, found in Anaxagoras an invincible opponent. 
An unf aihng source of contention between these thinkers 
was the question of the constitution of bodies. 

The ancient atomists reasoned that matter is com- 
posed of ultimate particles of unchangeable weight and 
extension. Twenty-five centuries later Boscovich, great- 
est among modern expounders of monadism, attributed 
to atoms unchanging weight and extension, but after- 
ward, in order to avoid inconsistency, affirmed that each 
atom has of itself no extension or mass, but is a geometri- 
cal centre of force which is an acknowledgment that 
motion is ultimate. 

An ultimate analysis demonstrates that force, which 
is a synonym of motion, implies both space and time. 
The difficulty with the atomists, ancient and modern, is 
that they endeavor to express the nature of substance 
in numerical instead of in geometrical terms, the former 
indicating discontinuous quantities, while the latter 
denote the continuity of nature. 

* Diog. Laert., 11,3, 10. 



CHAPTER III 
The Climax of Greek Thought 



The Sophists— Socrates — Plato 



Among the greatest of ancient Greeks were Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle, Just before their time a feeling 
of doubt gained possession of the Hellenic mind; that 
is to say, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the 
results of philosophy as then formulated. The leaders 
of this revolt were known as the Sophists. Their ad- 
vent marked the decline, under the influence of skepti- 
cism, of the first schools of thought. 

The supremacy attained by the Sophists as educators 
fills an interval of more than a century from the close 
of the Pre-Socratic era to the establishment of the great 
Athenian schools beginning with the Academy. The 
aim of the Sophists was to promote liberal education. 
Neglecting philosophy and the arts, they prepared the 
student for public life, the career of the Athenian cit- 
izen being always civic. The instruction given by these 
teachers, therefore, dealt principally with politics, in- 
eluding controversial rhetoric and oratory. 

Even the greatest of the Sophists failed to revive the 
declining interest in metaphysics. Protagoras, Gor- 
gias and Isocrates contributed little to the solution of 



38 The Evolution of Knowledge 

the fundamental questions of existence, and even Soc- 
rates, although his theories were sublime in an ethical 
sense, remained silent as to the nature of being. The 
metaphysical specula^tions of the Sophists consisted 
chiefly of a comparison of the various schools of thought 
made with the hope of harmonizing them, a method 
afterwards known as Eclecticism. Thus Greece awaited 
the genius of Plato, and of Aristotle, to restore to ontol- 
ogy its rightful sway. 

Protagoras, the most accomplished of the Sophists, 
was born at Abdera early in the Fifth Century B. C. 
He insisted that thought was derived from, and limited 
by, sensation, which, being relative, is imperfect. The 
effect of this doctrine upon Protagoras was outright 
skepticism.* His dictum, "Each man is the measure of 
all things,'' implied that there was no criterion of truth, 
all knowledge consisting, according to his view, of un- 
verifiable opinion. 

"Matter," said Protagoras, "is in a state of perpetual 
flux, of accretion and loss, and the senses are also con- 
stantly changing, both according to age and health. The 
inward nature of all phenomena is inherent in matter. 
Whatever matter may be in itself, it is to each man only 
what it appears. For men have at different times dif- 
ferent perceptions, according to the changes in their con- 
ditions. The man who is in a healthy state perceives 
those things in nature which can be perceived in a 
healthy state ; those who are in bad health perceive those 
things which can be perceived in an imhealthy con- 
dition. And in regard to the aged, and whether asleep 
or awake, the same fact holds true. Therefore, it rC' 

* Diog. Laert. IX., 51. 



The Climax of Greek Thought 39 

suits from this, that man is the criterion of things 
which exist, for all things which are perceived by man 
exist, and the things which are perceived by no man 
do not exist."* 

We shall not readily find a more definite version of 
idealism than this theory of Protagoras. How appalling 
is the doctrine that existence in general is only a con- 
sequence of individual perception. Yet in deriving 
thought from sensation, Protagoras foreshadowed the 
greatest achievement of modern psychology, namely, 
the demonstration of the physical basis of mind. This 
demonstration leads to the conclusion that mind is a 
form of motion. 

The speech of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias shows what 
a poor opinion the Sophists had of philosophy. 

" Philosophy," says Callicles, " is an elegant accomplish- 
ment if one pursues it moderately and at the proper age ; 
but if one continues it longer it is ruin. Even if a man 
has good powers, be he ever so highly gifted, still, if he 
philosophize to an advanced period of life, it is impossible 
for him to be versed in those accomplishments which every 
gentleman, every man of consideration, should possess. He 
remains inexperienced in the laws of the state and in the lan- 
guage which ought to be used in the dealings of men with 
men, whether private or public, and utterly ignorant of 
worldly pleasures and devices, and of human character in gen- 
eral. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves 
to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I suppose men of 
the world are when they are admitted to your reunions or the 
discussions which there take place. The true principle is, I 
think, to unite them. It is good to have just such a tinc- 
ture of philosophy as may serve the ends of a liberal training, 
and it is, therefore, no discredit to a young man to philoso- 
phize ; but, when one is more advanced in years the thing be- 

* Sect. Emp. Pyrrhon Hopy., i., 32. (211-219.) 



40 The Evolution of Knowledge 

comes ridiculous. * * * And if he continue the study in 
later life, I think he ought to be flogged." 

Although failing to develop the full meaning of 
skepticism, the Sophists were deeply influenced by the 
doctrine. Having lost faith in the power of man to 
comprehend nature^, they centered their attention on the 
problems of practical life. 

The Skeptics, as well as the Sophists, were convinced 
of the unreliability of all knowledge, but the former de- 
veloped the doctrine of skepticism to its full significance, 
while the latter turned from abstract speculation to prac- 
tical education. 

Plato represents Protagoras as arguing that the wise 
man is the physician of the soul. Since all thoughts 
have the same measure of truth, he cannot, indeed, 
induct truer thoughts into the mind, but he can induct 
better and more profitable ones. "Thus he may heal the 
soul not merely of individuals but also of states, since 
by the power of oratory he may introduce good and 
useful sentiments and opinions in the place of the base 
and the harmful."* 

With so much bitterness were the Sophists attacked 
by Plato and his followers, that in modern times de- 
fenders, such as Grote and Lewes, have come to their 
rescue. jThe criticisms made by Socrates,f however, 
were free'^from the party spirit characterizing the at- 
tacks of the Platonists. 

By the practice of their profession the Sophists ac- 
quired both wealth and influence. The grievance of 
Plato against them was that they sought knowledge, not 
for its own sake, but as a matter of expediency, and 

* Theaet., 167. f See Xenophon. 



The Climax of Greek Thought 41 

hence were not to be regarded as philosophers. Plato 
believed that thought was the chief end of life. He op- 
posed the Sophistical doctrine of expediency because he 
considered ideas as the chief object of worship. The 
question arises whether ideas are to be venerated for 
their own sake^ or only as a means to an end. The re- 
ply to this question is the axiom that "the only justifica- 
tion of thought is the illumination of conduct." 

According to their adversaries, the Sophists held that 
the criterion of right is personal good. They were charged 
with carrying this rule of expediency to such ex- 
tremes as to make all law and justice yield to individual 
interest. The adversaries of the Sophists, however, 
overlooked the fact that in the last analysis private and 
public rights are one, because conventions or laws are 
the function of necessary conditions. In other words, 
if we take a wide view of life individual interests become 
merged with those of humanity. 

Under the training of the Sophists, disputation be- 
came an important art. Moved by their own eloquence 
they doubtless occasionally made the worse cause appear 
the better ; but to say that much of the immorality of the 
time was attributable to their teachings is beyond reason. 

In Greece at this time, undeniably, egotism reigned 
supreme. State trampled upon state. Having lost all 
respect for law, the people were not slow in violating 
private as well as public rights. The litigious nature 
of the Greeks, their excessive love of law-suits, led them 
to place the highest value upon oratory. Skill in argu- 
ment became a necessity, for the citizen had to appear 
before the tribunals of justice to plead his own cause. 
The art of disputation thus became the stepping-stone to 



42 The Evolution of Knowledge 

all manner of advancement. There is no doubt of our 
indebtedness to the Sophists. As Lewes says, they 
proved that if forensic oratory does at times make the 
worse cause appear the better, it also has the power of 
showing the good in all its strength. 

SOCRATES 

ISTo more impressive event is recorded in history than 
the trial and death of Socrates. Born about 470 B. C, 
this teacher was identified with the most illustrious 
period of Hellenic development. The impairment of 
manhood and patriotism marking the decline of the 
Athenian power seemed to call him into being. 

Modern psychology proves that thought is an activity, 
not wholly of the individual but also of society. We 
live in an atmosphere of language charged with thought. 
Prophecy is the intelligence of society reflected in some 
individual. In the case of moralists or prophets, such 
as Socrates, that which enraptures others is not a super- 
natural power of divination, but the command of truth 
expressed in their lives. Their powers of prediction are 
wholly natural. Living in harmony with their environ- 
ment, they perceive intuitively the underlying prin- 
ciples of existence, and apply them to the future. Feel- 
ing and thinking more deeply than others, they have a 
wider view of destiny. 

We can judge the future only by the past. Our most 
reliable conjecture is the voice of experience. What, 
then, may be said of prophecy contradicting all experi- 
ence ? To be rational, language must voice possibilities, 
because every thought is subordinate to the broad gener- 
alization that life is the individual form of a universal 



The Climax of Greek Thought 43 

principle without beginning or end. To be individual- 
ized this principle must be organized. 

The science of organic life known as Biology is grad- 
ually leading us to the conclusion that since organism 
implies limits, there can be no limitless personal 
existence. Individual life is a span reaching from birth 
to death. To add another life is to provide another 
birth and complete it with another death. Under the 
title of the self-contradictory, therefore, must fall all 
prophecies of an unlimited personalit}^, because they 
ignore the conditions of life. Immortality, or continuous 
life, is a chain composed of individual links. It is the 
race passing through its generations. To become a 
moral aspiration the hope of immortality must conform 
to divine laws as expressed in the conditions of in- 
dividuality. 

Plato's account of the faith of Socrates constitutes one 
of the earliest attempts to establish a philosophical basis 
for the belief in immortality or in an unconditioned 
existence. All civilized nations, as well as almost 
all savages, believe in a limitless individual life. This 
faith is held by almost all systems of religion and of 
thought. The purification of language, resulting from an 
increased definiteness in the use of general terms, sub- 
jects this faith to a higher and higher discipline. Since 
it has been discovered that individuality is only another 
name for organism, that is to say that psj^chical and 
physical life are inseparable, both being the func- 
tion of a limiting membrane, the theory of personal 
immortality is becoming less and less tenable. 

Closely allied to the theory of a limitless personal 
futurity is that of a design in nature, known as the doc- 



44 The Evolution of Knowledge 

trine of teleology or a providential shaping of ends. 
These beliefs, logically inseparable, vere entertained by 
the great moralist of ancient Greece, as represented in 
the Platonic dialogues. 

If it is true that we must die, may not a knowledge 
of the fact prove beneficial? There can be no higher 
virtue than courage, no more sublime trait of character 
than the grace of calmly meeting the inevitable. Noth- 
ing can so refine the S3rmpathies as a comprehension of 
the limits of personality. An appreciation of the boun- 
daries of individual life gives to opportunity a higher 
value; to duty a deeper meaning. 

Why should not the tragedy of the cross which has 
so long insi^ired us receive its true interpretation? The 
essence of salvation is not to die but to live for others, 
for that is the only way open to all of giving our 
lives for our fellow men. 

Social organization is as yet too feeble to allow the 
masses to recognize the limitations of individuality. The 
great majority of thinking beings instinctively avoid this 
question because it is so much easier to hope for another 
life than to make the one we have sublime. 

The hope of personal immortality is the unenlightened 
instinct of self-preservation. To enlighten this instinct 
is to reveal the highest meaning of duty, for righteous- 
ness signifies self-preservation, providing, always, the term 
self is enlarged until it embraces humanity. If the high- 
est meaning of good is the welfare of the race, an enlight- 
ened and a righteous hope of immortality will find its 
realization in the future of humanity. There is no great- 
er unselfishness than submission to divine laws. There 
can be no higher religion than trust in the order of nature. 



The Climax of Greek Thought 45 

As represented in the Platonic dialogues, there- 
fore, Socrates was the first great thinker to 
give to the belief in immortality a systematic basis.* 
The arguments thus adduced in support of a 
future life and an over-ruling Providence still 
inspire writers on natural theology. These ar- 
guments center in the principle that righteousness is 
the will of an infinite ruling power. The highest inter- 
pretation of the Platonic theory of immortality is that all 
human beings partake of eternal life to the extent of 
their obedience to an over-ruling Providence. But, ac- 
cording to Plato, divinity is the order of nature, and 
Justice is a form of this universal harmony. Hence 
righteousness is obedience to the infinite and the eternal 
life, which, however, according to Plato, is a principle, 
not a person ; a method of action, not an individual. 

In the mind of Socrates devout ideas were constantly 
uppermost. "Do you not recognize," said he, "the fact 
that the oldest and wisest of human communities both of 
cities and nations, are the most God-worshiping, and that 
men at the most reflective period of their lives are the 
most religious ?"t "Consider, too, my friend," he con- 
tinued, "that your soul, existing within your body, 
orders the latter according to its own will; so that you 
are bound to believe that the intelligence which subsists 
in each object directs that object agreeably to itself, and 
you must not imagine that while your vision is capable 
of ranging over a distance of many furlongs, the eye 
of the Deity is unable to survey the universe at a glance. 

* There are grave doubts that the real Socrates believed in the 
immortality of the soul. 

t Xenophon Mem., Bk. I., eh. 4, sec. 16. 



46 The Evolution of Knowledge 

You may thus recognize the fact that the nature of the 
Deity is so stupendously constituted as to be able to 
see all things, and to be present everywhere, and to 
take cognizance of everything at the same time." 

The aim of Socrates was the enlightenment of youth. 
He saw that intellectual progress depended chiefly upon 
the rising generation, because of its freedom from prej- 
udice. In his opinion there was more honor in making 
wise and virtuous citizens than in obtaining for one's 
self even the greatest political power. Although willing 
to help others to acquire knowledge, he held that the 
learner miist conquer the truth for himself. The key 
to his philosophy was the injunction of the Delphic God, 
"know thyself." Although counted among the Sophists, 
he strenuously opposed their tenet that there is no re- 
liable knowledge, no criterion of truth. 

By insisting upon clear definitions, Socrates did much 
toward establishing a true psychology. It was in this 
manner that he laid the foundations of that logical 
science afterward so highly developed by Aristotle. One 
cannot proceed to any great lengths in reasoning with- 
out the aid of naming or classification. Socrates' 
method was to require his pupils to classify principles. 
Thus he was not only a logician, but a moralist, for he 
ever sought to establish clearer conceptions of duty. 
Some of his biographers assert that ho produced a revo- 
lution in thought, initiated the inductive method, and 
founded Greek Philosophy. Although one of the subtlest 
of disputants, he was not a metaphysician. Phil- 
osophy had not as yet acquired a vocabulary 
capable of isolating metaphysics. Such a rigorous 
isolation as Socrates would have demanded was at 



The Climax of Greek Thought 47 

that time out of the question. Selecting for his topics 
the experiences of daily life, he explained with great 
distinctness the motives of conduct. If he failed to dis- 
tinguish the human from the divine, he at least saw 
that virtue means human life, or in other words, that 
Justice is the social aspect of universal order. This 
truth he demonstrated by identifying virtue with knowl- 
edge. 

Socrates refused to exchange the world of facts for 
that of words. To this extent he avoided the entangle- 
ments of the metaphysicians. It is true that he failed to 
grasp the interdependence of mind and matter in the 
fullness with which it can be understood to-day, for the 
discovery of this identity of function and structure is 
the greatest result of modern science. On the contrary, 
recognizing change as the rule of nature, he vainly 
sought for an unchanging existence, or for "the im- 
mutable one." He never declared, however, that the 
immutable one was an inherent quality of ideas rather 
than of objects. This unwarranted assumption was 
made by his disciple, Plato, who built upon it a system 
from which modern idealism has sprung, 

PLATO 

The metaphysic of Plato is an attempt to define an 
''unchanging existence" or a ''divine essence" more real 
than nature. 

The Pre-Socratic thinkers had already indicated a 
center of reality, a point where all analysis ends and all 
synthesis begins. From the theory of Parmenides, which 
demarcated the perception of the senses from that of 
the reason, Plato evolved a theory of "an unchanging 
existence," which he called ideas. 



48 The Evolution of Knowledge. 

The prevalent notion concerning Plato is that he was 
visionary. Although it is undeniable that the theory 
of absolute subjectivity presides over all his writings, 
we will look in vain for a more rigorous logician, or a 
more devoted student of the mind. 

In expounding the thought of Socrates, Plato dealt 
with both psychological and ethical problems, but ever 
in that mystical vein which provoked from Aristotle 
in reply, the Ethics and the Politics. 

Plato was born at ^gina (429 b. c.) during the Pelo- 
ponnesian war, and about the time of the death of 
Pericles. The Greeks held that body and mind should 
be developed together. The education of Plato em- 
braced athletics as well as dialectics. In early youth 
he was instructed in music and poetry, but at the age of 
twenty, becoming acquainted with Socrates, everything 
was abandoned for the profounder problems of the 
mind. 

This remarkable scholar was much given to the con- 
templation of nature. Skepticism, that fever of the 
age, was not without effect upon him, but there came 
with doubt the craving for belief. Under the guid- 
ance of his beloved master, the life-long quest for truth 
was begun. 

At the trial of Socrates, Plato sought to defend the 
accused before the court. Failing in this he offered a 
sum sufficient to redeem the life of his friend, but 
Socrates disdained to evade the process of the law. 

The resort of Plato and his pupils was a public gar- 
den called the Academia,* in the neighborhood of 
Athens. Here the ideas were promulgated which still 

* Diog. Laert. III., 1, 5. 



The Climax of Greek Thought 49 

obtain at almost every seat of learning in Christendom. 
It will be of interest, therefore, to discover the subtle 
error underlying the reasoning of this greatest of an- 
cient dialecticians. 

The story so widely circulated that there was an in- 
scription over the door of the academy, "Let none but 
Geometricians enter here," is supposed to have origi- 
nated in the purely argumentative nature of the dis- 
courses. Objections have been made to the authenticity 
of this story on the ground that Plato regarded mathe- 
matics as distinct from philosophy, although it is well 
known that he used mathematics in philosophy. Plato 
made no attempt, however, to harmonize poetry with 
abstract thought. Poets he held to be inspired mad men, 
not responsible for the truth that fell from their lips.* 

During a long life of thought, changes of opinion are 
inevitable. Some writers maintain that in his old age 
Plato rejected the greatest idea of Socrates, which was 
the identification of virtue and knowledge, and of vice 
and ignorance. 

Like Socrates, Plato remained in doubt concerning 
the certainty of knowledge. His life was devoted to the 
search for the ultimate truth, but without professing to 
have found it. 

Socrates relied on the inductive method, and on defi- 
nitions, but these did not satisfy Plato, who found it 
necessary to go still further and to insist upon analysis 
as a philosophic process. It was impossible to under- 
stand the whole without first understanding the parts, 
or, as he expressed it, "seeing the one in the many.^f 

Long before the time of Plato, the idea had become 

* Phaeder, 245. f Phile. in Farm. 1 37 and following. 



5o The Evolution of Knowledge 

prevalent that sense-perception is unreliable, because its 
object is the changeable, or phenomena. Heraclitus had 
already taught that reality signifies change, which can 
only mean that the cause sought as the underlying fact 
of being is motion.* In "transitory phenomena" Plato 
did not perceive true existence, but only its image. He 
held, and with justice, that to know "real existence" 
one must seek unity in variety, or the one in the many. 

During the summer of 1881, I visited, at Concord, 
Massachusetts, a School of Philosophy, founded upon 
the principles of Transcendentalism. The first lecture 
attended was upon the idealism of Plato, and it was 
given in the tone of a disciple of that master. One of 
the illustrations used, as a presentation of the Platonic 
reasoning, was that "the St, Louis Bridge is not in 
reality the structure that spans the Mississippi; the 
real bridge is the idea of the structure existing in the 
mind of the engineer." 

Here is Plato's answer to Diogenes, who thought he 
could demolish the theory of idealism by saying, "I see 
indeed a table, but I see no idea of a table." Plato 
replied, "because you see with your eyes and not with 
your reason."t Twenty-four centuries after this reply 
was made, the followers of Plato still insist that the 
perception of the senses is unreal, the only reality being 
the perception of the reason. 

Plato and his modern disciples agree that phenomena, 
the changing or the unreal, is perceived by the senses, 
and that noumena, the unchanging or the real, is per- 
ceived by the reason. 

Plato often asserts that human knowledge is neces- 

* Heraclitus. t Diog. Laert. VI., 2, G. 



The Climax of Greek Thought 51 

sarily imperfect: "Sensation troubles the intellectual 
eye; only when the soul is free from the hindrances of 
the body shall we be able to discern things in all the 
ineffable splendor of truth."* It is undeniable that the 
"ineffable splendor of truth" is far to seek, and that its 
appreciation requires education of the emotions as well 
as of the reason. The fact remains, however, that per- 
ception depends upon an organism; that is to say, upon 
the adjustment of the individual and its environment. 
Reason is a development of sense, the perception of the 
senses being the means to an intellectual end. There 
is no absolute separation of sentiency and thought, or of 
the physical and the spiritual, both being forms of 
motion. 

The idealism inaugurated by Plato, and long after- 
ward revived by the transcendentalists, rests upon the 
postulate that there are two absolutely different kinds of 
perception; nameh^, that of reason, and that of sense; 
the product of the former being noumena, ideas, or 
reality, and of the latter phenomena, objects, or change. 

In Part II. of the present work, which is devoted to 
Psychology, the proposition that reason is a develop- 
ment of sense will be proven. For the present we have 
to deal with the dialectical aspects of the question, 
and, therefore, to depend upon the demonstrated sig- 
nificance of universal terms. If the ultimate reality is 
motion or change, how can phenomena, which are con- 
tinually changing, prove less real than noumena, a term 
used to denote unchanging existence? Where shall we 
find unchanging existence ? The idealist regards reality 
and change as opposite in meaning, a distinction which 

* Phaedo 66 fol. 



52 The Evolution of Knowledge 

illuminates the whole question, for an ultimate analysis 
teaches that change and reality mean the same thing. 

There is another theory held by Plato, namely, that 
ideas are real while objects are unreal. Aristotle says: 
"Plato followed Socrates respecting definitions, but, ac- 
customed, as he was, to inquiries into universals, he sup- 
posed that definitions should be those of intelligibles 
(i. e., noumena), rather than of sensibles (t. e., phenom- 
ena) : for it is impossible to give a general definition 
to sensible objects which are always changing. Those 
intelligible essences he called ideas, and received from 
them their names; for it is in consequence of their 
participation in ideas that all objects of the same genus 
receive the same name as the ideas."* 

It is with reluctance that I make this quotation, for 
although one of the clearest of all the interpretations of 
Platonic idealism, it has about it that fatal mist which 
has enshrouded so many powerful minds. Here is the 
mystical fog in which so many great thinkers have been 
lost. It is in their efforts to escape that they have made 
enduring fame. 

To repeat: "Definitions should be those of intelligi- 
bles (t. e., noumena) rather than of sensibles {%. e., phe- 
nomena) , for it is impossible to give a general definition 
to sensible objects, which are always changing." In- 
telligibles which are afterward identified with ideas have 
unchanging existence {%. e., are noumena) , and sensibles 
afterward identified with ob^cts have changing exist- 
ence (t. e., are phenomena). The object of Plato was to 
prove that intelligibles, i(Jeas, unchanging existence, 
noumena, — which are terms now identified as having the 

* Arist., Met. 1, 6. 



The Climax of Greek Thought 53 

same ultimate meaning — represent reality ; and that sen- 
sibles, objects, changing existence, phenomena, — terms 
also identified as having the same meaning, — represent 
the phantasmal or the unreal. This points out Plato's 
central theor}', of the truth of which we are now able to 
judge, namely, that unchanging means real, and that 
changing means unreal. 

Minds trained in the idealistic school find it difficult 
to realize that the central fact of the universe is change. 
Plato never wearied in the search for the "One among 
the multiplicity of phenomena." He declared it to be 
the "essence of matter." He also sought the "One 
among the multiplicity of ideas," and declared this 
unity to be God. Like all idealists, he insisted upon 
an absolute separation of ideas from phenomena, as 
though mental life were not a phase of universal activity. 

Thus, Plato ever sought the "divine unity of exist- 
ence," and at the same time ever denied it, but, if this 
fundamental error of his system can be overlooked, a 
fair inference from his thought would be that God is 
the one being comprising within Himself all existence, 
the "cause of all things spiritual as well as physical." 
What better expression could there be of the unity of 
mind and nature? 

Platonists, however, insist that God is the supreme 
idea or ego, and that ideas are real, but that phenomena 
are unreal. Would it not be more reasonable to 
acknowledge that mind, functioning in thought and 
language, is an expression of nature and, therefore, no 
more nor less real than any other existence? Are not 
natural forces infinite, and is not the infinite power 
divine? 



5'4 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Plato held that intelligence was another name for 
God; that in this world of changing phenomena evil 
dwells. To overcome this evil we must lead the life of 
the gods. What is the life of the gods ? Every Platon- 
ist will tell you that it is the Jife of the eternal contem- 
plation of truths, or ideas. ! According to Plato, there- 
fore, man must find his salvation in thought, whereas 
evolution teaches that the salvation of man does not lie 
in thought, but in its embodiment in action. 

A glance at the Psychology of Plato will afford a still 
clearer view of his theories, and of their divergence from 
what, in our time, is considered as scientific conclusion. 
According to Plato, the soul is a self-subsisting essence, 
the principle of all motion in the universe. It always 
has been and always will be. It does not depend for its 
existence upon union with the body. It existed before 
such union, and shall exist after the separation. Plato 
taught that everywhere the soul is the moving force. 
Intelligent beings have a soul moving them from with- 
in, while unconscious nature is moved from without. 
The soul cannot be produced, neither can it decay, else 
all motion would eventually cease. 

A broad view of biology leads to the conclusion 
that all organic activities, including psychical phe- 
nomena, are forms of motion. Had Plato known of 
the discoveries of cellular psychology which correlate 
psychical and physical life, he would have had little dif- 
ficulty in recognizing motion as the ultimate of both 
mind and matter. He would have perceived that the 
theory of personal immortality is simply the theory 
of perpetual motion applied to mind. As a principle, 
motion is eternal, but none of its forms are perpetual. 



The Climax of Greek Thought 55 

Some of the devotees of the Platonic philosophy have 
even demurred when their doctrine has been described as 
idealistic. All Platonists concede, however, that their 
master was an inveterate dialectician. Accordinj^ to 
Aristotle, general terms or ideas were invested by Plato 
with an absolute or unchanging existence. He main- 
tained that there is the Abstract Man no less than the 
Concrete Man ; but that the latter is a man only in so far 
as he participates in the ideal man. As the word is 
generally understood, this is idealism ; but since as years 
passed Plato changed some of his most important con- 
victions, differences of opinion regarding them are in- 
evitable. 

The influence of Plato has been second only to that 
of Aristotle. From the time of the Alexandrian school, 
until the second century of our era, when the doctrines 
of the Neo-Platonists were founded, idealism remained 
predominant. The theory marks the transition from the 
worship of individuality or of character to the appreci- 
ation of universal order. 

The second generation of Neo-Platonists degenerated 
into mysticism. The sect was much given to citing 
texts from the writings of their "God-enlightened mas- 
ter," as authority for many extravagances, among which 
was the revival of the interpretation of visions, a belief 
strongly condemned by Plato himself. Plutarch and 
Boethius, the last of the N'eo-Platonists, redeemed some- 
wliat the character of their chosen philosophy, but from 
the time when the Emperor Justinian interdicted all 
instruction in the Platonic schools, the system gradually 
declined. 

The early Christian Fathers owed their theology not 



56 The Evolution of Knowledge 

only to the genius of the Hebrews, but also to that of 
Plato. Justin Martyr, Jerome and Lactantius speak of 
him as the greatest and wisest of philosophers, while 
St. Augustine ascribed to the same mind much of the in- 
fluence that led to his conversion, thanking God that 
he became acquainted with the Dialogues first, and with 
the Gospels afterward. 

It is admitted by Biblical scholars that the Christian 
versions of the tragedy of the Cross bear a striking 
resemblance to tbe Platonic accounts of the death of 
Socrates, and that other portions of the New Testament 
are strangely like passages of the Dialogues. Through- 
out the dark ages when the classics were read only by 
monks and churchmen, the writings of Plato were pre- 
served. Later on, these writings, with their logical op- 
ponent, the Aristotelian system, gave birth to that 
coalition of science and theology known as Scholasticism. 

When the revival of learning in Europe re-established 
independent thought, the influence of Plato again as- 
serted itself and the modern idealists, chief among 
whom are the German dialecticians, have perpetuated 
not only the truths, but the cardinal error of their great 
master. 



CHAPTER IV 

Aeistotle^ the Cynics^ the Stoics, and the 
Skeptics of the New Academy 



Aristotle — Diogenes — Zeno the Stoic — Epicurus ■ 
Pyrrho-Arcesilaus — Cameades 



It is generally conceded that Aristotle stands first 
among the ancients for power of thought. He created 
and practically finished the science of logic. His 
History of Animals naturalists still consult with profit. 
Among works upon government there has yet to appear a 
rival of The Politics. His metaphysical treatises are in 
one sense a completion, but in another a refutation, of 
the dialectic of his master, Plato. 

In common with thinkers of all epochs Aristotle at- 
tempted to define the principles of being. His progress 
in this direction is indicated by the ten categories so 
prominently connected with his name. With the excep- 
tion of the "four causes" postulated by the same author, 
this table of realities was the nearest approach made at 
that epoch to an ultimate analysis. 

The influence of Aristotle can be discerned in the de- 
velopment of every European nation. Long after the 
decline of Greece and Eome, Nestorians, who had fled 
into Persia, translated the Aristotelian writings into 
Syriac. About the Ninth Century the Mohammedan 



58 The Evolution of Knowledge 

conquerors of Africa and the East rendered them into 
Arabic. Thus arose that philosophical literature after- 
wards so potent a factor in the revival of learning in 
Europe. 

After the subjugation of the Greek States, Philip of 
Macedon entrusted to Aristotle the education of his 
son, Alexander. For four years master and pupil were 
together. At the beginning of the Macedonian war the 
preceptor repaired to Athens to open his school. Avhile 
Alexander, taking with him Callisthenes, a pupil and 
kinsman of Aristotle, soon afterward departed on his 
Persian expedition. 

Tradition asserts that the friendship of both Philip 
and Alexander for the philosopher was of much value 
to science. Plin}^ relates that as many as three thou- 
sand men were placed at the disposal of Aristotle to 
aid him in the search for specimens for his History of 
Animals. According to Athenseus eight hundred talents 
(nearly one million dollars) were given by Alexander 
for this purpose. Great as the sum appears, it is not 
inconsistent with the accounts of the wealth acquired 
by the plunder of the Persian treasures. 

The critics of all subsequent ages agree that Aris- 
totle wrote more intelligently upon a greater number 
of subjects, than any other man. Although some of his 
writings have become obsolete, others, such as the Or- 
ganon and The Politics, have never been superseded. 
His classification of the types of government, like that 
of animals, is fundamental. The tyranny, the mon- 
archy, and the republic will always represent, respec- 
tively, the sentiments of fear, of honor, and of virtue. 
In a tyranny the people have no protection against 
the ruling power, and, consequently, fear is the domi- 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 59 

nant sentiment. Under a monarchy they have a partial 
protection under the constitution of laws; hence they 
are actuated by the sentiment of loyalty or honor. In a 
republic the people protect themselves, which is the 
essence of virtue, for freedom harmonizes might and 
right — the prime elements of social order.* 

If, from The Politics, we turn to the Aristotelian as- 
tronomy and physics, intensely interesting rudiments 
of science are encountered. What can be more instruc- 
tive than the efforts of so great a mind to comprehend 
natural phenomena ? Many discoveries, now familiar to 
us, were then scarcely suspected. To Aristotle the earth 
was the fixed centre of the universe. "If the earth,'^ says 
our author, "be carried around, whether in the centre or 
apart from the centre, such motion must necessarily be 
violent or contra-nature. Such motion does not belong 
naturally to the earth itself, for if such were the fact 
it would belong equally to each portion of the earth; 
whereas we see that all these portions are carried 
in a straight line to the centre. Being thus violent or 
contra-nature, it cannot possibly be eternal. But the 
order of the Cosmos is eternal.^'f As to the earth's 
shape, Aristotle was correct. He proved it to be spher- 
ical. 

During his lifetime the theories of Aristotle concern- 
ing astronomy were by no means generally accepted. The 
speculations of the Pythagorean school, and of Aris- 
tarchus of Samos, were opposed to the theory of the 
earth's position in the centre of the universe, devoid of 



* See Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois as an outgrowth of The 
Politics. 

fDe Coelo, 11, 14. 



6o The Evolution of Knowledge 

any motion of translation. In the second century of 
our era, however, Ptolemy, the Alexandrian astronomer, 
reaffirmed the doctrine of the Aristotelians; and that 
system, obtaining general acceptance, satisfied men's 
minds until, with Copernicus and Galileo, modern as- 
tronomy began. 

The firm hold obtained upon the public mind by the 
theories of Aristotle, both true and false, is shown by 
the fact that during the time of Shakespeare and Mil- 
ton the universities of Europe taught that the sun turns 
round the earth. The Christian Church long accepted 
this view as elaborated by Ptolemy and St. Thomas 
Aquinas, but, enlightened by modern discovery, these 
crude opinions have since been frequently modified. 
{jEence, the Cosmology of Aristotle was a combination 
of verified and unverified opinion. The natural philos- 
ophy of our time, going back to the Principia of New- 
ton, considers the fundamental facts of existence 
as beyond its sphere, but Aristotle was convinced of the 
interdependence of all knowledge, and strove to reduce 
both mental and physical life to one system. His aim 
was to co-ordinate sensible experiences and universals. 
He denied that there is any absolute creation or be- 
ginning to the universe. The region from which all 
things have sprung he described as the possible or 
potential, the transition from this realm bringing us to 
the actual. To him possihiliiy and actuality were the 
opposite poles of reality. In this manner he defined 
the meaning of the often-recurring "is" and "became." 
/!N"ature was explained by Aristotle as "a principle of 
motion and rest essentially inherent in things, whether 
that motion be locomotion, increase, decay or alteration." 
There is only one Universe or Cosmos; outside of this 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 61 

there is "neither space nor vacuum, nor time."* "The 
things outside of the Cosmos are neither in place, nor is 
there any time to affect them with old age, nor do they 
undergo change of any kind. They are without any 
change of quality, and without susceptibility of suffer- 
ing; they remain throughout the entire Aeon, in the 
best and most self-sufficing life. "I' 

Many of the vagaries of theology have sprung from 
these speculations of Aristotle concerning a life of joy 
in a region "beyond space," where there are no changes 
of any kind, no personality, no growth, and no decay. 
Modern science declares that existence itself is change, 
and that there can be no life without the phenomena 
of personality, growth, and decay. 

.Descending from the region "beyond space," where it 
is alleged that there is life without change, we come, 
in the Aristotelian system, to the "First Heaven," the 
region of fixed stars, revolving with great velocity from 
the East to the West. These stars are composed of ether, 
that fifth element or quinta essentia which enters into 
the composition of the human soul. The sun, moon and 
stars are living beings, and their condition is that of 
perfect happiness. Curious as they now appear, these 
theories were in harmony with the beliefs of the 
learned at that time. 

'The difference between the faith of Aristotle and of 
his master, Plato, is definite. Aristotle was a scientist ; 
Plato was in a philosophical sense a theologian. The 
former endeavored to systematize knowledge; the lat- 
ter, aiming at an expression of divine truth, fixed 
upon mind or personality as the ultimate cause. From 

* Phys., ii 192,. b. 19 t De Coelo, 1, 9. 



62 The Evolution of Knowledge 

these two schools emanate science and theology; or pa- 
tient investigation accompanied by verification and the 
contemplation of universals. 

Throughout the Aristotelian writings, the influence 
of Plato is manifest. The Politics were written by the 
pupil in order to refute the theories of the master as 
set forth in the Republic. Aristotle believed that the 
idealism of Plato had its origin in unverified introspec- 
tion rather than in actual research. He held that we 
have no proof of the absolute separation of the universal 
and the material, because from the point of view of each 
individual, both the thoughts and feelings of others are 
external or objective. He, therefore, denied to ideas a 
purely subjective being. 

^Nor could Aristotle, like Plato, give to qualities, such 
as weight, size and color, an existence other than that of 
attributes. Plato believed that from one, man could 
arrive at all ideas without the aid of objective experi- 
ence. Aristotle maintained that, since all knowledge 
comes from experience, all ideas must spring from the 
same source, and are, therefore, the result of the inter- 
action of individual and environment. 

Though both of these writers regarded ideas as 
generalizations or universals, one attributed real ex- 
istence to reason, advocating the contemplation of ideas 
in themselves; while the other gave experience as the 
source of knowledge, teaching men to observe and ques- 
tion nature. The truth underlying these opposite theo- 
ries is that, in the last analysis, reason and experience 
are one. 

If Aristotle adhered to the scientific method, the ques- 
tion arises. How could he have been at the same time so 
renowned a metaphysician? The answer is suggested 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 63 



by the nature of metaphysical inquiry. Before the ap- 
pearance of Lewes' ProMems of Life and Mind, the 
most exact ontological thought was, doubtless, to be 
found in the writings of Herbert Spencer; and yet, 
Spencer would have objected to being called a meta- 
physician. The fact is, Ave cannot view life thoughtfully 
without becoming metaphysical, because thought leads 
inevitably to generalizations or principles. All inquiries 
tend toward the simplification or the unification of 
knowledge.* 

The categories or the principles which Aristotle con- 
ceived as ultimate, are as follows : 



ORIGINAL TRANSLATION 

Literal. 

Essence. 

How much? 

What manner ? 

To something. 

Where? 

When? 

To what posture ? 

To have. 

To do. 

To be affected. 



ovcrla 

irocbv 

iroi6v 

irpbs ri 

iroO 

TTori 

irdax^'-v 

With the light of our time these principles can be 
simplified., Some are repetitions and many are com- 
posite, 



Free. 

Substance or matter. 

Quantity. 

Quality. 

Relation. 

Space. 

Time. 

Position in Space, 

Possession. 

Action. 

Passion or reaction. 



The ten categories of Aristotle suggest the 



*WilIiam James says that metaphysics mean nothing more 
than an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly. If I 
could only appeal to the obstinacy of Dr. James to the extent 
of obtaining his recognition of motion as the ultimate reality, 
much could be accomplished in the way of educational reform, 
for so many teachers of psychology in America are influenced by 
the charm of his personality and the candor and breadth of his 
expositions. 



64 The Evolution of Knowledge 

co-ordinates of the Pythagoreans. In reducing ten 
double principles to as many single ones, Aristotle made 
an advance toward an ultimate analysis. Modern philo- 
sophy has reduced the ten categories of Aristotle to five 
universals. Spencer's system denominates them ; Space, 
Time, Matter, Force and Motion.* 

It will be found that a generalization of these uni- 
versals is possible, for, as already shown in Chap. I, 
space, time, matter and force may be resolved into mo- 
tion. 

But to return to the categories of Aristotle, the ele- 
ments composing them are the ultimate reality with its 
opposite aspects, and the relative fact of individuality 
or species. 

As will be shown, Aristotle confused individual with 
general existence. Personal and impersonal or indi- 
vidual and general mean ultimately the subjective and 
the objective aspects of existence or the one. Individu- 
ality and species are terms that can be used intercon- 
vertibly. The widest meaning of individual is species, 
or the lines within which organic beings reproduce or 
preserve themselves. 

Aristotle was conscious that the ultimate type of in- 
dividuality is species, but he failed to perceive the rela- 
tionship between individual and general existence, and 
those aspects of motion known as time and space. As a 
consequence some of his categories, instead of being sim- 
ple, are composite; that is to say, they can be further 
reduced by analysis. 

* In First Princiriles Spencer postulates a sixth ultimate, con- 
sciousness being added to the five above cited. A fair inference 
from other portions of his writings, however, is that con- 
sciousness is a relative, not an absolute fact. 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 65 

The reduction of the categories to ten had of neces- 
sity a history. The object of thought had been to find 
a summum genus, an essence, or, better still, an ex- 
istence, which by continued abstractions of differences 
might be comprehended as a common universal, or, in 
other terms, the object was to find the ultimate reality. 

To meet this requirement, Aristotle proposed as the 
first of the categories, 1. Substance (oiJo-ta) . By employ- 
ing the mathematical ultimate motion, in the place of 
substance, we shall find that the aim of Aristotle is 
attained. It did not occur to him that the ultimate, 
which he called substance, could explain all relations, 
because he had not identified substance with universal 
change expressed in terms of number and quantity or 
time and space. He, therefore, specifies nine additional 
categories, which can be decomposed as follows: 

2. Quantity, if unlimited, signifies both the infinite 
and the eternal or space and time which taken together 
are equivalent to motion. The ultimate meaning of limit 
is individual as distinguished from general. A limited 
quantity, therefore, is individuality added to substance. 

3. Quality is action and reaction added to substance. 
Then follow: 4. Eelation; 5. Where? 6. When? The 

ultimate relation is motion. Relations are of co-exist- 
ence and of sequence, or of space (where), and time 
(when), which are united in motion. 

7. Position is limit and rest added to space. 

8. Possession is individuality added to substance. 

9. Action is individuality added to motion. 

10. Passion, or reaction, is individuality added to ac- 
tion (or inter-action). 

It will be observed that apart from motion and its ob- 
jective and subjective aspects, the term most frequently 



66 The Evolution of Knowledge 

employed in these definitions is individuality or species. 
Now, individuality is the cause of consciousness or of 
the separation of the subjective and objective aspects of 
general existence. In other terms, the division of mo- 
tion into time and space is the result of the interaction 
of species and environment. Language is implied by 
species, because it is a form of consciousness. 

Aristotle discovered that the infinite divisibility of 
time is a correlative of the infinitive divisibility of space. 
In other terms, time and space are the opposite aspects 
of that universal continuity called motion. 

The transcendentalists admit that thinking involves 
change, but they also maintain that thought is a deeper 
reality than motion. Those who through scientific 
analysis have reached the conclusion that reality, change 
and motion are synonymous terms will ask how the 
transcendentalists can remove thought to a region 
beyond space, since space is an aspect of motion. 

To turn from the transcendentalists to the material- 
ists, some scientists persist in imagining force as the 
cause of motion. The ancient materialists conceived 
matter to be in itself inert and propelled by force; the 
two being in some way conjoined so as to produce mo- 
tion. They then introduced time as a necessary element, 
and supplied for its convenience an infinite space. These 
preliminaries being arranged, the imiverse proceeded 
without difficulty. How strange it is that all these 
universal principles should work together so harmon- 
iously in spite of the inartistic manner in which man 
has put them together. 

Dr. Holmes once remarked that when he met a mathe- 
matician he could hear the click of the wheels in his 
head. If the regular sequences of mathematics suggest 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 67 

the leverage of wheels, what a leverage the physicist 
must exert who calmly unites disconnected principles 
so as to produce the continuity of nature? 

Would it not be more in accord with our attitude, as 
students of nature, to recognize that fundamental unity 
which we symbolize in so many ways? As above in- 
dicated, this unity has many names. Each science, ac- 
cording to its point of view, gives it a distinctive ap- 
pellation, but the terms employed are all symbols of 
power. In this synthesis of universals even religion 
joins by reaching the same ultimate as the sciences. 
Most significant is it that the definition of deity, which, 
according to the theologians, is the union of the in- 
finite and the absolute, should correspond exactly with 
the simplest interpretation of motion, the union of the 
infinite and the absolute, or of space and time. 

P?he extremes, known as idealism and ancient ma- 
terialism, are to be avoided. Idealism holds that mind 
is independent of motion, while the ancient materialists 
held that matter is independent of motion, or, in other 
terms, that until force is added it is inert or immutable. 
To the idealist, reality is the immutable soul; to the 
ancient materialist, it was the immutable substance. It 
is now known that both soul and substance are forms 
of motion. 

Philosophy will have accomplished its object when it 
•has identified the forces of mind with those of nature. 
Tfe' degree of intellectual development necessary to 
enable us to reach this synthesis can be inferred from 
the fact that at almost all universities not only are the 
energies of the intellect unidentified with physical force, 
but even those basic types of energy revealed by the solar 
spectrum, and known as chemical elements, are conceived 



6S The Evolution of Knowledge 

as absolutely separate existences, instead of as interde- 
pendent forms of motion. 

The metaphysics of Aristotle were as coherent as the 
science of their time. With singular unanimity of pur- 
pose, the earliest philosophers sought the first cause. 
The causes of Aristotle came nearer to an ultimate 
analysis than did his categories. They were four in 
number; namely, first, the material cause or essence; 
second, the formal; third, the efficient or the principle 
of motion ; fourth, the final cause or the purpose and 
end. 

To synthesize these causes, all that is necessary is to 
identify essence with existence or motion; form with 
matter or space, and purpose with individuality or 
species ; for the final cause is identical with the ultimate 
reality. 

Thought consists of the interaction of hypothesis and 
verification. The strength of Aristotle lay in his com- 
mand of facts and in his power of generalizing them. 
Plato will always be regarded as a finer writer, and, in 
a literary sense, as a greater genius. Aristotle never 
reached such sublime heights of abstraction. He was 
content to apply himself to the evolution of principles 
from nature. 

THE CYNICS 

Antisthenes, an Athenian, was a pupil of Gorgias the 
Sophist. Upon making the acquaintance of Socrates, 
and in order to become his pupil, he abandoned the 
school he had established at Athens, persuading his 
disciples to follow his example. This course was, per- 
haps, suggested by the remark of Socrates : "I see thy 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 69 

vanity, Antisthenes, peering through the holes of thy 
cloak."* 

After the death of their master, and in disregard of 
the Socratic moderation, Antisthenes and his disciples 
carried poverty to such extremes as to receive from the 
refined Athenians the name of Cynics. Holding all 
social amenities in contempt, their habits soon came to 
resemble those of dogs. Denouncing the luxury and 
indulgence of the time, the Cynics advocated a return 
to the olden simplicity. "I would rather go mad," said 
the founder of this sect, "than become sensuous."f 

Diogenes of Sinope, most noted of the Cynics, was a 
pupil of Antisthenes. His father, a banker, was accused 
of debasing the coin. The son, becoming implicated, 
fled to Athens, where he soon fell into poverty. An- 
tisthenes would have repelled the newcomer, but Diog- 
enes refused to depart. Upon the master threatening 
to use his staff, "Strike!" said Diogenes, *^you will not 
find any stick hard enough to drive me away, while you 
continue to speak."+ So conciliatory was the reply that 
it was not made in vain. 

The joyous life of the Athenians repelled the Cynics. 
Such was their zeal that they lost sight of the mean- 
ing of virtue which the Greeks defined as "moderation 
or the saving of tendencies from excess." 

The Cynics combatted idealism with skepticism. They 
ridiculed the Socratic theory, that a definition is the 
essence of a thing, because they regarded phenomena 
and reality as one. 

They denied that motion does not exist, because to 
them mind signified nature in movement. They did not 

* Diog. Laert. VI. 1. 8. t "Hiog. Laert. VI. 1. 3. t JDiog. 
Laert. VI. 2. 2. 



70 The Evolution of Knowledge 

perceive, however, that existence and motion have the 
same ultimate meaning. To them philosophy was the 
art of life, but a life stripped of joy. Language they 
regarded as metaphorical. They saw that as facts ex- 
press themselves, they are, in a sense, independent of 
words. They failed, however, to recognize that the 
ultimate fact is proportion or beauty. 

The fanatical distrust of pleasure manifested by the 
Cynics was inconsistent. Their lives clearly exempli- 
fied the influence of skepticism upon conduct. Although 
recognizing mind as a part of nature, they regarded the 
former as holy, and the latter as unholy. In propor- 
tion to the accompanying pleasure, therefore, they con- 
sidered physical functions as degrading. It is true that 
in the excesses of the age they had a certain excuse for 
this belief, but the effect of their theory was to make 
of pain a virtue. 

The Stoics agreed with the Cynics in recognizing the 
superiority of intellectual pleasures. Both were proud 
of poverty, for they considered it an aid in the search 
for truth, but the Stoics saw no reproach in reason- 
able enjoyment, whereas the Cynics made of privation 
an object of worship instead of a means to an end. 

THE STOICS 

The Stoics devoted themselves to a criticism of re- 
ligion, of manners and of government. Their doctrines, 
although widely diversified, proposed no original con- 
ception of mind. The pronounced skeptics, however, 
were different, for they had a well-defined theory of 
knowledge. Although no longer maintained as a sep- 
arate school, the doctrine of skepticism, immortalized 
by Pyrrho and Carneades, still has its adherents. 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 71 

The Stoics formulated a more definite theory of 
morals than any other philosophical sect. So exalted 
were their principles, that had they believed in a per- 
sonal deity and in individual immortality, their faith 
would have become a religion. 

Until the discovery of evolution organized religion 
remained faithful to the theory of a personal God. It 
was not to be expected that the church would surrender 
its faith in an absolute individual until all species were 
shown to be mutable. The Stoics held that, according 
to nature, death is the end of the individual. They said 
with Job, "Man lieth down and riseth not." To the 
Stoics God was a principle and not a person, the infinite 
and eternal order of the universe and not an individual. 

The Christian religion has deified one who died for 
his kind. The Stoic martyrs freely gave their lives for 
their principles. Tacitus said that Nero, in killing 
Soranus and Thraseas, sought to destroy virtue itself. 
In that age death or banishment was a common fate of 
the Stoics, who more fearlessly than any other sect 
opposed superstition and tyranny. 

The names of the Stoics will ever illuminate human 
history. In Greece and Rome from the close of the 
Fourth Century before our era, for five hundred years, 
they were the chief advocates of human freedom. Much 
of this period was fraught with the deepest oppres- 
sion, for the cruelties of tyrants and the superstitions of 
the people were triumphant ; but the era terminated in 
nearly a century of political liberty and of literary 
activity, known to Eome as the reign of the Stoics. 

From the time of Zeno, the first of the Stoics, to that 
of Marcus Aurelius, occur the best and worst rulers 
the world has known. Eenan declares that Antoninus 



72 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Pius would have had no rival as the best of sovereigns, 
had he not designated Marcus Aurelius as his succes- 
sor, while history reveals no stronger types of inhuman- 
ity than Caligula and ISTero. The hymn of Cleanthes, 
belonging to the opening of the Stoic literature, breathes 
a lofty spirit of trust in the order of nature, while the 
words of Epictetus and of Seneca will ever live for their 
grandeur and benignity. 

Compared with that of the Epicureans, the virtue of 
the Stoics was severe. The aim of the former was hap- 
piness, that of the latter, duty. To harmonize these prin- 
ciples, a higher social order was needed, for when not 
expressed in government, altruism is only a dream. 

Many of the sublime precepts of the ISTew Testament 
bear a striking resemblance to the teachings of the Stoics, 
but why raise the question of priority as between these 
bodies of ancient writings? High aims have but one 
ultimate authority, — the weal of humanity. 

The Stoics were nearly related in their doctrines to 
Socrates, and classed themselves among his followers. 
In their opinion, dialectics and physics were sulDordi- 
nate to ethics, for they held that the central problem 
of life is conduct. Eighteousness they esteemed as the 
highest good, because it suffices for happiness. 

The Stoic philosophers sought to harmonize theology 
with science. Although they were chiefly absorbed in 
ethical problems, incidentally they endeavored to find 
ultimate principles in nature. To them matter and 
force were opposite sides of reality. Force, or the under- 
lying principle of matter, they called God. 

The founder of the Stoic sect was Zeno, born at Cit- 
ium, a small city in the island of Cyprus. During 
youth he engaged with his father in commerce, but 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 73 

upon hearing of Socrates, decided to devote his life 
to philosophy. At a mature age, when first visiting 
Athens, he was shipwrecked. Losing all of his posses- 
sions, he joined the Cynics, allured by their display of 
poverty, but it was not long before their grossness re- 
pelled him. 

After many years of study in different countries, Zeno 
returned to Athens and established a school. The place 
selected was the Painted Porch or Stoa, the former re- 
sort of the poets. 

The character of Zeno was greatly admired by the 
Athenians, who at a time of danger intrusted the keys 
of the citadel to his keeping. For ages afterwards his 
monuments proclaimed that his life was in harmony 
with his beliefs. 

Macedon had now supplanted Athens, and the civili- 
zation of the Greeks was in its decline. Discouraged by 
the degeneracy of his race, Zeno turned to ethics in the 
hope of establishing the principles of human freedom 
upon those of virtue. 

With the Stoics the criterion of truth was distinctness 
of mental representation, or, as Descartes long after- 
ward expressed it, "All clear and distinct ideas are 
true." According to Sextus Empiricus,* the Stoics 
named this criterion the Cataleptic Phantasm; that is 
the sensuous apprehension, or the harmony of sense and 
reason.f 



* Sext. Emp., VII., 160. 

t A comparison of the sensuous and the intellectual appre- 
hension has been made in the review of Plato in the preceding 
chapter. This subject will be more fully examined when the writ- 
ings of Spencer and Lewes are reached. 



74 The Evolution of Knowledge 

EPICURUS 

The Stoics were not alone in opposing the C}Tiics, 
for in their adverse criticism they were joined by the 
Epicureans. As Epicurus said: "We cannot live pleas- 
antly unless we live prudently, nobly, and Justly; nor 
can we live prudently, nobly and justly without living 
pleasantly, * * * Our happiness depends not only 
upon how long, but upon how wisely and virtuously 
we live. Out of the natural distinction between such 
pains and pleasures as increase our happiness, and such 
as diminish it, arises the moral law."* 

There is an impression that the Epicureans were 
devotees of pleasure. The terra has come to mean 
a voluptuary, or a luxurious and dainty eater. The 
sect, however, was noted for abstemiousness. Over 
the door of the garden at Athens, where Epicurus led 
a life of calm enjoyment with his friends, was the in- 
scription: "The hospitable keeper of this mansion, 
where you will find pleasure the highest good, will 
present you liberally with barley cakes, and water fresh 
from the spring. The gardens will not provoke your 
appetite by artificial dainties, but satisfy it with natural 
supplies. Will you not be well entertained ?" 

A boast of Epicurus was that his own food cost not 
more than a penny a day. He confessed that he needed 
only bread and water to equal Jupiter in happiness. 
"Send me a little Kytherian cheese," he wrote to a friend, 
"so that if I wish a feast, I may have the means."t 

All schools have contributed to the advancement of 
truth, and all have been guilty of perversions. Cynics 
despise pleasure; Stoics control it; while Epicureans 

* Diog. Laert. X. 140. t Diog. Laert. X. 6. 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 75 

recognize in it the highest good. The fact is that pleas- 
ure and righteousness are terms of the same ultimate 
significance. 

Epicurus, whose father was a school teacher, was born 
about 340 B. C, at Samos, off the Ionian coast. At 
the age of eighteen he visited Xenocrates, who was then 
teaching at the Academy, while Aristotle was at Chalcis. 
After studying for a time at the Academy, he left the 
Athenian capital to reside in various other Hellenic 
cities. He afterward established at Athens the school 
over which he presided until his death. 

During this period at Athens there was every facility 
for studying philosophy. The Platonists had their Aca- 
demic Grove; the Aristotelians the shaded walks of 
the Lyceum. At the Cynosarges, the Cynics assembled ; 
the Stoics met at the porch; while the Epicureans en- 
joyed their favorite garden. It is not surprising that 
with such competition immortal truths were evolved. 

Epicurus regarded philosophy as the art of life rather 
than of truth. Ideas and arguments were the means of 
happiness, not the end. Instead of transitory pleasures, 
his aim was the uninterrupted course of happiness 
throughout life; a result to be attained not by the 
gratification of the senses, but through the lasting enjoy- 
ments of the mind. To him virtue was inseparable 
from real happiness. He did not condemn luxuries, 
but contended that simplicity of life conduces to happi- 
ness. With him wealth consisted not in great posses- 
sions, but in moderate wants. 

Thus in morals Epicurus sought a refuge from the 
skepticism of the age. The numerous works accredited 
to his pen have been lost; but Diogenes Laertius pre- 
served three letters giving a summary of the Epicurean 



76 The Evolution of Knowledge 

philosophy, besides which there are the criticisms of 
the Stoic writers. 

The critics of all subsequent ages concede that the 
ideas of Epicurus were sublime. He regarded the dia- 
lectical method of Plato as misleading. "Eepresenta- 
tions are enduring images or perceptions." "Beliefs are 
true or false according as they are confirmed or refuted 
by perceptions."* 

With Epicurus the test of truth was the satisfaction, 
not the suppression, of doubt. He contended that 
animals and men were developed from the earth, the 
rise of man to higher stages of culture being an evolu- 
tion. Words were originally formed, not arbitrarily, 
but by a natural process, in correspondence with our 
sensations and ideas. Belief or opinion is due to the 
continued workings of impressions upon us. The will 
is aroused, but not necessarily determined, by ideas. 
Freedom of the will is independence of causes in self- 
determination.f 

Nowhere, even among modern writers, shall we find 
the principles of consciousness so briefly and so ac- 
curately stated. 

Epicurus was called the glory of the Greeks, not 
only on account of the beauty of his thoughts, but also 
of his friendships. Beginning with an obscure few, 
his disciples became a great party, placing his teachings 
among the most potent of Greek influences. 

This remarkable thinker was revered for having freed 
his friends, and through them multitudes of his fellow- 
men, from fear of the gods, demons and fates, by show- 
ing them how to explain everything by natural causes. 



Diog. Laert. X., 22. f Diog. Laert. X., 27, 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 77 

"It is necessary for true happiness," said he, "that the 
soul should be protected against superstitious fears and 
useless longings." 

THE SKEPTICS 

Although Socrates led a revolt against skepticism, 
which shows the priority of the doctrine, Pyrrho 
founded the first systematic school of doubt. Later on 
this school of Pyrrho developed into the new Academy, 
that body of Platonists who, although holding that 
truth is beyond reach, still longed for certitude. The 
names of Cotta and Vaxro, as well as of Horace, and 
Cicero, are to be found among these Agnostics of old. 

Inextricably involved, as are the doctrines of Pyrrho, 
with those of his pupils, all alike centre in the tenet 
that there is no criterion of truth. The best descrip- 
tion extant of the skeptical propaganda is given by 
Sextus Empirieus.* 

The celebrity of the school of Pyrrho was chiefly due 
to the prominence of the doctrines it combated. It 
is far easier to destroy than to build up. The Skeptics 
attacked the teachings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, 
and for a time well-nigh brought them to naught. Al- 
though philosophy was thus condemned on account of 
its errors, nothing was offered capable of taking its 
place. 

Exaggeration is always a weakness, even when it takes 
the form of doubt. Faith is trust, skepticism is dis- 
trust, in appearances. Appearance and disappearance 
are forms of universal change. Thought is a response 
to these changes. To experiment and to verify is the 
course of mental activity. The actions and reactions 

*Hypot. Pyrron. 1, 11, 111. 



78 The Evolution of Knowledge 

constituting intellectual progress presuppose extremes 
of faith and doubt. Scientific conclusion is the mean 
of these extremes. 

Belief is a reaction from doubt; it is a confession of 
our inability to disbelieve. Skepticism is loyalty to 
doubt, and is, therefore, a distinct form of faith. The 
feeling of the Skeptic with regard to belief is like that 
of the misanthrope who said that he was most happy 
when alone, but nevertheless confessed the need of at 
least one person to whom to confide the happiness. 

The chief tenet of Skepticism is that there is no 
criterion of truth. The reason given for this belief is 
that we have no absolute standard by which to meas- 
ure facts, and, if we had, it would be of no avail, be- 
cause there is a noumenon behind facts more real than 
nature. 

Noumenon means unchanging existence, whereas facts 
are changing existences. The whole argument, there- 
fore, depends upon whether there is an unchanging 
existence. Since evolution demonstrates that life, 
existence and change mean ultimately the same thin.:, 
may we not call upon the Skeptic to prove that there is 
such a thing as unchanging existence, before accepting 
his statement that noumena constitute a deeper truth 
than phenomena? Existence cannot be other than 
changing, and, therefore, unchanging existence must be 
a contradiction in terms. 

The assertion of the Skeptic that perceptions bear no 
conformity to the objects perceived, and, if they were 
to, the conformity never could be known, might be 
parodied as follows: In viewing oneself in a mirror 
one must believe that one is looking at some one else, 
or that one is some one else; or, if not, it does not 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 79 

matter, as one cannot know who one is. And yet it is 
said that Skeptics believe nothing! 

Doubtless, Arcesilaus and Carneadis would have re- 
garded this illustration as flippant, but some of the 
most solemn arguments have a humorous aspect. It is 
not my wish to convey the impression that the pro- 
nounced Skeptics, who so puzzled the Greeks and con- 
founded the Romans, were stumbling over obvious er- 
rors. I would prove simply that Skeptics, as well as 
others, hold beliefs, and that these beliefs, in so far as 
they deny the validity of knowledge, are mistaken. 
Skepticism is the belief that to be perfect knowledge 
should be absolute, whereas it is, by nature, relative. 

Arcesilaus, born at Pitane, in Asia Minor, about 316 
Bi C, succeeded Crates in the xA.cademic chair. Between 
the Academicians and the uncompromising Skeptics 
there was a marked difference. The former declared 
that all things are incomprehensible while the latter 
refused to affirm anything, even that all things are in- 
comprehensible. The modesty of these latter Skeptics 
is open to suspicion, for to be thoroughly convinced 
that we know nothing requires considerable knowl- 
edge. 

Carneades, the most illustrious of the Academi- 
cians, was born probably 213 B. C, at Cyrene, in Africa. 
His teacher was Diogenes, the Cynic. While at Rome as 
ambassador the eloquence of Carneades astonished all 
who listened. In attempting to prove the uncertainty 
of human knowledge, he denounced justice as vehe- 
mently as he had formerly upheld it. Indeed, one of his 
pupils confessed that so skilled was his master in dis- 
putation that it was impossible to discover his real 
opinion. Fearing that such sophistries might corrupt 



8o The Evolution of Knowledge 

the Eoman youth, Cato, the Censor, hastened to have 
the Skeptic dismissed from the cit3^ 

While admitting the argument of Plato against the 
validity of sense perception, Arcesilaus supported Aris- 
totle in his opposition to the ideal theory. Nothing 
was left him, therefore, but skepticism. 

The question propounded by the Academicians was 
this : Is every modification of the mind a true response to 
the external object causing the modification, or, in other 
terms, do we know things as they are? The fact that 
knowledge is derived from the senses caused the 
Academicians to doubt its accuracy. Since the senses 
are the outposts of the understanding, — that is to say, 
since there is no absolute dividing line between the 
activities of the senses and those which take place within 
the citadel of thought, — it is manifestly impossible to say 
where sense ends and where reason begins. The Skeptic 
is as powerless to make this division as we are. All 
reason has a sensuous aspect, and all sense a reasonable 
aspect. In other words, these faculties are interde- 
pendent ; they are different sides of one process. 

When we receive impressions through the senses, and, 
by a complex organism, they are elaborated into an idea, 
or when the act of reason occurs, we have sequent 
groups of changes, or a chain of cause and effect, unit- 
ing external phenomena, sensuous apprehension, and 
ideas. The greater the number of changes co-ordinated 
by the mind, (made possible by accumulated modifica- 
tions of the mental structure) the greater the scope of 
reason, the wider and deeper the generalization. To say 
that things are not in reality what they seem is a 
gratuitous assertion, for we know things to the extent 
that they affect us. These impressions are the re- 



Aristotle, the Cynics and Skeptics 8i 

action of a definite structure, and as the modifications 
of the structure increase, the reaction or response be- 
comes more and more definite. To know an object in the 
sense that the Skeptic imagines that we should know it, 
(to have an absolute knowledge of it) would be to be- 
come the object itself, or, in other terms, to include it in 
our existence. Employing a theological figure, this is 
the way in which God Tcnows, because divinity shares 
existence with everything. Whether it be regarded as 
fortunate or otherwise, we are individuals. Our per- 
ceptions are neither more nor less than the relationship 
or inter-action of ourselves and our surroundings. In 
the silent contemplation of nature we come face to face 
with reality. The moment we attempt to give this 
reality expression, to communicate it to others, we en- 
counter insuperable difficulties. Nothing is more cer- 
tain than action ; nothing more uncertain ttian its trans- 
lation into symbols or words. As language, the medium 
of thought, extends the lives of all who use it ; it is also 
a source of endless confusion to those who do not re- 
alize the meaning of its terms. 

The issue I would take with the Skeptic is now ap- 
parent. Skepticism is the theory that knowledge should 
be absolute. Contrary to its teachings, I hold that all 
knowledge is comparative or relative and that relative 
knowledge is valid. 



CHAPTEE V 

The Alexandrian School^ Scholasticism and the 
Eevival of Learning 



Philo — Plotinus — Ahelard — Bruno — Bacon 



In ancient Greece, thought declined with political 
freedom, and the intellectual forces, so long assembled 
at Athens, found a new center at Alexandria. At the 
latter place, during the early centuries of our era, there 
occurred that coalition of Greek philosophy and Judaism, 
which accounts for Christian theology. 

Long before this period Alexandria had become the 
scene of great literary as well as commercial activity. 
Its vast library, founded by the Ptolemies, was a 
treasury of Egyptian, Hellenic and Oriental letters. 
The thoughtful world will never cease to regret the loss 
of this collection, burned by Christian fanatics under the 
Archbishop Theodosius toward the close of the Fourth 
Century. 

The history of reason and of faith are inseparable. 
The developmentof the Alexandrian school of philosophy 
explains the genesis of Christian dogma. The religious 
belief of each community expresses the popular idea of 
government, — a problem that can be solved only by deter- 
mining the nature of God and the human soul. Belief in 
an individual deity and in individual immortality will 



The Alexandrian School 83 

persist until it is generally understood that God is more 
than a person. When deity is recognized as the order 
of the universe, it will be seen that there is no absolute 
personal existence, — for all individuality is relative. 

From the close of the Second to that of the Fifth 
Century the school of Alexandria competed with the 
Christian Church for the spiritual control of Europe. 
The rivalry was not, as might be supposed, between 
reason and faith, for the philosophical form of the doc- 
trine of faith originated with the Alexandrians. This 
doctrine had not as yet lent itself to the defense of 
religious orthodoxy. It was the chief tenet of the Alex- 
andrians, devised by them as a reply to skepticism. 
Only in after years was it employed in the defense of 
ecclesiastical dogma. 

The contention between the Alexandrians and the 
Christians was not, therefore, a conflict between ra- 
tionalism and orthodoxy, but between two kinds of 
religious faith. It was the rivalry inherent between the 
God of Plato and the God of Israel, between deity con- 
ceived as universal order and as an all-powerful person. 
The Platonic creed, however, was not without grave in- 
consistencies, confusing the individual and the general, 
for Platonist and Christian believed alike in the immor- 
tality of the soul and in an overruling Providence. 

Philosophy has long attempted the allied problems of 
mind and duty, or of consciousness and justice. These 
great questions presented little difficulty to the ex- 
plainers of revelation. The early Christian Church 
confidently resolved the problems of existence, and it is 
to the authority of its conclusions that the attention of 
the reader is now invited. 

The deification of some individual is a phase of de- 



S4 The Evolution of Knowledge' 

velopment through which every race must pass. A 
personal God is an idealization of character. The charm 
of personality is inseparable from devotion; for the 
highest influences are exerted not by reason alone, but 
also by example. So essential to religious teaching 18 
example that in order to control the actions of the 
majority of men, principles must be clothed as per- 
sons; they must live as heroic beings. The spiritual 
religions, therefore, are necessary object-lessons of duty. 

The theologians of the Greeks were their poets and 
artists. Every civilization has need of these interpreters 
of divine truth, for they endow principles with the 
authority of proportion or beauty. 

To the mind trained to generalize it suffices to say 
that God is the order of the universe, that a true creed is 
science, and that our origin and destiny are develop- 
ments of nature; but philosophy is not content with re- 
ducing existence to abstract principles ; it will ever strive 
to make itself intelligible to the masses by supplement- 
ing the analysis of being with a synthesis of life so real 
and so beautiful as to inspire devotion. When it is 
generally understood that consciousness and justice are 
evolutions of nature, the most abstract principles of 
existence will assume the form of a sublime and an im- 
perishable example. 

In tracing the growth of religious dogma it will be 
well to remember that society has as yet evolved no in- 
stitution capable of taking the place of the Church, 
unless it be the hierarchy of justice. With the excep- 
tion of jurisprudence, as embodied in family and state, 
the Church is the most powerful progenitor of righteous- 
ness. Its mission is to found a government of love as a 
preparation for a reign of justice. 



The Alexandrian School 8^ 

The Alexandrians derived the doctrine of faith 
from their necessities. Skepticism, "that theory 
which rejects experience as the criterion of truth," had 
defeated the reason. The propaganda of doubt had 
challenged the validity of the understanding, but it is 
impossible so deeply to discredit experience as to deprive 
it of all authority. The authority that the Alexandrians 
offered was faith. It was, therefore, to the ingenuity of 
those defenders of thought who, having been defeated 
by skepticism, sought another source of knowledge than 
reason, that religion owes the bulwark of its creed, the 
argument of faith. 

PHILO 

Christian theology took its rise in the interpretations 
of deity evolved by the schools at Alexandria, chief 
among which was the ISTeo Platonic. 

Philo Judgeus, who was the precursor of this school, 
was born at Alexandria shortly before the beginning of 
our era, and was, therefore, a contemporary of Jesus. 
Although belonging to the same race, these two sublime 
characters were separated by insurmoimtable barriers. 
At that epoch, the inestimable treasures of Greek 
literature were unknown to the orthodox Jews of Pales- 
tine, because the writings of all other nations, together 
with the only liberal Jewish culture of the time, be- 
longed to a body of learning strictly interdicted by 
the Sandhedrins, Such was the stigma of Atheism 
which the Jewish authorities visited upon the heathen 
theology, that the grandeur and beauty of human 
thought and feeling — as revealed in Hellenic and 
Oriental letters — were veiled from the worshippers of 
Jehovah. 

Having imbibed the doctrines of the New Academy, 



86 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Philo made no pretense of refuting the theories of the 
skeptics. His endeavor was to build a system of belief 
which could endure in spite of all skepticism. The source 
of truth, he maintained, is the innate faculty of faith. 
"The senses may deceive, reason may be powerless, but 
there is still a faculty in man; there is faith." "Real 
science is the gift of God ; its cause is piety." 

With great subtlet}'^, Philo combined with theology 
adherence to the law and ritual of his race. If any- 
where God is conceived as an individual, it is in the 
Hebrew Scriptures. There we find a deity of passions, 
making plans and repenting of them ; taking vengeance 
and offering forgiveness. 

To the conception of the personal God of Israel 
Philo added the Platonic idea of universal unity. He 
contended that God is to be worshipped not only as 
an individual, but also as the most general of existences. 
To Philo, therefore, God was both a person and the 
universal principle, a limited as well as an unlimited 
existence. 

Plato sought to identify the ideas of good and of 
divinity, but Philo maintained that God is exalted above 
all goodness. Had the latter conceived of deity as a 
principle alone, he would have been justified in separat- 
ing the idea of righteousness from that of divinity, for 
divinity is universal, whereas the meaning of good is 
limited to species. What is for the advantage of one 
species cannot be so for all, because nature ordains that 
each form of life, as a condition of existence, shall prey 
upon other living things. 

The aim of philosophy is to discover not only the 
criterion of truth, but of right, or the meaning of 
good. Biology informs us that the elements of life, or 



The Alexandrian School 87 

the basic organic functions, are assimilation and repro- 
duction. Life is only another name for the coincidence 
of these forces. Language, as an intellectual environ- 
ment, aids the assimilation and reproduction of ideas, 
just as the physical medium co-operates in correspond- 
ing corporeal activities. Thus, all life, whether spiritual 
or physical, is a form of assimilation and reproduction, 
and these basic instincts indicate duty, because upon 
them existence depends. 

Existence or self-preservation is the first law of 
nature, and, therefore, of God, but in order to conceive 
this principle as a moral law, it is necessary to extend 
the meaning of self until it includes the race. Eight- 
eousness, therefore, is another name for the right line 
of assimilation and reproduction, or the true develop- 
ment of property and of family, the means by which 
living beings maintain themselves. Hence, duty is the 
line of least resistance for the preservation of each 
species. Only within the pale of species is might 
modified by right. Within this ethical sphere the strong 
should protect the weak. Beyond this natural boundary 
of justice, force is the only law. 

Hence, Philo was right in saying that deity is ex- 
alted above all goodness, unless by goodness is meant 
that universal order to which every individual owes not 
only its life, but also its sentence of death. 

If deity were a person, he would belong to a race, for 
there can be no individuality without species. To him 
the preservation of race would be the criterion of right. 
There is no need, therefore, of confusing the principle of 
universal order with righteousness, for the former signi- 
fies motion, and the latter, species. 

Philo, who was a believing Jew, inaugurated a school 



S8 The Evolution of Knowledge 

of philosophy which existed for centuries as a rival of 
the Christian faith. His teachings were gradually in- 
corporated by the church in its creeds. Hence, the doc- 
trines of the Platonists have insensibly passed into the 
confession of every Christian denomination. The three 
constituent factors of Christian theology are the God 
of Israel, the Platonic idea of divinity as interpreted 
by the Alexandrians, and that ancient doctrine of mys- 
ticism, — ^the necessity of a mediator between God and 
man by which to surmount the otherwise inaccessible 
nature of deity. 

AMMONIUS SACOAS 

Early in the third century Ammonius Saccas was 
instrumental in founding the school of Alexandria, — a 
movement which attracted many great minds. For near- 
ly three centuries this school flourished, its rivalry with 
Christianity spreading its renown throughout the 
world. Under its auspices the idealism of Plato was 
revived by Plotinus. His successors, Porph}Ty and 
lamblicus, endeavored to show that idealism is superior 
to Christianity ; while Proclus sought to harmonize reli- 
gion and philosophy. 

The intellectual center in which the dogmatic of the 
Christian era took its rise was truly cosmopolitan. Not 
far from the temple of Serapis, Greek skepticism, 
Platonism, Judaism and Christianity, each found ex- 
pounders. 

The method of the Alexandrian Eclecticism was to 
place in juxtaposition the various systems of thought, 
in the hope that the truth might be evolved. Long 
afterward in France, this method was revived by Victor 
Cousin and his contemporaries. Although an out- 



The Alexandrian School 89 

growth of the doctrines of Plato, the Eclecticism of 
Alexandria produced by degrees a mystic pantheism 
wholly foreign to Greek thought. The confusion then 
prevailing concerning the attributes of deity can be 
judged of by the fact that Theology and Theosophy 
were used as convertible terms. 

PLOTINUS 

Not only by reason of the sublimity of its thought, 
but on account of its mysticism, for a time the school 
of Ammonius Saccas succeeded as a rival of the Chris- 
tian faith. The Alexandrians were Puritans. Their 
tendency was to despise the corporeal, for they be- 
lieved that the material and the ideal are incompatible. 
Plotinus blushed because he had a body. Contempt for 
human nature could go no further. This austere thinker 
originated the Alexandrian metaphysic; a system of 
absolute idealism long afterward rehabilitated by the 
German transcendentalists. Its theories all spring from 
the fact that subject and object are the opposite terms 
of the relation known as thought; but as expounded by 
Plotinus, the ideas of the school became so involved as 
to be almost impossible of explanation. The object of 
Plotinus was to reach an ultimate analysis by proving 
that the varieties of the universe are modes of divine 
being — variety and unity being the opposite aspects of 
existence. Viewing deity as the imiversal principle, this 
theory is correct. But Plotinus failed because he con- 
ceived deity as an absolute individual, or ego, whereas 
all individuality is relative. 

iThe discovery that knowledge is relative, or that in- 
telligence depends upon organic functions, has proved 
fatal to pantheism or the doctrine that deity is an 



90 The Evolution of Knowledge 

absolute and omnipresent consciousness. Plotinus 
taught that the sensible world or nature is a dynamic 
manifestation of the ideal, or, as Kant afterward ex- 
pressed it, that nature is a result of ideas. He also 
taught the mystical belief in an "ecstatic vision of the 
infinite," — the theory that deity, or the ultimate reality, 
although inscrutable to man's normal faculties, may 
nevertheless be apprehended through a state of mind 
called ecstacy. If knowledge is relative there can be no 
absolute difference between divine and human intelli- 
gence. There is no need, therefore, of "ecstatic vision" 
in order to perceive the order of nature, unless by ecstacy 
is meant devotion to truth. 

The dispute between the Alexandrians and the 
Christians concerning the Trinity is of deep philosophic 
interest. Each side claims priority for its doctrines. 
Both views are derived from beliefs of the highest 
antiquity. In the Athanasian creed is to be found the 
most concise statement of the Christian belief. "That 
we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, 
neither confounding the persons nor dividing the sub- 
stance ; for there is one person of the Father, another of 
the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. But the God- 
head of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy 
Ghost is all one ; the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal." 

One of the principal explanations offered in support 
of this elaborate dogma is, that the names applied to 
God in the Old Testament, such as Elohim, having a 
plural signification and yet being used as the subject of 
a singular verb, suggest both unity and variety in the 
Godhead. One will look in vain among the traditiona 
of Moses for any of these subtle divisions of deity in 
which the Jews and Christians of Alexandria so de- 



The Alexandrian School 91 

lighted. The great legislator of the Hebrews is exon- 
erated from any complicity in the idea of three Gods in 
one, by the artless manner in which he is made to speak 
of Yahveh in the Ten Commandments and other Hebrew 
Scriptures.* 

In his explanation of the Trinity, Plotinns was more 
philosophical than the Christians. He explained the 
hypostases or substances of deity as a completion of the 
theory of Semitic monotheism. 

Jules Simon maintains that there is only a slight re- 
semblance between the Alexandrian and the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity. The Christian Trinity, says 
this author, is the unity of three different persons, or 
hypostases or substances in one being. The persons of 
the Christian Trinity know and love one another, 
whereas the hypostases of Plotinus know and love only 
the one higher than themselves, being unconscious of the 
inferior ones until unity is realized which has nothing 
above, and knows and loves nothing. Plotinus' idea 
of deity was similar to that offered long afterward by 
Spinoza, when he said that: "No one can desire to be 
loved by God, for it would be to desire that God cease 
to be perfect.'' 

The Christian conception of the Trinity is poetical, 
for it divides deity into three equal persons, between 
whom the love is reciprocal. The Trinity of Plotinus 
is philosophical, for it symbolizes the ultimate three in 
one, or the universal principle, with its subjective and 
objective aspects, which is the real source of all theories 
of a tripartite divinity. 



* Also notably consult Exod. iii: 14; Deut. xxxii: 39, 



92 The Evolution of Knowledge 

ROMAN LAW 

In passing from ancient to modern philosophy, we en- 
counter the civilization of the Eomans in which the 
science of mind, as compared with that of jurisprudence, 
held so inferior a position. During and long after the 
Augustinian age, the Eomans looked to Alexandria for 
their philosophy, and the Church of Eome derived from 
the same scource its prof oundest theories of existence. 

With the Eomans, philosophic originality took the 
form of law. In creating their marvellous legal system 
they were impelled not by a motive of conscious literary 
production, but by the instinct of social development. 
Thus the treasures of Eoman jurisprudence were ac- 
cumulated as a result of the organic growth of the state. 
In this great commonwealth the source of authority was 
the will of the people, voiced by the decrees of magis- 
trates empowered by the people to legislate. Hence 
Eoman law is one of the surest historical foundations 
of human liberty. 

The civil edicts of the Eomans were formulated with 
singular independence. Before the law of contract, of 
inheritance and of family relationship, the plebeian and 
the patrician were equal. To the edicts of the Eoman 
magistrates we owe nearly all the legal principles under 
which we now live. They were the basis of canon-law, 
for the ecclesiastical courts administered them after 
Eome lost her sovereignty. Thence they passed into 
our common-law. Indeed, so profound has been the in- 
fluence of this system upon the nations of Christendom, 
that in a legal sense we are to a great extent a perpetua- 
tion of the Eoman state. 

Up to the time of Tiberius, when the foundations of 
the vast tribunal or court system were laid, the Eomans 



Church Dogmatism 93 

had no law schools, no professional lawyers, no profes- 
sional judges. The inconceivable riches of their juris- 
prudence were contributed by soldiers, by statesmen and 
by land owners, by men who devoted only part of their 
time to the practice of law. From the many persons 
daily besieging their homes in quest of legal advice 
the Roman jurists never thought of asking recompense. 
They solved legal problems just as the problems of 
other sciences have been solved, for the sake of truth. 
To the Eoman people we are indebted for the only co- 
ordinated legal system of antiquity, an institution which, 
as above indicated, arose spontaneously as a result of 
social development. Like the art and the philosophy of 
the Greeks, the legal science of the Eomans has never 
been superseded. As language is the structure of 
thought, so law is the structure of morals. The Eo- 
mans, therefore, have laid for us the foundations of 
ethical science. 

CHURCH DOGMATISM 

From the decline of the school of Alexandria to the 
revival of learning in Europe, philosophy remained sub- 
Bervient to the Church. During the centuries known 
as the Dark Ages, the cloister provided learning with 
a home ; but when the mind of Christendom, en- 
couraged by growing civil liberties, sought to regain in- 
dependence, it found in its ecclesiastical protector a 
powerful and a determined enemy. 

The opposition of the Church to scientific progress, 
says Turgot, does not imply the advocacy of error; 
*Vhat opposes the progress of truth is indolence, obsti- 
nacy and the spirit of routine." 

The Christian religion teaches one central truth. 



94 The Evolution of Knowledge 

To the believing Christian, God is made manifest 
through Christ. The character of deity is revealed in 
the life of Jesus. The controlling motive of Jesus was 
love working regeneration. This doctrine of devotion 
to the race as the source of social progress is the root 
of all that Christian practice has steadfastly taught, 
and moreover, it contains all the elements of a true 
system of ethics. 

The civil character of the early Christians was formed 
under the guidance of Roman law, and their minds were 
developed in a community enlightened by the ideals 
of Grecian Philosophy. The fathers of the Church in- 
stinctively availed themselves of these monuments of 
knowledge for their own work. The civil organiza- 
tion of Eome determined the form of the Church, for 
that institution was built upon the existing lines of 
the Imperial Government. The dioceses of the Church 
were identical with the subdivisions of the Empire, and 
her local counsels were a reproduction of the political 
"Concilia." The Bishop and the priests of a province 
composed a synod, while the Sacerdos Provincice with 
his deputies (legati) constituted the partly civil and 
partly religious councils of the Empire. Thus it was by 
following the lines of existing civil institutions that the 
Christian hierarchy gradually absorbed the functions of 
the decaying Eoman state. 

Neo-Platonism had created a literature in which the 
Hellenic and Hebraic faiths found a certain reconcil- 
iation. The worship of Jehovah and the Platonic idea 
of divine unity joined in a mystic theosophy. From this 
competition of personal and universal authority modern 
civilization has sprung. 

Where conflicting principles are assembled reactions 



Church Dogmatism 95 

inevitably ensue; — hence the wars of the Iieresies which 
distinguished the early epochs of Christian development. 
From this tumult asceticism retired. A great monastic 
system appeared, at whose doors have been laid the 
darkest of crimes, grotesquely mingled with the sublim- 
est virtues. The treasures of ancient art and letters 
preserved at the A^atican silently reproach the Chris- 
tian monks, who destroyed the statues of the Greeks and 
the library of the Alexandrians, and yet, where are we 
to find higher examples of devotion than have been of- 
fered by Christian ascetics? Asceticism is a pietistic 
extreme. Like bigotry and superstition, it is reactionary. 
The power which enabled the Church to supplant the 
Roman commonwealth was not gained by extreme meas- 
ures. It came from the offer of place and emolument 
alike to the haughty Eoman citizen and to his bond- 
man, and of asylum to the oppressed. It came from the 
offer of spiritual freedom to the greater part of the 
people who were slaves, and of social influence conferred 
by proclaiming the religious equality of women. The 
facts of Christian development illustrate the immortal 
dictum of Montesquieu: "I will ever repeat it, man- 
kind is governed not by extremes, but by principles of 
moderation." These righteous and moderate influences 
strengthened the authority of the Church and gradually 
converted the Eoman Empire. 

In competing with other religions, Christianity added 
many extraneous beliefs to the idea with which it be- 
gan. This idea was the original doctrine of regenera- 
tion symbolized by a Kingdom of God founded upon 
Love, but it gradually became obscured by accretions of 
dogma and ritual. 

We are told that of all nations of antiquity the Jews 



96 The Evolution of Knowledge 

made most manifest the distinction between holiness 
and sin. The divine gift of holiness they regarded as 
inseparable from their laws and rites. They believed 
that its benefits were intended exclusively for their own 
race. But Jesus belonged to a class of reformers who 
strove to give the advantage of salvation to the whole 
world. 

The first form assumed by Christianity, therefore, 
was the distinctively Hebraic faith in a Messiah, — the 
race deliverer, the innovation upon the old belief con- 
sisting in the offer of salvation not to a favored race, but 
to all mankind. 

THE CHRISTIAN MYSTERIES 

In the dogmatic development of the Church there 
early appeared the mysteries of the Incarnation, the Ee- 
demption, and the Trinity, each of which may be found 
in a developed form in other and older religions. The 
annals of the Patristic teaching tell us how these ancient 
mysteries were gradually absorbed by Christianity, and 
incorporated in its creeds, and how the complicated 
visions of the Gnostics and the Manichasans were re- 
jected in favor of simpler forms of theosophy. 

The Apostolic Fathers were occupied in the struggle 
between Jewish and Pauline Christianity, or between 
Christ sustained by the law of Moses and Christ alone. 
The triumph of the latter resulted in the utter sepa- 
ration of ecclesiasticism from Judaism and the inde- 
pendent development of a hierarchical Church. 



Church Dogmatism 97 

TEE PATRISTIC FATHERS 



JUSTIN MARTYR 

Justin Martyr, who followed immediately after the 
Apostolic Fathers, gave his allegiance first to the Stoics 
and to Plato, and afterwards to Christianity. The in- 
spiration of the Greek philosophers and poets he as- 
cribed to the Divine Spirit, but maintained that a more 
complete revelation was to be sought in Christ. The 
middle of the Second Century found Justin advocating 
the moral law of the Jews, and the Pharisaic doctrine 
of a conditional future life arranged so that the soul 
might receive rewards and punishments after death. 
This great Father also espoused the Persian dogma of 
the resurrection of the body, and the original Christian 
theory of a millennial reign of Christ to precede the final 
judgment. 

CLEMENT OP ALEXANDRIA AND ORIGEN 

Clement of Alexandria and Origen declared that the 
condition of salvation is active obedience to the divine 
law. These Fathers disagreed, therefore, with the teach- 
ing of Justin and Irenseus, for they held that the soul 
is immortal by nature, existing before and after the body. 
In their opinion the fate of the soul, whether that of 
happiness or of damnation, depended upon the favor of 
God as a gift of divine grace. 

Clement and Origen maintained that the goodness of 
God could be better illustrated by bringing to an end 
the punishment of the transgressor so that he could re- 
turn to original blessedness. This humane doctrine is in 
contrast with the theory that since the sin of our first 



98 The Evolution of Knowledge , 

parents, we do not inherit original blessedness, but, on 
the contrary, we are born in a state of total depravity 
from which we can be saved, not by good actions, but 
only by the gift of God's grace. The Council of Nicsea 
(A. D. 325) gave sanction to the theory of total de- 
pravity in the vain attempt to establish, by ecclesiastical 
authority, harmony among the conflicting dogmas held 
in the Church. 

GREGORY OF NYSSA 

The Church had already gained a recognized suprem- 
acy in the Eoman state when Gregory of Nyssa promul- 
gated the doctrine of Election, the theory that God, 
knowing in advance how each human being would 
decide concerning salvation, rejects some and elects 
others. If decided in advance, man's fate cannot de- 
pend upon his own actions. Gregory professed to think 
that divine justice would not permit eternal punish- 
ment. He advocated the more humane doctrine that 
punishment is a purification, or that by the ultimate 
triumph of the divine will all shall be saved. 

ST. AUGUSTINE 

The most prominent figure among the Patristic 
Fathers was the African St. Augustine, to whom we 
are indebted for a refutation of the benignant teaching 
of Gregory concerning the will of God. In attempting 
to vindicate the dogma of eternal damnation, St. Augus- 
tine reasoned that the vast number of human beings 
condemned by Providence to endless siilTering are in- 
stances of divine justice. 

St. Augustine also taught, with undoubted sincerity, 
that that which faith holds to be certain should also be 
comprehended by the reason. In the De Vera Religione, 



Scholasticism 99 

he asserts that philosophy and religion should be one. It 
is worthy of note, however, that in the last literary pro- 
duction of this eminent theologian. The Betractions, 
written a few years before his death, A. D. 430, he re- 
cants his earlier views, deemed too favorable to the 
sciences and to human freedom, in order that his writ- 
ings might coincide with the teachings of the Church. 

These conflicts of opinion concerning rewards and 
punishments, — disputes which have been coextensive 
with the history of the Church, — will ultimately yield 
to psychology and ethics. These great sciences will 
eventually explain the nature of God and the human 
soul, or, in more modern parlance, they will enlighten 
us as to the ultimate nature of authority. 

SCHOLASTICISM 

To the modem mind accustomed to regard the state 
as the sovereign power, the condition of Europe during 
the Middle Ages is scarcely conceivable, because the 
chief governing power, instead of being political, was 
ecclesiastical. The Eoman Church having become a 
state within a state, its influence in political as well as 
in spiritual matters was supreme. 

The fact that Europe was divided into a multitude of 
small territories, in each of which the civil government 
had but feeble control, causing justice to depend 
upon force of arms, gave to the hierarchy universal 
sway. Owing to the inefhcient political organizations, the 
Church was often the only protector of the poor and 
helpless. In the disputes of rulers it frequently as- 
sumed the function of arbiter by persuading princes 
that its sanction was necessary to their authority. 

The influence upon thought of this religious autocracy 



..or 



c r> 



loo The Evolution of Knowledge 

was as enervating as might have been expected. Like all 
unrestricted authority, it corrupted those who wielded it. 
But, as often happens, the suppression of truth resulted 
finally in its vindication. Through the admirable sin- 
cerity of the religious dogmatist science was enabled 
eventually to triumph; for, as the history of scholasti- 
cism shows, the more the dogmatist meditated upon his 
beliefs the more outspoken he became in his conviction 
that the Church doctrines could not be reconciled with 
reason. 

Scholasticism represents the intellectual life of the 
Middle Ages. It includes the chief theological and 
scientific controversies of that epoch. During this 
period the natural sciences were cultivated only in a 
slight degree. The all-pervading ecclesiastical power 
centered attention upon theology, and, as a consequence, 
the most learned and gifted persons in all Europe were 
absorbed in questions of systematic divinity. But as the 
modern mind became disenchanted, public interest in 
theology declined. Reason gradually became the arbiter 
of faith for the Eenaissance ushered in an era of free 
investigation which obtained at last the reluctant sanc- 
tion of orthodoxy, 

JOHANNES SCOTUS 

The earliest noteworthy philosopher of the Scholastic 
period was Johannes Scotus, or Erigena. He was edu- 
cated, it is said, early in the Ninth Century at the 
schools then flourishing in Ireland. In 843 Charles the 
Bald invited him to take charge of the Court School at 
Paris. 

The Fathers did not hesitate to interpret the Scrip- 
tures allegorically, modifying them in accordance with 



Scholasticism loi 

their own views. This treatment of Holy Writ re- 
sulted naturally in the habit of dogmatizing. In after 
years the Scholastics treated the writings of the Church 
Fathers with the same reverence as they accorded the 
Scriptures. An examination of the conclusions arrived 
at shows that the Scholastic attempts to reconcile the 
Bible and the Fathers inevitably led to contradictions. 

The course of truth never runs smoothly. The first 
Scholastic philosopher began by getting into trouble 
with Rome. At all times ready to assert the authority 
of the councils, the hierarchy was unceasingly occupied 
with heretical controversy. Rome did not realize that 
"Truth makes revelation, not revelation, truth." As 
knowledge slowly developed, a greater and greater num- 
ber of dogmas were found incapable of demonstration. 
One of the sources of this revolt of reason against dog- 
matism was the Aristotelian philosophy, which con- 
stantly inspired a spirit of original investigation. As a 
consequence there arose in the very bosom of the Church 
a feeling of antagonism toward the peripatetic system, 
notwithstanding the fact that it had so long enjoyed the 
protection of orthodoxy. 

Pope Nicholas I. complained to the King of France 
that Scotus did not submit his translation of Dionysius 
Areopagita to his censorship. To such close pontifical 
scrutiny can be traced much of the uneasiness still felt 
concerning certain versions of the ancients. 

Scotus was an independent thinker and endeavored to 
harmonize philosophy and religion. Where there was 
conflict with ecclesiastical authority, he gave the prefer- 
ence to reason. Very delicately, however, was this inde- 
pendence expressed. "We must," says Scotus, "piously 
accept the teachings of the Fathers; yet it is permitted 



I02 The Evolution of Knowledge 

us to give preference to what appears in the judgment of 
the reason, more in accordance with divine knowledge, 
especially where the ancient teachers of the Church are 
in contradiction," So deep-seated, however, was the 
disagreement among the Fathers, that the appeal of 
Scotus to reason had eventually the effect of overthrow- 
ing the intellectual authority of the Church. 

There is a general impression that the writings of the 
Scholastics were arid and their reasonings specious. As 
a rule, they adopted a severe dialectical method, often 
giving minute attention to matters now considered 
as puerile. When we find tliem, for instance, earnestly 
debating how many spirits can dance upon the point of 
a needle, we are apt to question the sense of their in- 
quiries. And yet for those who believed in disembodied 
spirits nothing could have been more natural than the 
question of the room they require. Had it been pos- 
sible for the Scholastics to have consulted a biologist, 
they would have learned that there can be no function 
without structure. Hence even spiritual or intellectual 
functions occupy space. 

In the first book of Scotus an attempt is made to co- 
ordinate the categories of thought, or to discover the 
relationship of universals. This author regarded not 
motion alone, but motion and rest, as ultimate. Since 
it has been discovered that both substance and rest are 
arrested motion, it is clear that some of the Scholastics 
came very near to a last analysis. 

According to Scotus, Predestination, which means 
fore-ordained punishment for man, is a proof of the 
goodness and justice of God. In attempting to justify 
this doctrine^ he offered the comforting reflection that 



Scholas ticism 103 

it is better that a few should be saved than that all should 
foe lost. 

By this time the heresies had become so numerous as 
to present almost every possible shade of dissenting 
opinion. Although there was a body of dogmas serving 
the purpose of a creed, the trend of orthodoxy was by no 
means clearly defined. Then, as now, it was not uncom- 
mon to hear bishops complaining of the infidelity of 
their more thoughtful contemporaries. New interpreta- 
tions of the Incarnation, the Eedemption and the 
Trinity, were constantly appearing. In this ceaseless 
war of opinion there was conspicuously lacking a 
standard of faith. The Apostolic Fathers could not 
agree concerning the meaning of the Scriptures, the 
Scholastics could not agree concerning the beliefs of the 
Fathers, or the decrees of the councils, while reason 
vehemently protested against all but one of the Chris- 
tian dogmas, whether heretical or orthodox. And yet, 
so essential to human happiness is a theory of existence 
that throughout this vast conflict of opinion the Chris- 
tian retained his faith. 

The only Christian doctrine that represents the aim 
of the Church and at the same time appeals to the 
reason is that of love working regeneration. This doc- 
trine develops naturally into a sublime and an imperish- 
able example. 

ROSCELLimJS 

Eoscellinus, canon of Compiegne, was the first advo- 
cate of Nominalism against the pretensions of Idealism, 
a theory which was then called Eealism. He believed 
that words and ideas represent facts, whereas the Eealist 
believed that facts represent ideas. Between these ex- 
tremes lies the truth, for when it is understood that in 



104 The Evolution of Knowledge 

the deepest sense thought is action, there can be no dis- 
pute concerning the comparative reality of ideas and 
facts. 

Eoscellinus maintained that universals, or general 
ideas, derive their reality from the facts which they 
classify, and, therefore, that the general idea of the 
Trinity can become a reality only in its individuals, their 
unity of substance disappearing as a mere name. For 
this tritheistic doctrine Eoscellinus was impeached by 
the Council of Soissons in 1092. The members of the 
Council, representing extreme Eealism, maintained that 
facts are only copies of ideas, and hence the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Ghost, which they assumed to be facts, 
are not individual realities but only copies of the one 
idea of God. 

The worthy Eoscellinus reluctantly acquiesced in the 
decree of the Council. His recantation, confessing that 
the three individual Godheads are not separate realities, 
had the good fortune of agreeing not only with ortho- 
doxy, but with reason. 

ANSELM 

Of all the Scholastics the most orthodox was Anselm, 
Archbishop of Canterbury. Both in thought and deed, 
he required absolute submission to ecclesiastical author- 
ity. On the score of originality, therefore, we need have 
no fear of his opinions. 

The fervent piety of Anselm caused him to subordinate 
philosophy to theology. His aim was to place on a 
logical basis, not only the monotheism of the Trinity, but 
the mystery of the Incarnation, although many eminent 
Scholastics, even including Thomas Aquinas, frankly ad- 
mitted that these mysteries could not be conceived as 
rational, but should be accepted upon the authority of 



Scholasticism 105 

revelation or by faith. The Archbishop, however, be- 
lieving implicitly in Church dogma, labored to prove the 
rationality of his creed, which is an instance of the 
homage sincerity instinctively offers to truth. 

Anselm reasoned that since man's sin is infinite, it 
requires infinite punishment. If, therefore, it were the 
fate of all mankind to be eternally damned, it would 
still be in accordance with divine justice; but such 
severity being contrary to divine goodness we have need 
of the Christian scheme of atonement. Thus the great- 
est of all revelations, which is that justice and goodness 
are one, found no favor in the sight of this worthy 
archbishop. 

ABELARD 

The aversion of the ecclesiastical authorities of the 
Middle Ages to independent thought was modified in the 
case of Abelard, a scholar and dialectician known to 
fame not only for intellectual prowess, but also because 
of his devotion to the brilliant Heloise. 

Although he taught theology after the approved 
Aristotelian method, Abelard's views were rationalistic. 
"Words/' said this author, "were invented by men 
to express their thoughts, and must conform to 
facts." From this it is evident that Abelard was not a 
Eealist, for in that case he would have said that facts 
must conform to words. He opposed the realistic 
tendency to account for phenomena by ideas, because 
he saw that thought is related to phenomena in the same 
manner as a reflection to its object. Of course, the re- 
flection itself can be viewed as an object. If thought is 
made an object of thought, the result is a re-reflection. 
To each individual the ideas of others are external, or a 
part of objective phenomena. When it is realized that 



io6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

both are forms of motion, there will bo no question as 
to the comparative reality of ideas and facts. 

The engrossing interest of Scholasticism was the con- 
tention between Nominalism and Realism. Some writers 
class Abelard as a Nominalist, others as a Eealist, and 
still others as a Conceptualist. Throughout all post-Gre- 
cian philosophy one distinction can be traced, originating 
in the divergence between the teachings of Plato and 
Aristotle. Plato invested ideas with absolute existence. 
He believed that thoughts come nearer to reality than 
facts or nature ; and as we recognize ideas only by means 
of names, he gave to ideas and to their names a deeper 
reality than to phenomena. This was the metaphysical 
theory of Plato, and is best known by the term Idealism. 

The opposite of the idealistic theory is the method of 
investigation accompanied by verification and the group- 
ing of the results into more and more general truths. The 
ideas of science are always subordinate to facts, because 
evolved from them. This, in general terms, was Aris- 
totle's method, and is distinguished from Plato's in that 
the latter regarded ideas themselves as the source of 
reality. 

Realism is the theory that certain kinds of ideas, 
known as general, such as animal — man — truth — ^have 
an absolute existence, separate from the facts which they 
generalize. 

Idealism maintains that all ideas have an absolute 
existence, such as both the idea of a given man, and the 
idea of man in general, or that of a given animal and the 
order animal. 

Nominalism, on the other hand, is the ultra-scientific 
theory. It holds that names and the ideas they repre- 
sent are signs of facts and their relations ; that a general 



Scholasticism 107 

name, such as circle, stands siniply for the relation of a 
circumference to its center. This relation can be 
generalized by applying it to many single facts; but in 
each case it is the function of a fact and has no abso- 
lutely separate existence. 

To repeat, Eealism holds that the name circle stands 
for an existence more real than the conditions of a 
circle. It is a form of the Idealism of Plato which 
believed in divine Archetypes, from which all concrete 
embodiments are derived. But this theory of Plato has 
fallen into such disrepute that the word ideal has come 
to signify the opposite of real. To us real means the 
actual or the verifiable as distinguished from the ideal or 
the phantasmal. 

It is not surprising, therefore, since the terms are gen- 
erally understood as having an opposite meaning, that the 
general reader should be puzzled when told by the his- 
torian that Eealism is a species of Idealism. In 
short. Idealism holds that all reality is in the mind ; 
while Eealism maintains that only the greater part of 
reality is in the mind. Nominalism, on the other hand, 
proclaims that the mind is the function of organic condi- 
tions and that its vehicle, language, is purely symbolic. 
Now, evolution proves that mind and phenomena are 
simply different points of view of nature, and that 
nature and reality are one. 

Imagine, therefore, the confusion arising from the 
contention of the Scholastics that Aristotle, who stood 
for the rational or scientific method, was a Eealist or a 
quasi-Idealist. The fact is that Aristotle endeavored 
to oppose the Idealism of Plato, but he became so en- 
tangled in its mystical phraseology that, in the Middle 
Ages, certain of Aristotle's works were interpreted in the 



io8 The Evolution of Knowledge 

spirit of Scholastic Realism, and were identified with re- 
ligious orthodoxy. Hence we shall not be surprised to 
find a line of reformers from Abelard to Francis Bacon, 
attacking Idealism by denouncing the orthodox versions 
of Aristotle. 

Even those who place no credence in religious dogma 
may commiserate with the Church on accoimt of the 
number of heresies that arose against it. The simplest 
form of religion is the aspiration for a higher life. 
Without this aim the Church could not subsist, for 
eventually it is by reason of their utility that all insti- 
tutions survive. The accretions of dogma, clinging to 
the structure of Christian faith, have been thus far sup- 
ported by the mighty human purpose beneath. 

The Church received its beliefs from numberless 
sources. The wonder is not that so many doctrines were 
rejected, but that so many were accepted. The hos- 
pitality of the hierarchy to the tenets of other re- 
ligions is well known. From the worship of Isis and of 
Buddha; from the cults of the Greeks and Romans; 
from the teachings of the Jews and of the Neo-Platon- 
ists; and from the philosophy of the Aristotelians, the 
Stoics and the Scholastics; the Church of Christ has 
received beliefs connecting it by countless invisible 
ties with the intellectual and the devotional life of the 
past. Yet, many opinions arose for which no room 
could be found in the Christian household. Over the 
question of the acceptance of these doctrines wars were 
waged. It would be wrong to suppose that in the 
majority of these conflicts the hierarchy was the ag- 
gressor. As a rule, the Church opposed heresies only 
when its authority was endangered. In resisting hetero- 
doxy the heirarchy was contending with overwhelming 



Scholasticism 109 

forces of disintegration, which threatened not only re- 
ligion, but the order of society. 

We are wont to condemn organized religion because 
it is an intellectual despotism, but until we can find 
a better guide for the great majority of men, who, alas, 
will always depend upon others for thought, we must 
concede its utility. True criticism is not destructive, it 
is always constructive. The religion of Christ will never 
be destroyed. It will be superseded by a better and a 
higher faith, to which, in the course of evolution, it will 
give birth and through which its sublime principles will 
live again. 

Nestorius, a Fifth Century patriarch of Constan- 
tinople, proclaimed that the Virgin Mary was not the 
mother of God, for the reason that divinity could not be 
a member of a species. He was condemned at Ephesus 
and exiled to Egypt, but his followers became so numer- 
ous and powerful that the orthodox party declared war 
upon them, and they were driven into Syria. Before 
the time of Mohammed, Nestorians, who resided among 
the Arabs as physicians, translated the works of Plato 
and Aristotle into Arabic. Through this medium the 
medieval Christians were destined to gain their knowl- 
edge of Greek Philosophy. In the meantime, while 
Hellenic thought flourished among the Mohammedans, 
among the Christians it declined, for the decree of Jus- 
tinian, suppressing Neo-Platonism, had for many cen- 
turies the effect of debarring the faithful from the ines- 
timable benefits of the Greek language and literature. 



no The Evolution of Knowledge 

ALBERTUS IMAGNUS 

Albertus Magnus, who belonged to the Thirteenth 

Century, was the first Scliolastic to revive interest in 
the Peripatetic school. For generations Aristotle had 
been known in the Church in a fragmentary way, but 
Albertus restored to light the system as a whole, thereby 
unconsciously preparing the way for the subsequent re- 
volt of reason. Unacquainted with the original, in his 
presentation he followed Avicenna and Averroes, as well 
as the Jewish philosopher, Maimonides, but he did not 
hesitate to modify the doctrines of the great Stagirite to 
meet the views of the Church. 

THOMAS AQUINAS 

The chief interest of the Scholastic period centers in 
Thomas Aquinas, the pupil of Albertus Magnus. Aqui- 
nas taught that Christian dogma cannot correspond with 
reason but is revealed only unto faith. Such a belief 
could not fail eventually to injure orthodoxy, for in 
the last analysis reason and truth are one. The writings 
of Aquinas, which are acknowledged to be the comple- 
tion of orthodox}^, repeatedly aver that theological dog- 
mas have never even professed to be scientifically true. 

Theology, or systematic divinity, has always sought to 
transcend nature. To romance nothing is impossible. 
Theology is the romance of divinity, the story of an un- 
known world peopled with unknowable beings. If to 
persuade an enlightened people to acknowledge the 
authority of reason, it is necessary to appeal to the 
imagination, the examples or characters employed 
should conform as nearly as possible to nature, the 
source of all truth ; for when discrepancies are dis- 



Scholasticism 1 1 1 

covered between the teachings of the Church and those 
of experience the former invariably suffers. 

The people are guided by authority rather than by 
reason. The masses yield to personal suasion; "they 
seek not to understand, but to obey." But it is no 
longer safe to rely upon popular submission to ecclesi- 
astical authority. The instinct for truth is ever active, 
and the Church must find a way of conforming its 
teachings to the revelations of nature. 

Until reconstituted after their return from captivity 
under Ezra, the ancient Hebrews were a collection of 
tribes lacking political solidarity. The hierarchy taught 
them the principle of nationality, and the temple was 
the center of religious and political unity. Their faith 
in Jehovah was therefore a necessity. The Christian 
nations are learning that the highest nationality is 
community of human interests. The realization of this 
ideal of a common humanity was the aim of the medie- 
val church and the essence of its catholicity. Hence the 
worship of a personal God is preparing the way for 
that highest catholicity known as the reign of justice. 

Aquinas said: "The doctrines of the creation of the 
world in time, of original sin, of the Incarnation of the 
Logos, of purgatory, of the resurrection of the flesh, the 
Judgment of the world, and eternal salvation and damna- 
tion are not to be demonstrated by natural reason, for 
reason cannot from its own principles advance to the 
demonstration of these dogmas."* In other terms, the 
mind cannot develop naturally and believe in them. 
"The fact that these dogmas cannot be proved," he con- 
tinues, "is a sort of merit attaching to faith, for the in- 

' ' * Sum. Theol., 1 In. 32 Art. 1. 



112 The Evolution of Knowledge 

tellect assents to them not because convinced by proof, 
but in obedience to the will."* 

Here is an example of complete submission to ec- 
clesiastical authority;, or of surrender of the mind to 
the Church. None of the earlier Scholastics or of the 
Church Fathers made so clear the distinction between 
dogmatism and reason. Although a partisan of the 
Church, Aquinas was always honest. The sincerity with 
which he dwelt upon the discrepancy between dogma and 
reason has gone far toward enabling later generations 
to triumph over superstition. 

With the advent of the Renaissance and Humanism 
came a general revolt against sacerdotal rule, — a move- 
ment requiring no little courage on the part of its 
leaders, for at that time nearly all Christendom believed 
that the soul could be saved only by the assistance of the 
priesthood. All accounts agree that the popular heart 
was set upon attaining salvation. The opportunity thus 
afforded was, perhaps, utilized by the Church in the 
best possible manner at a time when great allowance 
must be made for feeble political organization and its 
consequent unenlightenment. It is dijBBcult to read 
the ecclesiastical chronicles of this epoch without indig- 
nation. Before giving way to resentment, however, it 
will be well to remember the vast services rendered to 
society by the Church even during the reign of sacer- 
dotal crime. The devotional life of a community is an 
outgrowth of the political status. Undeveloped ideas of 
deity mean undeveloped civil institutions, for, after all, 
religion is always a reflection of the popular conception 
of justice. 

*Sum. Theol,, 11, 2. ' 



The Revival of Learning 113 

THE REFORMATION 

Although the Eeformation resulted eventually in en- 
lightening society, its leaders were by no means intellec- 
tually free. Luther, who, next to Erasmus, was the great- 
est opponent of papal tyranny and corruption, said that 
"Eeason is the devil's harlot and can do nothing but 
blaspheme." Salvation through the priesthood was the 
old regime. The order introduced by Protestantism was 
salvation througli faith ; but a faith consisting of an un- 
questioning reception of the Scriptures. Instead of the 
Pontiff, the Bible was made the autocrat; — that book 
which of all others requires the most delicate and sym- 
pathetic analysis in order to disengage the spirit of 
righteousness which it contains; that book which is 
capable of so many different interpretations that each of 
the three hundred or more conflicting sects of Protest- 
antism has drawn from it a separate rule of faith. 

The Eeformation was not only an assault upon sacer- 
dotalism. Luther also bitterly opposed the writings of 
the ancients. Blindly attacking the learning which the 
Church had conserved, he regarded some of the great- 
est intellectual achievements of the race as part and 
parcel of the hated hierarchy. In his enthusiasm for the 
Bible, he would have made it the repository of all 
knowledge. Unwittingly selecting the master of ancient 
thought as the object of his wrath, he said : "If Aris- 
totle had not been of flesh, I should not hesitate to 
affirm him to have been truly a devil." 

The Scriptures, however, proved to be but human 
literature, and when the Protestant Church began the 
task of educating its ministry, it was compelled to look 
beyond Holy Writ for the foundations of knowledge. 
Melanchthon, Luther's associate, soon discovered that the 



114 The Evolution of Knowledge 

ancient classics were indispensable and finally confessed, 
as even Luther did afterward, that the new Church could 
not dispense with the monuments of Aristotle. 

GIORDANO BRUNO 

Philosophy as well as religion has had its martyrs. 
In Eome, on the 16th of January, 1600, Giordano Bruno 
suffered death at the stake on account of his opinions. 
This great reformer was the first to give to modern 
science a true method and evolution. 

The devout society of the time was not wholly without 
sympathy for advanced thought. Many Italian ration- 
alists were priests who enjoyed the protection of power- 
ful prelates. These free thinkers created within the 
Church a body of independent learning which was after- 
wards generalized by Bruno. 

At this time, through progressive methods, the pur- 
suit of knowledge found new life. Before the renewed 
investigations of nature the mystical form of all the 
sciences were giving way. The astronomy of Aris- 
totle and Ptolemy was revolutionized by the discoveries 
of Copernicus. To the mind of Bruno the universe was 
infinite in time and space, instead of being, as the theo- 
logians taught, limited in both. The solar system was 
one of innumerable stellar systems. God was the power 
of nature. Eecognizing the unity of mind and matter, 
Bruno saw in the monad properties not only physical 
but psychical, thus connecting the evolutionary theories 
of Aristotle with those of modern times. 

Soon after entering the Dominican order at Naples, 
where he had been educated, Brimo journeyed to the 
Eepublic of Genoa and thence to Venice and Geneva in 
quest of a broader horizon, but the reformed orthodoxy 



The Revival of Learning 115 

of the latter place repelled him as much as had Eoman 
Catholicism. At the Sorbonne, at Oxford and at the 
German seats of learning, this apostle of advanced 
thought was heard. With such vehemence did he attack 
the science of Aristotle and Ptoleniy that at some of the 
universities debates of great moment were organized to 
oppose him. These intellectual tournaments were a 
feature of the age, providing for philosophical discus- 
sion the opportunity now afforded by the modern 
periodical. 

At that time almost all learning was confined to the 
Church. The works of Aristotle were regarded with the 
same reverence as that in which the Bible is now held. 
The Aristotelian logic and physics, and the Ptolemaic 
system of astronomy were integral parts of the accepted 
faith. Around these germs of science, ecclesiastical 
dogma had crystallized, and all who, for any reason, 
opposed the orthodox position were persecuted as enemies 
of society. The hold upon the public mind obtained by 
this miscellaneous body of opinion is to us scarcely con- 
ceivable. In 1624 — a quarter of a century after Bruno's 
martyrdom — the Parliament of Paris issued a decree 
banishing all who publicly maintained theses against 
Aristotle ; and in 1629, at the urgent remonstrance of the 
Sorbonne, it again decreed that to contradict the prin- 
ciples of Aristotle was to contradict the Church. A stu- 
dent, so runs an anecdote of the time, having detected 
spots in the sun, communicated his discovery to a worthy 
priest. "My son," replied the priest, "I have read Aris- 
totle many times, and I assure you there is nothing of the 
kind mentioned by him. Go rest in peace ; and be cer- 
tain that the spots which you have seen are in your eyes, 
not in the sun." 



ii6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

From the time of the Alexandrian school and of the 
Neo-Platonists, for more than a thousand years, philoso- 
phy remained subservient to the Church, gradually 
degenerating into a mystic theosophy. Against this 
practice Bruno led a rebellion, seeking to free the mind 
from its appalling bondage. For this great service to 
humanity, during the six years preceding his martyrdom 
the reformer languished in prison deprived of books and 
writing materials. 

But the progress of thought is irresistible. Begin- 
ning with the debates of the later Scholastics, the revival 
of learning steadily advanced, demanding, finally, defini- 
tions of universals. 

FKANCIS BACON 

Although no age has been without the aid of induction 
or the scientific method, we are, even yet, far from ap- 
preciating its importance. Bacon endeavored to make 
the authority of experience supreme. To no one more 
than to him are we indebted for those reforms which are 
gradually emancipating the modern mind from occult- 
ism, and superstition. "Turn where we will," exclaims 
Macaulay, "the trophies of that mighty intellect are 
full in view." 

The life of Bacon was cast in times of profound re- 
ligious disturbance. The discoveries of science were 
beginning to arouse the deepest interest. All Europe 
trembled with the efforts of independent investigation. 
Throughout the Dark Ages religion and science had 
gone unsuspectingly hand in hand, but were now part- 
ing, never again to be united except through the identi- 
fication of their principles. 

The revival of learning found science indeed feeble. 



The Revival of Learning 117 

for hitherto the Church had been the arbiter of all 
questions of the understanding. The devotion of Bacon 
to the method of experiment and verification and his 
heroic opposition to unenlightened tradition give him 
a high place among the founders of education. 

Although known as the father of experimental phil- 
osophy, Bacon gave but little heed to metaphysics. Not- 
withstanding its avoidance of ontological problems, the 
power of the Novum Organum lies in its grasp upon the 
principles of existence. Without performing an ultimate 
analysis. Bacon perceived that consciousness is organic. 
Seeing that mind springs primarily from conditions 
wider and deeper than personality, he declared that all 
knowledge is evolved from the action and reaction of 
organism and environment. 

"Man," says Bacon, 'Vho is the servant and interpre- 
ter of nature can act and understand no further than he 
has either in operation or in contemplation observed the 
method and order of nature."* In other terms, to 
understand we must have had experience. If our ex- 
periences do not enable us to perceive general truths, 
we must multiply and classify them as the only means 
of advancing knowledge. To reduce the method of 
Bacon to a sentence, he endeavored, in the words of St. 
Paul, to "Prove all things," and "hold fast that which 
is good." His plan was the systematization of gradu- 
ated verification as the sole method of research, 

"There are two ways," continues our author, "of 
searching after and discovering truth; the one from 
sense and particulars, rises directly to the most general 
axioms and, resting upon these principles and their un- 
shaken truths, finds out intermediate axioms, and this 
* Novum Organum, 1. aph. 1. 



ii8 The Evolution of Knowledge 

is the method in use; the other raises axioms from 
sense and particulars by a continued gradual ascent, 
till at last it arrives at the most general axioms — which 
is the true hut hitherto untried way. The understand- 
ing, when left to itself, takes the first of these ways and 
prepares it in logical order; for the mind delights in 
springing up to the most general axioms that it may 
find rest; but after a short stay here it disdains experi- 
ence, and these mischiefs are at length increased by logic 
for the ostentation of dispute."* 

Thus Bacon sought to acquire knowledge by interpret- 
ing nature, and yet he failed to perceive that the great- 
est need of the race is a point of beginning, so that the 
"graduated verifications," upon which he so earnestly 
insisted, might take their rise from one incontrovertible 
truth. 

That he felt the need of the unification of knowledge, 
however, is evident from the following: "But let none 
expect any great promotion of the sciences, especially 
in their effective part, unless natural philosophy be 
drawn out to particular sciences ; and again, unless these 
particular sciences be brought back again to natural 
philosophy. From this defect it is that astronomy, 
optics, music, many mechanical arts, and, what seems 
stranger, even moral and civil philosophy and logic rise 
but little above their foundations and only skim over the 
variety and surfaces of things, viz. : because after these 
particular sciences are formed and divided off, they are 
no longer nourished by natural philosophy, which might 
give them strength and increase and, therefore, no won- 
der if the sciences thrive not when separated from their 
roots."f 
*Novvm Orgamim, 1. aph. 19-20. 1[N'ov'iim. Organunijl.Siph. 79-80, 



The Revival of Learning 119 

From this it is evident that although Bacon regarded 
knowledge as an evolution, he made no attempt to re- 
duce mind and nature to an ultimate principle. So 
deeply impressed was he with the importance of gradu- 
ated verification, that its complement, the deductive 
method, seemed to him a mere labyrinth of error. Not- 
withstanding his devotion to the scientific method, 
Aristotle did not ignore deduction. It was Bacon's 
aversion to all forms of dialectical or deductive reason- 
ing which led him to complain that Aristotle cor- 
rupted the simple truths of natural philosophy with 
logic. And yet for centuries Aristotle was regarded as 
the originator of the inductive or scientific method, the 
very system which arrives at general truths through 
particulars. 

Through the co-ordination of the most general terms 
of existence, Aristotle endeavored to reach an ultimate 
principle. To this end he framed his categories. But 
these higher peripatetic speculations met with no sym- 
pathy from the Baconian empiricism, and nevertheless 
it was from the great Stagirite that Bacon inherited the 
title of "Father of the Inductive Method." 

Induction and Deduction are reciprocal methods of 
investigation, and always imply each other. The for- 
mer is synthesis, the latter analysis. To analyze is to take 
for granted a synthesis, to synthesize is to imply an 
analysis. They are correlatives. One system is the 
complement of the other. 

During the time of Aristotle, as well as of his remote 
successor, Bacon, knowledge was regarded by the masses 
as sacred ; its categories were held to be divine mysteries 
and their analysis a sacrilege. 

Both Aristotle and Bacon taught that experience is 



120 The Evolution of Knowledge 

the criterion of truth, and that the order of nature is the 
only law. Thus, although failing to recognize the 
achievements of the father of induction, Bacon advo- 
cated the peripatetic method of evolving knowledge from 
experience. 

Note. — It would be ungrateful to close this chapter without 
acknowledging the benefits derived from a long and intimate 
association with my lamented friend, Prof. D. O. Kellogg, of 
Vineland, N. J. This profound scholar and theologian gave me 
the inestimable advantage of his criticism, especially concerning 
the evolution of Christian belief. 



CHAPTER VI 
Modern Philosophy 



Descartes — Spinoza — Holies — Locke — Hartley — 
Leib niz — B erhel ey — Hum e 



The Cartesian philosophy marks the transition from 
medieval to modern thought. Like his contemporary, 
Galileo, Descartes suffered much from the religious 
intolerance of his time. While studying under the 
Jesuits at La Fleche, he was impressed with the insuffi- 
ciency of the theories of Christian orthodoxy. In de- 
spair he exclaimed: "Our studies enable us to discern 
only the hopelessness of our ignorance." As a last 
resource he turned to the sciences in the search for 
truth. 

The course of reasoning which led to his applicati&n 
of Algebra to Geometry, Descartes described as follows : 
"The long chains of simple and easy reasons which 
geometers employ in arriving at their most difficult 
demonstrations, made me fancy that all things which 
are the objects of human knowledge are similarly inter- 
dependent; and that, providing we abstain from assum- 
ing anything false, and observe the correct order in 
deducing things one from another, there are none so 
remote that we cannot reach, or so hidden that we can- 
not discover them. I was at no trouble in finding out 



122 The Evolution of Knowledge 

where to begin ; for considering that the mathematicians 
only had attained to some certainty, and this because 
they occupied themselves about the easiest subject of all, 
I thought I should examine this first. To explain the 
mathematical sciences by the briefest possible symbols, 
I should borrow all that was best from geometrical 
analysis and from algebra and correct the defects of 
each by the other."* 

This method of graduated verification opened up to 
Descartes new fields of discovery. Beginning with 
mathematics, he applied the principle to physical 
science, and even entertained the hope of employing 
it in the study of mind. "Not that I venture," con- 
tinues he, "to examine forthwith all manner of prob- 
lems, which would have been a violation of my rules, 
but, knowing that their principles must all be derived 
from (first) philosophy, in which I could as yet find 
none that were certain, I thought that here, above all, I 
ought to establish them." 

At the age of thirty (1624), we find Descartes work- 
ing in seclusion in Holland. Eight years afterward he 
published the Discourse on Method and the Meditations, 
which at once interested the learned world. Charles the 
First of England, and Christina of Sweden urged the 
philosopher to visit their courts. The decision in favor 
of Stockholm proved fatal, for he soon fell a victim to 
the rigor of the Scandinavian winter; but not before 
founding, with Christina's aid, the Academy of Sciences. 

In accordance with the best theories of the ancients 
concerning the constitution of matter, Descartes identi- 
fied matter and extension. He perceived that vacuum, 
or absolutely empty space, is impossible. "The essence, 
* "Discourse on Method," 2d section, Algebra and Geometry. 



Modern Philosophy 123 

or first principle of matter, or substance," says Descartes, 
'^'is extension, and wherever there is extension there is 
matter. The substance which fills all space must be 
assumed as divided into equal angular parts. Why 
must this be assumed? Because it is the most simple, 
therefore the most natural, supposition. This 
substance being set in motion, the parts are ground into 
a spherical form, and the corners thus rubbed off, like 
filings or sawdust, form a second or more subtle kind of 
substance. There is, besides, a kind of substance coarser 
and less fitted for motion. The first kind makes 
luminous bodies, such as the sun and fixed stars; the 
second makes the transparent substance of the skies; 
the third kind is the material of opaque bodies, such as 
earth, planets, etc. We may also assume that the 
motions of these parts take the form of revolving 
circular currents or vortices. By this means the matter 
will be collected to the center of each vortex, while the 
second or subtle matter surrounds it, and by its centri- 
fugal effort constitutes light." "The planets are 
carried round the sun by the motion of this vortex, 
each planet being at such a distance from the sun as 
to be in a part of the vortex suitable to its solidity and 
mobility."* Although these theories can be traced as 
far back as the ancient lonians, the interpretation given 
them by Descartes was regarded as advanced at the be- 
ginning of the Seventeenth Century, their author being 
one of the foremost physicists of his time. 

It is manifest that Descartes was not aware of the full 
significance of his theory maintaining the identity of 
matter and space, for if matter and space are one there 
can be no doubt of the unity of mind and nature. In- 

* Principia Philosophae, Pt. III., LIV. 



124 The Evolution of Knowledge 

stead of universal unity, he insisted that there is an 
ultimate duality consisting of substance and thought, 
and yet, following the example of Plato, he identified 
mind with general existence or God, Now modem 
psychology demonstrates that mind is that special form 
of general existence known as organic, and that it is 
therefore not universal but limited. 

Descartes' famous dictum, "I think, therefore, I am," 
really constitutes two identical propositions. His asser- 
tion amounts to this : Existence being thought, I think, 
therefore I exist, or, I think, therefore I think. By his 
capital axiom, "All clear and distinct ideas are true," 
Descartes meant that those ideas alone are true which 
have overcome doubt. As more fully explained in 
Chapter XIV., certitude consists of the surrender of 
doubt or of our inability to sustain objections. Like all 
other intellectual activities, belief is instinctive and, 
therefore, largely unconscious, for it is a form of the 
adjustment of organism and environment. The equilib- 
rium called belief occurs only when disturbing doubts 
are set at rest. 

From Descartes, who read and admired Bacon, 
scientific investigation received a great impetus. His 
theories of the physical sciences were elaborated long 
before the other parts of the system, but their publica- 
tion was delayed on account of the alarm felt at the per- 
secution of Galileo. 

Descartes' first publication was entitled Discourse on 
the Method of Properly Guiding the Reason in the Re- 
search of Truth in the Sciences: also Dioptrics, Meteors, 
and Geometry, which are Essays in this Method. In this 
great work the author treats of the nature of God and 
of the human soul. By a course of reasoning not with- 



Modem Philosophy 125 

out inconsistencies, the conclusion is reached that the 
human soul is absolutely distinct from the body ; because 
it is put there by a divine being infinitely perfect. In 
the opinion of Descartes this perfect being exists be- 
cause we have ideas of perfection. Ideas of perfection 
disclose imperfection, as the positive discloses the nega- 
tive, or as being discloses non-being. This argument of 
Descartes would have been more rational had he con- 
ceived God or the ultimate reality as the order of nature. 
The scholastic training of our author is revealed by his 
conception of deity as an individual consciousness. The 
conception of God as an individual is an emanation of 
that mysticism into which philosophy had degenerated 
while in the service of the Church. In deducing deity 
from personal existence Descartes reversed the order of 
nature, for deity or universal order is the ultimate 
reality from which all individual facts are deriva- 
tions. 

Notwithstanding the well-known theism of Descartes, 
that is to sa}^, his loyalty to a personal deity, the theo- 
logians of the Seventeenth Century were far from satis- 
fied with his doctrines. The publication of the Discourse 
on Method precipitated a fierce controversy. On one 
side were arrayed the Catholics and Calvinists, and on 
the other the Liberals. So offensive were some of the 
attacks upon the author that the magistrates of Utrecht 
ordered their suppression. 

About four years after the appearance of the Discourse 
on Method the Meditations were published in Paris with 
the King's privilege, under the title, Meditations Con- 
cerning the First Philosophy in which are demonstrated 
the existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul. 
Copies of this work were submitted in advance to the 



126 The Evolution of Knowledge 

ablest scientists and theologians, so that their criticisms 
might be published with the author's rejoinders. A 
result of these criticisms, coming as they did from such 
men as Arnauld, Gassendi and Hobbes, was to change 
the discussion from the immortality to the immateriality 
of the soul, — the latter being more in accord with the 
manner in which Descartes had treated the subject. 

Not feeling satisfied with his demonstration of the 
immateriality of the soul, Descartes adds (in the preface 
to the Meditations) that a strict proof of this theory 
would require a complete system of physics. A clear 
and distinct conception of the soul as separate from the 
body, he continues, is necessary, because substances thus 
clearly conceived to be distinct must really be so. 

In replying to Hobbes' objections to this argument, 
Descartes admitted that we infer the difference between 
mind and body from the difference in their qualities or 
activities, which, of course, remands the whole question 
to the science of psychology or to the study of mind as 
the function of an organism. 

Aroused by the aggressiveness of Leroy, a disciple of 
Descartes, the Protestant theologians of Utrecht and 
Leyden inaugurated a crusade against the Cartesians. 
This movement began with disputations by theses in 
the universities, and was followed with intense interest 
by the public. The debates were at first confined to 
scientific questions, but Leroy, wishing to force issue 
with his opponents, boldly annoimced, under the 
authority of Descartes, that man is a being composed of 
the elements of mind and extension; and is not, there- 
fore, a substance per se, but a substance per accidens. 
This can only mean that man, including his soul, in- 
stead of being unconditioned, is an evolution of nature. 



Modern Philosophy 127 

This announcement amounted to a direct challenge 
of the powerful orthodox party, which stood upon the 
absolute or the miraculous origin of man. The Prot- 
estants, represented by the rectors of the Universities of 
Utrecht and Leyden, promptly resented the Cartesian 
hypothesis of the evolution of man. These hostile 
theologians were also loyal to Aristotle and, therefore, 
opposed the Copernican theory of the earth's motion 
round the sun, which Descartes accepted. 

Such, however, is the unity of all things, that in 
studying the mind we are compelled to develop a com- 
prehension of nature. There is no doubt that the acuter 
thought of the Seventeenth Century was arrayed against 
Christian orthodoxy, but the opposition of the Church to 
original research did not spring from an aversion to 
progress. The discoveries of science so disturbed the 
orthodox conception of man's position in the universe 
that all ecclesiastical authority was endangered. At 
that time the theologians believed that the order of so- 
ciety depended upon the Church. Who will blame them 
for insisting that the sun turned round the earth, if 
they were convinced that virtue itself was dependent 
upon that arrangement of the solar system ? They were 
unable to understand that, the movements of the 
heavenly spheres are of the same order as spiritual 
development, and hence that the discoveries of science 
are advancements of divine knowledge. 

An enlightened religion conceives deity as the 
order of the universe, and intelligence or the soul as a 
function of the social organism. When religion realizes 
that it derives its powers from the organization of 
knowledge, it will strive to enlist in its service the best 
efforts of the mind. On the other hand, the discov- 



128 The Evolution of Knowledge 

eries of science will always disturb the Church that 
worships persons instead of principles. 

The attacks of the Calvinist theologians, headed by 
Voet, were so bitter that to put a stop to the persecution, 
it was necessary to appeal to the Prince of Orange. It 
was that Prince who prevented the expulsion of the 
theories of Descartes from the Dutch Universities, and 
forbade the public burning of his books by the hang- 
man. 

The beliefs of the theologians were founded not upon 
reason, but upon faith. The influence of the Church, 
both Protestant and Catholic, was directed, therefore, 
against the fundamental principle of the Cartesian phil- 
osophy, which was the sacredness of reason or of the 
right of private judgment. 

The great triumphs of the Cartesian system are the 
discourses in mathematics and in the physical sciences. 
These investigations of nature enabled their author to 
advance the Aristotelian theory of evolution, for they 
showed that all phenomena can be reduced to time and 
space, or to number and quantity, which at that time 
was a bold announcement. So accustomed have we 
become to the statement that all phenomena can be 
reduced to motion, that its full significance escapes us. 
The meaning of this statement is that motion ac- 
counts for life, and life, for mind. Even Descartes 
failed to fully appreciate this conclusion; for, although 
it can be inferred from what he said that all phenomena 
can be expressed in terms of motion, the result of his 
analysis of existence is that mind and matter are 
absolutely distinct, constituting an ultimate duality, 
instead of the divine unity of existence. 

The Principles of Philosophy, the first planned and 



Modem Philosophy 129 

last published of the works of Descartes, is the most 
comprehensive. The author admits that as a treatise 
on physics this work is incomplete, because it does not 
include plants, animals, and lastly, man, or, in other 
words, because it did not evolve psychology from biology. 
This admission is one of many evidences that Descartes 
at least dimly foresaw the evolutionary philosophy, as 
later expounded by Darwin and Spencer. But his funda- 
mental postulate that consciousness and extension are 
irreconcilable is in conflict with the theory of universal 
development. 

SPINOZA 

Since Aristotle, no greater thinker has appeared than 
Benedict Spinoza. Born in Amsterdam in 1632, he was 
destined by his parents, who were Hebrews, to the 
service of the church. While studying at the synagogue 
of his native city, Spinoza conceived a distrust of the 
principles of theology. Finding him obdurate, the 
Rabbis resorted to the then terrible penalty of excom- 
munication, a course which they afterwards vainly re- 
gretted. 

With the ancients, piety meant the sentiment of 
humanity. It related more to character than to belief. 
"He that is unjust," says Marcus Aurelius, "is also im- 
pious." This sentiment was the inspiration of Spinoza, 
whose life was a rare instance of devotion to truth. 

Scholarship was not enough for the Jewish doctors 
of theology. In order to support himself, the 
novitiate of the priesthood was obliged to learn some 
mechanical art. Spinoza chose the industry of polish- 
ing glasses for optical instruments. At Leyden and 
Eynesburg, where he had fled to escape persecution, we 
find him engrossed in study, but relying upon his trade 



130 The Evolution of Knowledge 

for support. His philosophical acumen soon attracted 
the attention of scholars. Powerful friends appeared 
with offers of assistance, but he preferred obscurity and 
independence, deeming both necessary for success. 

It is now generally acknowledged that the ideas of 
Spinoza are sublime. The difficulty in comprehending 
them is due to the mathematical method employed. 
Since mathematics reduces all phenomena to number 
and quantity, its use as a vehicle of thought is limited. 
In the desire for simplicity, this limit was overstepped 
by Spinoza. 

The method of this great thinker may be discerned 
from the following definitions of universals taken from 
the "Ethics.'^ Opposite to each '"definition" is placed an 
explanation based upon an ultimate analysis of existence. 



"Definition III. — By Sub- 
stance I understand that which 
exists in itself, and is conceived 
per se; in other words, the con- 
ception of which does not re- 
quire the conception of any- 
thing else antecedent to it." 

"Definition VI. — By God 
I understand the Being abso- 
lutely infinite, i. e., the Sub- 
stance consisting of infinite 
Attributes, each of M^hich ex- 
presses an infinite and eternal 
essence." 



"Definition VIII. — By 
eternity I understand Exist- 
ence itself, in so far as it is con- 
ceived necessarily to follow 
from the sole definition of an 
eternal thing." 



Substance was conceived by 
Spinoza as existence itself or 
as the ultimate reality. 



The infinite means space and 
the absolute time. According 
to Spinoza, the attributes of 
God are the infinite and abso- 
lute which mean simply space 
and time, the aspects of mo- 
tion. God, therefore, means 
that ultimate known in mathe- 
matics as motion. 

There is but one clear mean- 
ing of eternity, and that is 
time, which is the subjective 
aspect of motion, and, there- 
fore, of existence. In Defini- 
tion III Spinoza says that 
substance is that which exists 
in itself, and in Definition VIII 



Modem Philosophy 131 

that eternity is existence itself. 
He, therefore, employs both 
substance and eternity in the 
sense of the ultimate reality. 
"Proposition VII. — It pertains to the nature of Substance to 
exist. 

"Demonstration. — Substance cannot be created by anything 
else, and is, therefore, the cause of itself; its essence necessarily 
involves existence; or it pertains to the nature of Substance to 
exist." 

"Proposition VIII. — All Substance is necessarily infinite. 
"Demonstration. — There exists but one Substance of the same 
Attribute; and it must either exist as infinite, or as finite. But 
not as finite, for as finite it must be limited by another substance 
of the same nature, and in that case there would be two Sub- 
stances of the same Attribute, which is absurd. Substance, 
therefore, is infinite." 

The whole Spinozistic system hinges ■upon the mean- 
ing of Substance. Physicists now agree that substance 
is equilibrated force, the mathematical name for which 
is motion. The attempt of Spinoza at mathematical ex- 
actness serves admirably to bring out the final problem 
of philosophy. It points out the impracticability of 
using more tlian one term to denote the ultimate reality, 
unless the equivalence of meaning between it and other 
terms so employed is defined. In brief, the metaphysics 
of Spinoza forcibly illustrate the necessity of deter- 
mining the relationship of the categories of thought. 
For instance, he employed the terms matter, sub- 
stance, space, extension and infinite without any at- 
tempt to correlate their meaning; whereas in the 
deepest sense they are all synonymous. The definitions 
of substance which he offered demonstrate the im- 
possibility of distinguishing between substance, space, 
and extension. Finally, he repeatedly used the terms 
essence, substance, God and existence, in a similar 
sense, which amounts to an acknowledgment thaf they 
are interdependent in meaning. 



132 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Although he did not fully succeed in refuting the 
theory, Spinoza was opposed to skepticism. He de- 
clared that our knowledge is real, that our impressions 
of things disclose their actual nature; whereas the 
skeptic maintains that as knowledge is of phenomena 
only, it does not disclose the actual nature of things, — 
as though there were any limit to phenomena, or any 
difference between reality and nature. 

In the appendix to the book De Deo, Spinoza defines 
his attitude toward religion. Here we have his great 
argument against that form of teleology, known as the 
belief that the universe exists for man. "Men do all 
things for the sake of an end, namely, the good or use- 
ful which they desire, hence they seek to know the 
motive or cause of everything that happens, and if these 
causes are not apparent, they judge of them by the 
motives determining their own actions. By this means, 
they come to consider all natural things as devised for 
their benefit. Since they find that they have eyes to see 
with, and teeth to masticate with, vegetables and 
animals for food, and the sun to give them light, they 
conclude that some order of nature has provided all 
these things for them in order to subdue man, and to 
gain from him the highest honor. Thus this error has 
connected itself with superstition, and has become 
deeply rooted in men's minds. And observe, I pray 
you, to what a point this belief has brought them. To- 
gether with the many useful things in Nature, they 
necessarily found not a few injurious things, namely, 
tempests, earthauakes, diseases, etc. These happened, 
they supposed, because the gods were angry on account 
of offenses committed against them by man, or because 
of faults incurred in their worship; and, although 



Modem Philosophy 133 

experience every day protests and shows by infinite 
examples that benefits and injuries happen indifferently 
to pious, as well as to ungodly persons, they do not, 
therefore, renounce their inveterate prejudice." 

This argument remands humanity to its true place in 
nature. It rebukes those kindred theories known as 
idealism and anthropomorphism. The former relegates 
all reality to mind, the latter consecrates all nature to 
the service of man. 

The charge of Atheism, so often made against Spinoza, 
may be attributed to his use of the term substance in 
designating the ultimate reality or deity. It always 
shocks devotional feeling to identify deity with sub- 
stance, which in its deepest sense means the objective or 
statical aspect of motion. 

Spinoza used the term substance to designate the prin- 
ciple of existence or life, that is to say the ultimate real- 
ity, rather than the statical aspect of the universe which 
is usually called matter. No one who follows the ideas 
of this great thinker will doubt that he rose above the 
theory that inert matter is the ultimate of the physical 
and the mental universe, which theory is known as an- 
cient materialism. Nor is there any doubt that he 
avoided the other extreme known as idealism, or the 
belief that mind is absolute, or unconditioned, instead 
of being an evolution of nature. 

With Spinoza the ultimate fact was the one infinite 
substance of which all individuals are modes or limited 
expressions. This substance he denominated God. He 
held that God viewed as the infinite substance is the 
natura naturans, viewed as modes or manifestations he 
is the natura naturata. The attributes of deity he con- 
ceived as extension and thought, for to him extension 



134 The Evolution of Knowledge 

was visible thought, and thought invisible extension ; the 
objective and subjective of which God is the identity. 
"There are many existing things, but only one existence ; 
many forms, but only one substance. God is the idea 
immanens — the One and All." 

If Spinoza meant that thought is the subjective or 
the most personal view of nature, who will reject his 
wonderful analysis, for in that case he meant that sub- 
stance or space is the objective, and time the sub- 
jective aspect of the universal relation? 

The truth underlying his analysis is manifest, for 
matter, which is a synonym of extension, is the name 
commonly given to tangible or visible existence, while 
time, being subjective, is, in a certain sense, invisible 
extension. 

Spinoza laid himself open, however, to the charge of 
Pantheism — that theory which invests all nature, ani- 
mate and inanimate, with an inherent faculty of 
thought. Pantheism confuses mind and nature. It dis- 
seminates, as it were, a thinking spirit throughout the 
universe. It is a magnificent fetichism, the theory of 
an omnipresent mind. How much higher is that con- 
ception of deity which regards personality or mind as 
an organism, or as a limited existence, and God as the 
order of nature. 

Spinoza, therefore, did not carry his impeachment of 
teleology far enough. Although he exposed the presump- 
tion of the belief that nature moves for the benefit of 
man, he failed to limit mind to organic existence.* The 
belief that mind is the ultimate reality, is the basic error 
of teleology. This error accounts for the Cartesian dual- 

* "God is a thinking being." Ethics II. Part Prop. I. 



Modern Philosophy 135 

ism, as well as for its lineal descendant, the absolute 
ego of the German dialecticians. 

Ethics Demonstrated hy Geometrical Method is 
Spinoza's greatest work. All authorities agree that this 
attempt to define universals is a masterpiece of reason- 
ing. From its pages the foregoing quotations have been 
taken. 

In Holland, where he felt comparatively safe from 
persecution, Spinoza led a life of retirement and priva- 
tion. Although afterward often referred to as "the God- 
intoxicated man," throughout the century following his 
death he was characterized as an atheist. To the Ger- 
mans of Goethe's epoch, we are indebted for the rec- 
ognition of his genius and of the sublimity of his life. 
Goethe said : "The man was represented as an atheist 
and his opinions as most abominable; but immediately 
after it is admitted that he was a good citizen, a sym- 
pathizing neighbor and friend ; — a calm, reflective, and 
diligent scholar." 

HOBBES 

Toward the close of Descartes' career and before the 
unity of Spinoza's thought was revealed to the world, a 
mind of singular power made its appearance in Eng- 
land. Like most scientific men of his time, Thomas 
Hobbes was deeply interested in mathematics. He 
studied at Oxford, where they still conserved the 
Ptolemaic astronomy, and the scholastic metaphysic. 
This was prior to the discovery of the fluctional calculus 
and of universal gravitation, for Leibniz and New- 
ton were in their boyhood. The circulation of the blood 
had just been announced by Harvey. Galileo had ob- 
served the spots on the sun, the satellites of Jupiter, 
and Saturn's rings, and was conferring upon these 



1^6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

topics -with the monks of the Holy Inquisition, while 
Kepler was formulating his laws of the planetary 
motions. 

At this time, by an attempt at an analysis of 
consciousness, Hobbes founded psychology in England. 
Bacon had insisted that experience alone was the 
source of knowledge. Proceeding by this slow but sure 
method, Hobbes came very near to an analysis of mind. 

It is to be remembered that Hobbes had before 
him none of the modern examples of idealism, for 
Berkeley and Kant were as yet unborn. Nor do his writ- 
ings indicate that he troubled himself much about Plato 
and the Skeptics ; but there is no doubt that he compre- 
hended the nature of language; witness his aphorism: 
"Words are wise men's counters ; they do but reckon by 
them; but they are the money of fools." Hobbes per- 
ceived, therefore, that language is an artifice, or that 
truth has its source in nature, and is reflected in mind, 
of which language is a phase. Both thought and lan- 
guage are forms of motion inseparable in the sense of 
being parts of a whole. Instead of being materialistic, 
this view of the intellect is exalted; for it holds that 
life and mind are forms of one universal relation. 

It is not surprising that Hobbes did not make a com- 
plete analysis of consciousness. With the scientific ac- 
quirements of his time, that would have been impos- 
sible. With admirable simplicity, however, he described 
the connection between thought and sensation. This 
simplicity becomes apparent when his argument is com- 
pared with the tortuous explanations of the meta- 
physicians. It is now well known that sensation and 
thought are interdependent functions of the sentieni 
organism. Thoughts are complex co-ordinations formed 



Modern Philosophy 137. 

by tHe highly-structured nervous system with the help 
of language, while sensations consist of impressions, 
comparatively simple or unorganized. As there is no 
absolute sej)aration between nerve and muscle, there is 
none between psychical and physical phenomena, or be- 
tween thought and sensation. 

That Hobbes perceived the interdependence of body 
and mind is evident from the following, where he 
explains the origin of ideas : "When a body is once in 
motion, it moveth unless something hinder it externally, 
and whatsoever hindereth it cannot in an instant, but 
in time and by degrees, quite extinguish it; and as we 
see in the water, though the winds cease, the waves give 
not over rolling for a long time after, so also it 
happeneth in that motion which is made in the internal 
parts of man. For after the object is removed, or the 
eyes shut, we still retain an image of the things seen, 
though more obscure than when we saw it. The decay 
(subsiding) of sense in men waking is not the decay of 
the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in 
such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light 
of the stars; which stars do not less exercise their 
virtue by which they are less visible in the day than 
in the night. But because amongst many strokes which 
our eyes, ears, and other organs, receive from external 
bodies, the predominant is only visible, therefore the 
light of the sun being predominant, we are not affected 
with the action of the stars." 

Moved by the influence of the Church, Parliament 
passed censure upon the writings of Hobbes. That 
august body has since relinquished the prerogative of 
philosophical criticism. Hobbes' theory of society is 
somber and cynical. It teaches that an absolute 



138 The Evolution of Knowledge 

monarchy alone can save the race from the misery of its 
natural state^, which is that of war. According to 
Hobbes, man's natural state is mutual opposition, or 
competition. The existence of society depends upon the 
establishment of an authority of sufficient power to 
suppress this inherent competition. In the opinion of 
Hobbes, the social ideal is not, as we understand it, a 
development of human nature under the discipline of 
law, but the arbitrary suppression of our deepest in- 
stincts. 

Although wholly distrusting the ability of human 
beings to govern themselves, Hobbes saw no danger in 
entrusting the fate of the state to a single member of 
the species. According to his theory, the choice of this 
individual should depend not upon character or ability, 
but upon the hazard of birth. Ignoring the equality 
of all individuals before the law, upon which principle 
human liberty depends, he recommended absolutism as 
the only practical form of government. 

It is true that the science of sociology as outlined by 
Comte belongs to two centuries later, but the Politics 
of Aristotle was accessible to Hobbes and might have 
suggested better principles of government. It must be 
admitted, however, that Hobbes pointed out the basic 
principle of organic, and, therefore, of social life, when 
he reduced all civil phenomena to competition. 

It is not to be wondered at, that so forbidding a 
philosophy was neglected. Only after the elder Mill 
called attention to the merit of Hobbes' analysis of 
mind was this sturdy thinker appreciated, even by his 
own countrymen. 



Modem Philosophy 139 

LOCKE 

While Spinoza was identifying God and nature, 
and Newton and Leibniz were unconsciously vying in 
the higher mathematics, the study of mind, as the func- 
tion of an organism, was taken up where Hobbes had 
left it and further developed by John Locke (1633- 
1704). This writer had also pursued mathematics at 
Oxford, but finally chose the science of medicine. His 
life was cast in those troublous times in England, when 
James the First promulgated afresh the doctrine of 
the "Divine Eight of Kings." The Covenanters, bent 
upon resisting the Eitual of the established Church, the 
discontented Roman Catholics, and the irreconcilable 
Puritans were blindly combining in the revolution which 
Cromwell was soon to lead. The ideas of Locke were 
promulgated, therefore, at a time of profound social 
unrest when religious tolerance was the principal need. 

There are critics who have mistaken the uncertainty 
with which Locke deals with religious questions for in- 
tellectual mediocrity. Leibniz calls him poor in thought, 
"Paupertina pMlosophia." 

After meeting with these criticisms one is hardly pre- 
pared for the firmness and vigor characterizing the 
writings of Locke. His aim was to arouse a feeling 
against Scholasticism and its interminable disputes, and 
to establish in the place of these hopeless controversies 
the study of the functions and structures of the human 
mind. 

In order to draw a necessary distinction, the theory 
which explains the development of ideas as an organic 
evolution is known as scientific, while the theory that 
consciousness is absolute or self-existent is known as 
a priori or idealistic. 



I40 The Evolution of Knowledge 

The idealists fixed upon certain categories, calling 
them a priori ideas, which means that these categories 
were not evolved from experience. Naturally enough, 
those who believe that the essence of reality is mind 
are unable to explain consciousness as an evolution 
of nature. Instead of attempting to evolve ideas 
from the interaction of organism and environment, or 
from the experiences of progenitors, handed down 
through heredity, the idealists proceed to build up a sys- 
tem in which consciousness is made the central mystery, 
and to which all surrounding facts are related in an 
unknowable manner. As the successor of Bacon and 
Hobbes, Locke occupied a position hostile to idealism, a 
theory which later on developed into transcendentalism. 

Although written nineteen years before, the principle 
work of Locke was not published until 1690. The author 
acknowledges in this work that the source of all author- 
ity is a personal deity, which can only mean that the 
deepest meaning of good is obedience to a divine will. 
He, nevertheless, identifies good with pleasure, and evil 
with pain. "The test of an action,'' said he, "is the de- 
gree in which it promotes pleasure, and averts pain," 
which means that the divine will or the trend of uni- 
versal order is expressed through human sensations, or, 
in other terms, that righteousness is an evolution of 
nature. This is a necessity to which all writers upon 
ethics are eventually brought, for the highest authority 
is self-preservation, using self in its widest sense, which, 
is species. Since nature ordains that, in order to exist, 
species must destroy one another, the meaning of good 
cannot extend beyond species. The criterion of right 
for each race must be life, for what good c«a. there be 



Modem Philosophy 141 

without existence? Hence in the last analysis good is 
life, and evil, death. 

''The true ground of morality," says Locke, "can only 
be the will and law of God, who sees in the dark, has in 
his hands rewards and punishments, and power enough 
to call to account the proudest of offenders; for God, 
having by an inseparable connection joined virtue and 
public happiness together, it is no wonder that every 
one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify, 
those rules to others, from whose observance he is seen 
to reap advantage himself. The conveniences of this 
life make men own an outward profession and approba- 
tion of them, whose actions sufficiently prove that they 
but little consider the Law Giver, that prescribed these 
rules or the Hell He has ordained for the punishment 
of those that transgress them."* 

From the above it is seen that, although the theory 
of innate or supernatural ideas was rejected by Locke, 
he still ostensibly held to the belief in a supernatural 
deity, a man-fashioned God, dealing out rewards and 
punishments, and employing even a physical Hell with 
which to enforce his will. 

If these beliefs seem unworthy of Locke, we must 
remember the difficulties of the situation in England 
during the Seventeenth Century. At that epoch the 
Church anathematized all who openly advocated inde- 
pendence of thought. From tlie following citation, 
it will appear, however, that Locke had a deeper knowl- 
edge of the nature of deity than he was willing publicly 
to confess : "Yet, if we ask a Christian who has the views 
of happiness and misery in another life, why a man must 

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book I,, Chap. Ill, 6. 



142 The Evolution of Knowledge 

keep his word, he will give this as a reason : Because God, 
who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it 
of us. But if a Hobbist be asked why, he will answer: 
Because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will 
punish you if you do not. And, if one of the old phil- 
osophers had been asked, he would have answered: 
Because it is dishonest, below the dignity of man, and 
opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human na- 
ture, to do otherwise."* 

That Locke enjoyed comparative freedom of thought 
is demonstrated by the following passage, which was 
undoubtedly intended to discourage the belief in a 
supernatural revelation. "So God might by revelation 
reveal the truth of any proposition in Euclid, as well 
as men by the natural use of their faculties come to 
make the discovery themselves. In all things of this 
kind there is little need or use of revelation, God hav- 
ing furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive 
at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we 
come to the clear discovery of, from the loiowledge and 
contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer 
to us than those which are conveyed to us by traditional 
revelation. For the knowledge we have that this revela- 
tion came at first from God, can never be so sure as 
the knowledge we have from the clear and distinct per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of our own 
ideas. . . . The history of the deluge is conveyed to us 
by writings which had their original from revelation; 
and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and 
clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it; or 
that he himself would have had, had he then been alive 

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book I., Chap. Ill, 5 



Modern Philosophy 143 

and seen it. For he has no greater assurance than that 
of his senses that it is writ in the book supposed writ 
by Moses inspired ; but he has not so great an assurance 
that Moses writ that book, as if he had seen Moses 
write it."* 

The timidity of this criticism of the authorship of the 
Pentateuch is in contrast with the confidence of more 
modern writers upon the same subject. Professor Max 
Muller, for instance, placed the latest revelation of God 
to man as far back as Abraham, rendering all the sur- 
roundings of Moses perfectly natural. The biblical 
critics of the future will, perhaps, regard even Abraham 
as a product of evolution. 

In writing the Essay on Human Understanding, the 
task set himself by Locke, was, "to inquire into the 
origin, certainty and extent of human knowledge, 
together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion 
and assent," or, as it is now expressed, to explain the 
principles of certitude. Employing the ancient simile, 
Locke described the mind as an unused tablet upon 
which experience records its impressions; an entirely 
inadaquate representation of mental phenomena, be- 
cause it takes no account of the constituent factors of 
the intellect. What resemblance is there, for instance, 
between a tablet, the passive recipient of impressions, 
and an organism of highly complex structure, and, 
therefore, correspondingly complex reactions, moving in 
a medium of language, also possessing complex struct- 
use and exercising definite reactions ? 

The study of the interdependence of thought and 
language by such writers as Comte, Max Muller, Spencer 

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book IV. , C. XLIII. 4, 



144 The Evolution of Knowledge 

and Lewes, has produced valuable materials for 
psychology. At the time of Locke, the nature of language 
was little understood. The nearest approach made at 
that time to a true theory was a dim foreshadowing 
of the "association of ideas," afterwards developed by 
Hartley and James Mill. Locke was occupied in com- 
bating the doctrine of innate ideas or irreducible 
intuitions, a belief that at his epoch remained almost 
unchallenged. It was acknowledged that the mind has 
powers derived from heredity ; that is to say, conceptions 
that cannot be accounted for by the conscious experience 
of an individual. These inherited faculties were 
called a priori ideas, and it was believed that they defied 
analysis. They were described as irreducible intuitions, 
or unknowable forms of thought, a theory strenuously 
opposed by Locke. 

So deep-rooted, however, is the belief in the incom- 
prehensibility of the categories of thought which is the 
theory of innate ideas, that it has influenced even such 
writers as J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, both of whom 
advocate the concomitant theory of an unknowable. Now 
the theory of an unknowable assumes that a priori ideas, 
or the constituent elements of thought are insoluble 
mysteries. 

Locke taught that the source of all our ideas is the re- 
lated activities known as sensation and reflection, which 
means that thought is a generalization of experience or 
an evolution of nature. This theory accords with mod- 
ern discoveries in psychology, for it is now known that 
the sensorium, which is the organ of thought, is de- 
veloped by experience, or, in other terms, by the inter- 
action of organism and environment, conserved from 
countless generations through heredity. Without this 



Modem Philosophy 145 

inherited sensorium of complex and definite structure 
and reactions, through which to co-ordinate impres- 
sions, experience could not develop into ideas. 

It is important to observe how Locke explained uni- 
versals. "Our idea of space/' he said, "is derived from 
sight and touch. These experiences are co-ordinated 
and generalized until we form a symbol or general idea 
of all externals, co-existences, or space," This hypothesis 
of Locke, that the conception of space springs from the 
"sense of resistance," has been highly developed by 
Herbert Spencer, and constitutes one of many points of 
resemblance between the theories of the two authors. 

Thus the writings of Locke present a picture of the 
first stages of the development of psychology in Eng- 
land. Their chief value lies in the distinctness with 
which they show the vast extent of organic development 
recorded in the modifications of the sensorium and of 
language, a growth resulting in the formation of general 
ideas. 

HARTLEY 

Improving upon the psychological theories of Locke, 
David Hartley (1705-1757), an eminent English 
physician, propounded the "vibration theory," as an ex- 
planation of the association of ideas. 

In his work. Observations on Man, upon which he 
labored from 1730 to 1746 (first published in 1749), 
he confesses that his theory of a physical basis of mind 
(or that there is possible a physical explanation of sensa- 
tion and thought, connecting the two as muscular action 
and sensation), was first suggested to him by the 
Principia of Newton. Hartley also acknowledged his 
debt to a dissertation by the Eev. Mr. Gray, prefixed to 
the translation of Archbishop King's Origin of Evil, 



146 The Evolution of Knowledge 

in wliich the principle of "the Association of Ideas" is 
applied to ethics. The theory of "the Association of 
Ideas," can be traced as far back as Aristotle. Hobbes 
noticed it under the name of "Mental Discourse/' but it 
was Locke who gave it its present name. Hartley was 
the first to give to this theory a definite form, by point- 
ing out that consciousness consists in certain changes 
which take place in the nerve centers, centering in the 
brain. According to this theory the sequence of ideas 
is determined by the structural order of the sensorium; 
that is to say, "our ideas spring up or exist in the order 
in which the sensations existed, of which they are 
copies." 

To reduce consciousness to neural tremors or waves is 
to correlate mental and physical phenomena as differ- 
ent expressions of the order of nature. 

The neural hypothesis was suggested by Newton, who 
pointed out the relation of sensation and motion. 
The vibration theory Hartley explained by that of 
"neural tremors." Certain features of his explanation, 
however, have been found to be incorrect. The difficulties 
of the subject are stated by Hartley as follows: "If 
that species of motion which we term vibrations can be 
shown by probable arguments to attend on all sensations, 
ideas, and motions, and to be proportioned to them, 
then we are at liberty either to make vibrations the ex- 
ponent of sensations, ideas, and motions, or these the 
exponents of vibrations, as best suits the inquiry, how- 
ever impossible it may be to discover in what way 
vibrations cause or are connected with sensations or 
ideas." 

This theory of Hartley has been highly evolved by 
Herbert Spencer, who shows that the development of 



Modern Philosophy 147 

the functions and structures of the nervous system from 
lower forms of life leads step by step to those higher 
reactions known as feeling and thought. Spencer 
also shows that the development called language sup- 
plies the structure for the functions of spiritual life, 
which means that the adjustments of individual and en- 
vironment conserved through heredity account for those 
vibrations known as feeling and thought. In other 
terms, consciousness as well as Justice are expressions 
of the actions and reactions of the individual and so- 
ciety through the medium of language. 

LEIBNIZ 

Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716), who was 
the son of a professor of Moral Philosophy at Leipsig, 
carried metaphysical speculation much further than his 
great English contemporary, Newton, whose theory of 
universal gravitation still holds the highest place among 
the generalizations of nature. 

At the age of twenty Leibniz produced a treatise on 
the Combinations of Numbers and Ideas, his object 
being to harmonize the systems of Plato and Aristotle. 
At twenty-two he entered the service of the Elector of 
Mainz, to whom he had dedicated his recently published 
Neiu Method of Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence. 
In 1671 he advanced new and bold theories of motion in 
a treatise on a New Physical Hypothesis, in which the 
concrete and the abstract aspects of force were discussed. 
When these far-reaching theories of Leibniz are com- 
pared with the discovery of gravitation by ISTewton, the 
reversion of science as well as of philosophy to one 
universal principle is seen to be inevitable. 

About this time, Leibniz visited Paris, where he met 



148 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Cassini and Huygens. Soon after he made the acquaint- 
ance of Newton and Boyle in London. At the latter 
place he was elected to the Eoyal Society, and 
announced his new method of infinitesimal calculus, 
nearly identical with Newton's Method of Fluctions. 

Not satisfied with the command of the physical 
sciences which had made him famous, Leibniz devoted 
himself, while yet in the prime of life, to harmonizing 
the Protestant and Catholic religions. Toward the close 
of his career (1710), he produced his great work, 
entitled Essay on Theodicy, on the Goodness of God, 
the Liberty of Man, and the Origin of Evil; in which 
the theory of optimism was advanced. The motto of this 
book was "Everything is for the best in tie best of pos- 
sible worlds." Were this motto to have read every- 
thing is for species in the best of possible species, it 
would have thrown more light upon the ultimate mean- 
ing of righteousness; for deity or the order of the uni- 
verse cannot discriminate between species. Each type 
of life has for its criterion of right its own existence. 

Leibniz confined his writings almost entirely to 
French and Latin. Not until the close of his career did 
his native land give premonitions of the great intellec- 
tual development since attained. The foundations of 
psychology in England were laid by Hobbes and Locke ; 
while Leibniz gave the initiative to transcendentalism 
in Germany. 

Of the philosophical writings of Leibniz the criticism 
of Locke is the most interesting. This controversy 
dealt with the nature of the soul. "The question be- 
tween us," says Leibniz, "is whether the soul is in 
itself entirely empty like tablets, upon which noth- 
ing has been written (tahnla rasa), according to 



Modem Philosophy 149 

Aristotle, and the author of the Essay, and whether 
all that is there traced comes wholly from the senses 
and experience ; or, whether the soul originally contains 
the principles of several notions and doctrines, which 
the external objects awaken only on occasions, as I 
believe with Plato." 

Here Leibniz attempts to prove the existence of ir- 
reducible intuitions or innate ideas. This theory he 
advanced in place of the belief of Locke that knowledge 
springs wholly from the exercise of the senses and re- 
flection. Now, the exercise of the senses and reflection 
depends upon inherited, as well as upon acquired, facul- 
ties, both of which are implied in what are called innate 
ideas. To the close observer there is, therefore, little 
difficulty in discerning a fundamental agreement be- 
tween these opposing theories of Leibniz and Locke. 

The greatest achievement of Leibniz was his con- 
ception of "active force" as the ultimate of mind and 
nature. Matter, said he, is essentially resistance, and re- 
sistance is activity. Spinoza conceived God as nature. 
Deity was defined by Leibniz as universal law. Leibniz 
rose, therefore, to the sublime height of perceiving the 
interdependence of the forces of nature, a position which 
reveals not only the mutability of species, but of all 
phenomena, which means that motion is the ultimate 
reality. 

BERKELEY 

The successors of Hobbes and Locke were Bishop 
Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume (1711- 
1776). Both were deeply read in ancient philosophy 
and revived certain errors of Greek thought, thereby re- 
tarding the development of psychology which had been 
inaugurated by their immediate predecessors. 



150 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Born and educated in Ireland, Berkeley was distin- 
guished for the religious fervor characteristic of his race. 
The satirist Pope expressed the verdict of his time in 
ascribing to him "every virtue under Heaven." In 1709, 
Berkeley published An Essay Toward a New Theory 
of Vision, and in the year following The Principles 
of Human Knowledge. In the latter work he ad- 
vanced the ancient theory of absolute idealism. "There 
is no proof," said he, "of the existence of matter any- 
where but in our own perceptions," — as though the 
terms "proof" and "perception," did not imply a think- 
ing subject which can never be more than one term only 
of the relation expressed in thought, the other term 
being objective nature. Since mind implies object as 
well as subject, it implies extension or matter. 

The theory of idealism underlying the hypothesis of 
Berkeley has been dealt with in the foregoing re- 
view of Plato, and will be considered anew in the 
next chapter where the a priori philosophy of Im- 
manuel Kant is analyzed. Berkeley's hypothesis found 
a certain support in the systems of Schelling and 
Hegel — ^both generic developments of the Kantian 
dialectic. As already explained, all modern theories 
of idealism are more or less direct descendants of the 
Skepticism of the New Academy. 

HUME 

The skepticism of David Hume, so marked and so 
ably reasoned, awakened to a vigorous polemic against it 
a number of Scottish thinkers, headed by Thomas Eeid. 
In Germany it incited Immanuel Kant to the construc- 
tion of his critical philosophy. 

At the age of twenty-six Hume published in London 



Modern Philosophy 151 

(1738), the Treatise on Human Nature. This philo- 
sophical essay, by one who afterward became a classical 
historian of his country, is a worlc of singular acumen. 
As a theory of skepticism it constitutes the most for- 
midable attack on the validity of knowledge which has 
appeared in modern times. But skepticism is an an- 
cient doctrine. For clearness and precision the pres- 
entation of this doctrine by the absolute skeptics of 
the New Academy at Alexandria has never been sur- 
passed. This argument has already been considered in 
Chapter IV. 

Hume ascribed our conception of cause to the habit 
of observing the course of events. He maintained that 
since this habit is a personal experience, we can form no 
idea of impersonal cause or of the connection existing 
between impersonal events. As a consequence, we can- 
not reason from personal experience to the existence of 
God or to the immortality of the souL 

The question presented by Hume, reduced to its 
simplest terms, is as follows: Since our idea of cause 
results from experience, and as all experiences are 
personal, how are we to know things impersonal ? The 
reply is, that we know impersonal or external things 
by comparing their effects upon us, and things affecting 
us cannot be absolutely impersonal. 

Hume maintained that since the theory of a personal 
ruler of the universe and of the immortality of the soul 
are impossible to prove from any extension of experience, 
they cannot become a part of knowledge. 

In their deepest sense, laiowledge and the order of 
nature are one. The day is not far distant when the 
theory of a personal God and of immortality will be 
recognized as early stages of our attempt to harmonize 



152 The Evolution of Knowledge 

the individual and the general, or the human and the 
divine. The reason why these beliefs are so widespread 
is because they form the beginnings of intellectual de- 
velopment. The mind rises naturally from the personal 
to the impersonal. It is by worshipping individuals 
that humanity learns to appreciate principles. 

Hume's skepticism sprang from an incomplete 
analysis of consciousness. If consciousness is a form of 
motion, faith in the validity of knowledge is another 
name for trust in the order of Nature. 



CHAPTEE VII 

German Philosophy 



Kant, Fichte, Sclielling, Hegel, Herhart, Haeckel 



The a priori philosophy of Immanuel Kant as- 
sumes that there is an existence which transcends the 
power of reason. This existence is described as abso- 
lutely unchanging* to distinguish it from that chang- 
ing existence called phenomena or nature. The theory 
of this incomprehensible existence is also known as trans- 
cendentalism. It will be shown that the a priori phil- 
osophy or transcendentalism is a reproduction of the 
idealism of Plato, and of the N"eo-Platonists of Alex- 
andria, who believed that there is an unchanging ex- 
istence more real than nature. 

Great movements in philosophy have often assumed 
at first the form of subjectivism, which is a self-con- 
templation or introspection so intense as to produce an. 
under-estimate of externals. A result of this extreme 
self -consciousness is the habit of viewing all things from 
the standpoint of the ego or self, neglecting the objective 
aspect of existence known as extension. 

The philosophy of the absolute ego is an attempt to 

* " Kant's entire contention was for the issue that knowledge 
of absolute unchanging existence is impossible." — Ladd. 



154 The Evolution of Knowledge 

account for mind by time without employing space, 
whereas all reality, whether physical or mental, im- 
plies both time and space. 

That the dialectic of Kant and his followers should 
have made so deep an impression is due partly to the 
subjectivism, characterizing the great and sudden devel- 
opment of German thought, and partly to the intuitive 
genius of Kant himself, whose comprehension of the 
nature of mind was so profound as to amount almost to 
an ultimate analysis. 

To understand the influence of German thought it 
is necessary to consider not only its form, but also the 
circumstances of its development. As Germany slowly 
arose from the almost indescribable desolation of the 
Thirty Years' War, she emerged upon a period during 
which her political, her intellectual, and her social 
life lay prostrate. When peace was concluded in 1648 
her ethnic spirit had nearly expired. This war not 
only destroyed an old civilization fairly abreast with 
that of the rest of Europe, but so completely destroyed 
it that the nation was two hundred years in regaining 
her natural status in the world. Commercial statistics 
show that the general prosperity of the German peo- 
ple in 1850 had but just attained the level which it 
held at the beginning of the war of 1618. 

In his lectures at Oxford, Hillebrand affirms that at 
the close of the Thirty Years' War the highly culti- 
vated language of Luther, together with the whole lit- 
erature of his time, was forgotten. A semi-barbarism 
had become the prevalent state of society. Public in- 
struction and religious worship had suffered so much 
that many schools and churches stood abandoned. 

Toward the close of the following century, when 



German Philosophy 155 

Frederick II. in his memorable reign firmlj established 
the Prussian State, the intellectual life of Germany 
was not only reawakened, but immediately sprang into 
luxuriant life. Old universities were regenerated and 
new ones founded. Scholars, poets and think- 
ers had appeared. Kant, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller, 
with their great contemporaries, were there to advance 
the new national life. The beauties of the ancient 
classics were rediscovered; history was read by fresh 
minds and its organic nature disclosed; sciences were 
created to deal with the problems of life, for a people 
had arisen to take a new interest in humanity. During 
this marvelous reawakening German transcendentalism 
was born, and at once assumed the form of a profound 
subjectivism. 

Each nation formulates its philosophy with unfeigned 
satisfaction and pride. The old, old problems of life, 
that Greece derived from the East, and expressed so 
vividly, were at the time of the appearance of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, unknown in the vernacular 
of the Fatherland. The Teutonic form of these an- 
cient problems proved to be more remarkable even 
than the Greek, for they were evolved in a greater 
environment. German philosophy is a refined leaven 
of Hellenic thought, so powerful that ever since its 
appearance it has stimulated the mind of Europe. It 
has produced idealists beside whose theories Plato's 
Idealism is moderate; materialists whom Democritus 
would not have recognized; skeptics at whom Car- 
neades would have wondered. But of all these extremes 
idealism attained the greatest prominence. Its enigmas 
have proved so fascinating that what in the beginning 
was the harmless exaltation of a few great minds has 



156 The Evolution of Knowledge 

become, through the force of example, a national char- 
acteristic. 

How different has it been with France and England? 
These nations have had their wars and revolutions, 
but their philosophy, having been a more gradual devel- 
opment, is more natural. 

During the time that Germany was slowly regaining 
life, France was leading the civilization of Europe under 
Louis XIV. England was far advanced in political 
institutions and in religious liberty, and had already 
outranked Spain and Holland in commerce and con- 
quest. But for those advantages, belonging to unity 
and strength of national life, and which result in 
the refinement of the individual, France of the Eigh- 
teenth Century was pre-eminent. "The French," says 
Taine, "heeame civilized by conversation. The sullen 
denizens of the Academy and the Sorbonne speak 
but in epigrams. What a flight was this of the Eigh- 
teenth Century! Society, ever more anxious for lofty 
truths, crowds to philosophy as to the opera; the origin 
of animated beings, the question of free judgment, the 
principles of political economy — all is to them a matter 
of paradoxes and discoveries." 

At this time we find Leibniz complaining of the sen- 
suality and ignorance of the German gentry as compared 
with the love of science in England, and the intelli- 
gence and culture of the French. Count Manteufel 
writes to Wolff as late as 1738, — "The German Princes, 
who might be compared to your lords, think it be- 
neath their dignity to cultivate their minds." 

Thus we have England in the first half of the Eigh- 
teenth Century enriched by Shakespeare, Dryden and 
Pope, and still learning from Locke and Newton; 



German Philosophy 157 

France in possession of Pascal, Descartes^ Moliere, 
Malebranche and Eacine; England earnest and stu- 
dious; France brilliant and refined; but the Germans 
as yet intellectually undeveloped. 

Looking at Germany from the beginning of th'e 
Twentieth Century, with her army of trained scien- 
tists animated by the spirit of original investigation; 
with almost universal culture, and with intellectual, if 
not political liberty, it is difficult to perceive the effects 
of the ordeal through which she has passed. There 
are still traces, however, of the destruction which the 
nation suffered, and from which it has so triumphantly 
arisen, for if we look deeply into German philosophy we 
shall find it characterized by an astonishing imitation of 
one personal system. Although this imitation points 
to the fact that Immanuel Kant is the most potent 
philosophical genius that Germany has produced, yet 
this strange domination of oae recent dialectic in a 
race so old and intellectually powerful as the German, 
points to a break in her intellectual development. In 
other countries the opinions of Kant came into compe- 
tition with a wider philosophical knowledge. It is true 
that German transcendentalism has invaded foreign 
countries, but its extreme views have been far more suc- 
cessfully resisted abroad than in the land of their birth. 

KANT 

Since the Critique of Pure Reason is acknowledged 
to be the representative work of Kant and of German 
philosophy, let us compare its conclusions with the 
theory of evolution. 

The first words of the preface are : "Our reason (Ver- 
nunft) has this peculiar fate, that, with reference to 



158 The Evolution of Knowledge 

one class of its knowledge, it is always troubled with 
questions which cannot be ignored, because they spring 
from the very nature of reason, and which cannot be 
answered because they transcend the powers of human 
reason." 

This means that the nature of reason is incom- 
prehensible, a rather discouraging admission to make 
at the outset of a work, the object of which is to discuss 
the operations of the mind. Kant, however, must have 
believed that the nature of reason is comprehensible in 
some degree, for otherwise he would not have at- 
tempted a criticism of "Pure Eeason." Let it be our 
object, then, to discover what degree of comprehensi- 
bility Kant believed in, or hoped for, concerning rea- 
son. 

The preface continues as follows : "Nor is human rea- 
son to be blamed for this" (being incomprehensible). "It 
begins with principles which, in the course of experi- 
ence, it must follow and which seem sufficiently con- 
firmed by experience. With these, again, according to 
the necessities of its nature, it rises higher and higher 
to more remote conditions. But when it perceives that 
in this way its work remains forever incomplete, be- 
cause the questions never cease, it finds itself con- 
strained to take refuge in principles which exceed 
every possible experimental application, and neverthe- 
less seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary common 
sense agrees with them," 

This states a well known fact, that the reason springs 
from particular experiences and rises to general truths. 
But among those general truths, Kant tells us the 
Eeason finds no resting-place, and is "constrained to 



German Philosophy 159 

take refuge in principles which (transcend experience) 
exceed every possible experimental application." 

The point to be marked here is, that it is impossible 
for reason to act at all without utilizing or manifest- 
ing its deepest principles. In affirming that the prin- 
ciples of reason transcend experience, Kant evidently 
did not consider that experience can be traced back to 
the impersonal, that is to say, back through the actions 
and reactions of organism and environment to inorganic 
nature from which the individual has been evolved. 
In the Introduction Kant tells us, "If we remove from 
experience everything that belongs to the senses, there 
remain nevertheless certain original concepts, and cer- 
tain judgments derived from them, which must have 
had their origin entirely a priori, and independent of 
all experience, because it is owing to them that we are 
able, or imagine we are able, to predicate more of the 
objects of our senses than can be learned from mere 
experience, and that our propositions contain real gen- 
erality and strict necessity, such as mere empirical 
knowledge can never supply." 

Here is an assertion which in our time sounds strange 
indeed, — that there is an absolute difference between 
sensuous apprehensions, and those co-ordinations which 
give us the highest achievements of reason. By the 
term "a priori" which means "logically prior to per- 
sonal experience," Kant wished to designate certain 
conceptions not wholly accounted for by the conscious 
development of the sentient individual. Since experi- 
ence is an evolution of nature, it is not limited to any 
individual. Both sensations and ideas are evolved from 
physico-chemical reactions, which in the higher organ- 
isms assume the form of feeling and thought. 



i6o The Evolution of Knowledge 

On the same page we are told that there is a certain 
kind of '^knowledge which transcends the world of the 
senses, and where experience can neither guide nor 
correct us; here reason prosecutes investigations which, 
by their importance, are far more elevated than any- 
thing the understanding can find in the sphere of phe- 
nomena." 

Kant is to take us, therefore, into a region of knowl- 
edge where our investigations cannot be verified by any 
possible experience — a region far more "excellent" 
and "elevated than anything the understanding can find 
in the sphere of phenomena or nature." But any 
reluctance that we may feel in accompanying him 
thither is dispelled when he continues: "ISTay, we risk 
rather anything, even at the peril of error, than that we 
should surrender such investigations either on the 
ground of uncertainty or from any feeling of indifEerence 
or contempt. Besides, once beyond the precincts of 
experience, we are certain that experience can never 
contradict us, while the charm of enlarging our knowl- 
edge is so great that nothing will stop our progress until 
we encounter a clear contradiction." From this, it is evi- 
dent that in the region of knowledge to be traversed 
by the Critique of Pure Reason we are not to be left 
without protection against the delusions of the imagi- 
nation. This protection is to be the sense of "clear 
contradiction"; that is to say, upon entering the region 
of transcendental knowledge, we are not expected to 
leave all sense behind. But Tiow, in a sphere of "knowl- 
edge which transcends the world of sense," are we to 
retain sense enough to appreciate a clear contradiction? 

The modern psychologist has no faith in the existence 
oi "Pure Eeason," as the word is employed by our 



German Philosophy i6i 

author. The very name implies a disregard of the 
structural conditions of mind. To show the discrep- 
ancy between Kant's ideas and the conception of mind 
as an organic evolution, we give his definition of Pure 
Reason: "Every kind of knowledge is called pure if 
not mixed with anything empirical. But more 
particularly is tiiat knowledge .called absolutely pure 
which is not mixed up with any experience or sen- 
sation, and is, therefore, possible entirely a priori. 
Eeason is the faculty which supplies the principles of 
knowledge a priori. Pure Reason, therefore, is that 
faculty which supplies the principles of knowing any- 
thing entirely a priori. An Organon of pure reason 
ought to comprehend all the principles by which pure 
knowledge a priori can be acquired and fully estab- 
lished. A complete application of such an Organon 
would give us a System of Pure Reason. But as that 
would be a difficult task, and as at present it is still 
doubtful whether such an expansion of our knowl- 
edge is here possible, we may look on a mere criticism 
of pure reason, its sources and limits, as a kind of 
preparation for a complete system of pure reason. It 
should be called a critique, not a doctrine, of pure rea- 
son. Its usefulness would be negative onl}-^, serving for 
a purging rather than for an expansion of our reason." 
Any meaning which this definition has certainly hinges 
upon the term a priori, which signifies logically prior to 
individual experience. That is to say, a priori powers 
as conceived by Kant are congenital mental faculties not 
acquired by the conscious experience of the individual. 
They must, therefore, have been transmitted through 
heredity as a result of ancestral experience. In brief, 
a priori powers are tendencies acquired by one's pro- 



1 62 The Evolution of Knowledge 

genitors. By experience Kant, therefore, means the con- 
scious activity of a given individual considered apart 
from unconscious cerebration and heredity. Now the 
psychologists tell us that only a small proportion of our 
mental activities are conscious. Unconscious cerebra- 
tion constitutes by far the greater part of mental activ- 
ity. Experience in its deepest sense, therefore, means 
life, and this wider view includes both conscious and un- 
conscious cerebration, that is to say, all the experiences 
of the present and of previous generations reaching back 
through the evolution of species to the premordial types 
of life. Hence mental powers result from the devel- 
opment of the nervous system or of the sensorium, the 
highest function of which is reason.* It follows that 
there is no absolute separation of the objective and the 
subjective, or of the co-ordinations of sense ("external 
intuitions"), and those concepts to which Kant attrib- 
utes pure reason. It also follows that there is no hard 
and fast line between a priori and a posteriori knowl- 
edge or between concepts supplied by congenital mental 
faculties or those ideas acquired by the conscious reason- 
ing of an individual, for they are all included in that 
broad experience termed life. 

Psychology teaches that consciousness which includes 
reason arises from the relationship of subject and object, 
or from the interaction of organism and environment, 
or in other terms, from experience. Experience it is at 
first and experience it remains to the last. The a priori 
or transcendental concepts are habits of perception ac- 
quired by an infinite experience. 

Kant insists that there is a kind of knowledge which 

* This will be fully demonstrated when we reach the evolu- 
tionary systems of Spencer and Lewes. 



German Philosophy 163 

is independent of experience; not evolved by the indi- 
vidual's own experience but mysteriously put into the 
mind before individual ratiocination begins. He as- 
serts that this pure reason is a law unto itself, an 
unconditioned faculty, an unrelated and, therefore, an 
unchanging existence more real than phenomena. This 
incomprehensible knowledge, he says, is acquired by 
the understanding which he defines as follows: — *^e 
have before given various definitions of the understand- 
ing, by calling it the spontaneit}^ of knowledge (as op- 
posed to the receptivity of the senses), or the faculty 
of thinking or the faculty of concepts or of judgments ; 
all of these explanations, if more closely examined, 
come to the same. We may now characterize it as the 
faculty of rules. This characteristic is more significant 
and approaches nearer to the essence of the understand- 
ing. The senses give us forms (of intuition), the un- 
derstanding rules, being always busy to examine 
phenomena, in order to discover in them some kind of 
rule. Rules, so far as they are objective, are called laws. 
Although experience teaches us many laws, yet these 
are only particular determinations of higher laws, the 
highest of them, to which all others are subject, spring- 
ing a priori from the understanding, not being derived 
from experience, but, on the contrary, imparting to the 
phenomena their regularity and thus making experience 
possible. The understanding, therefore, is not only a 
power of making rules by comparison of phenomena; 
it is the law-giver of Nature, that is a synthetical unity 
of the manifold of phenomena, according to rules which 
would nowhere be found because phenomena, as such, 
cannot exist without us, but exist in our sensibility 
only. * * * * However exaggerated and absurd 



164 The Evolution of Knowledge 

it may sound, that the understanding is itself the source 
of the laws of Nature and of its formal unity, such a 
statement is, nevertheless, correct and in accordance 
with experience." 

The above definition of the understanding is a key to 
all the contradictions of the Kantian dialectic. It gives us 
the right to inquire, at what point in their development 
do ideas take command of the universe ? Kant acknowl- 
edges that we derive our ideas of rules or laws from the 
study of Nature. At what point, then, in the develop- 
ment of mind do our ideas of universal order become 
so powerful as to give to Nature its regularity and 
*'make experience itself possible ?"* 

Kant describes the scope of his great work in these 
words: "All that constitutes transcendental philosophy 
belongs to the Critique of Pure Reason. * * Trans- 
cendental philosophy is the wisdom of pure speculative 
reason. Everything practical, so far as it contains 
motives has reference to sentiments, and these belong 
to empirical sources of hnowledge." Pure reason or 
transcendental philosophy then, we must conclude, has 
little to do with knowledge of practical life, but confines 
itself to a criticism of those mental powers which are 
pure in the sense that they are not derived from personal 
experience. 

The well disciplined thinker, being earthly, would 
keep his feet upon the firm ground of sense. He feels 
that no thoughts are "too high, too pure or too excel- 
lent" to emanate from a physical source because physi- 
cal laws are universal and, therefore, divine. Correct 
reasoning is intellectual integrity, but why should we 
question the integrity of the Critique of Pure Reason 

* Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 126-127. 



German Philosophy 165 

on the ground that sense and reason should harmonize 
when its author tells us, in the last page of the intro- 
duction, that, "Although the highest principles of 
morality and their fundamental concepts are a priori 
knowledge, they do not belong to transcendental philoso- 
phy, because the concepts of pleasure and pain, desire 
and inclination, free will, etc., which are all of empiri- 
cal origin, must here be pre-supposed ?" This statement 
leaves us in doubt whether Kant means that transcen- 
dental philosophy has nothing to do with morality, or 
that "fl priori knowledge" has nothing to do with 
transcendental philosophy. At all events, the assertion 
is definite that in transcendental philosophy the moral 
sentiments so far as they represent a motive have no 
place. Example, therefore, which is as natural and as 
universal as gravitation, has, according to Kant, no 
power of determining the mind, for transcendentalism 
teaches that the mind determines nature. 

Kant describes the nature of perception with great 
fluency. The actions of the mind are presented with 
such simplicity that one is inclined to take the ac- 
curacy of the presentation for granted. At the out- 
set Kant affirms that "sensibility alone supplies us 
with intuitions (Anschauungen). These intuitions be- 
come thought through the understanding (Ver stand), 
and hence arise conceptions (Begriffe). All thought, 
therefore, must, directly or indirectly, go back to intui- 
tions (Anschauungen), i. e. to our sensibility, because 
in no other way can objects be given to us."* Thus we 
have sensation and thought duly recognized as different 
aspects of mental action, their separation being purely 
artificial. Then follows the very fair assertion: "The 
* Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 19. 



1 66 The Evolution of Knowledge 

effect produced by an object upon the faculty of repre- 
sentation (Vorstellungsfahigkeit), so far as we are af- 
fected by it, is called sensation (Empfindung). An 
intuition (Anschauung) of an object by means of 
sensation is called empirical. The undefined object of 
such empirical intuition is called phenomenon (Erschei- 
nung)." But suddenly we have a leap into obscurity 
which is amazing, and which, of course, we cannot 
follow. Witness these words : "I call all representa- 
tions in which there is nothing that belongs to sensa- 
tion, pure (in a transcendental sense). The pure form, 
therefore, of all sensuous intuitions, that form in which 
the manifold elements of the phenomena are seen in 
a certain order, must be found in the mind a priori. 
And this pure form of sensibility may be called the pure 
intuition ( Anschauung ) ." 

But we have been told that "sensibility alone sup- 
plies us with intuitions;" and that "all thought must, 
directly or indirectly, go back to intuitions, i. e. to sen- 
sations ;" that "sensation is the effect produced upon the 
faculty of representation by an object;" thus complet- 
ing the chain of cause and effect between the various 
forms of mental activity which Kant denominates 
sensuous apprehensions, representations, intuitions and 
thought. In the face of this we are told that he "calls 
all representations in which there is nothing that belongs 
to sensation, pure (in a transcendental sense)." Truly 
this trancendental sense seems to be the source of 
Kant's lasting error; for as will be fully demonstrated 
there is no function without structure, no mental pro- 
cedure that is not evolved from experience, no thought 
that is pure in a transcendental sense, for all thought 
is evolved from feeling. 



German Philosophy 167 

Speaking of space Kant says, — "No determinations 
of objects, whether belonging to them absolutely or in 
relation to others, can enter into onr intuition before 
the actual existence of the objects themselves; that is 
to say, they can never be intuitions a priori. Space is 
nothing but the form of the phenomena of all external 
sense; it is a subjective condition of our sensibility, 
without which no external intuition is possible for us." 
If these assertions came from a less illustrious pen than 
that of Kant, we should simply affirm their emptiness, 
for they involve fatal contradictions. Let us note, then, 
that the determinations of objects, or the properties by 
which they are perceived, imply a relation between the 
perceiving subject and the object. The determinations 
of objects, therefore, cannot belong to them absolutely. 
When Kant says that the "determinations of objects 
cannot enter into our intuition before the existence of 
the objects themselves," it is to be remembered that, as 
the determinations are qualities or functions of the ob- 
jects, they presuppose the existence of the object. As 
for the determinations never becoming "intuitions a 
priori," we have been distinctly told that intuitions 
come alone through sensibility. We, therefore, deny 
that there is any meaning in the term "intuitions 
a priori/'* The difference between sensuous intuitions 
and intuitions a priori is based upon an arbitrary sepa- 
ration by Kant of the matter and form of phenome- 

* With regard to this question Dr. A. Leroy Jones, of Columbia, 
to whom I am indebted for an able criticism, remarks, "This 
looks like a contradiction, but it may be possible to so interpret 
Kant as to escape the difficulty. The fact is that Kant's use of 
terms is so varying and indistinct that it is not worth while to 
undertake a detailed description of his views." 



i68 The Evolution of Knowledge 

na,* a distinction which has no foundation in fact, for 
the form of objects is clearly the expression of their sta- 
tical or space aspect; and the word matter is merely a 
generalization of the statical aspect of all phenomena. 
When Kant says, therefore, that space is a subjective 
condition of our sensibility without which no intuition 
of externals (objects) is possible, it is clear that he does 
violence to facts, first by insisting that space means form 
and does not mean matter, and then that form is ab- 
solutely distinct from matter or external phenomena. 
Briefly, Kant abstracts from that aspect of motion or 
general existence, known as space, an alleged transcen- 
dental principle which he calls form, and leaves behind 
a mutilated conception which he denominates matter. 
Form, he says, belongs to the mind and transcends all 
sensibility or experience ; but matter does not belong to 
the mind and cannot take part in it, because it is not 
form. Surely, the difficulty begins and ends with 
what Kant says, for he offers no proof whatever that 
form is separable from the statical aspect of phenomena. 
And yet the vitality of the Critique of Pure Reason 
springs from the deep insight obtained by its author 
into the nature of space and time. 

"Time," says Kant, "is the formal condition, a priori, 
of all phenomena whatsoever. Space, as the pure form 

* "The matter only of all phenomena is given us a posteriori; 
but their form must be ready for them in the mind (Gemuth) a 
priori, and must therefore be capable of being considered as 
separate from all sensations. * * * The pure form, therefore, 
of all sensuous intuitions, — that form in which the manifold 
elements of the phenomena are seen in a certain order, — must be 
found in the mind a priori. And this pure form of sensibility 
may be called the pure intuition (Anschauung)." — Kritik der 
reinen Vemunft, p. 20. 



German Philosophy 169 

of all external intuition^, is a condition^, a priori, of ex- 
ternal phenomena only. But all these representations, 
whether they have for their objects external things or 
not, belong by themselves, as determinations of the 
mind, to our inner state; and as this inner state falls 
under the formal conditions of internal intuition, and, 
therefore, of time, time is a condition, a priori, of all 
phenomena whatsoever, and is so directly as a condition 
of internal phenomena (of our mind), and thereby 
indirectly of external phenomena also.* We suppose 
that "the formal condition, a priori, of all phenomena 
whatsoever" means the idea of all phenomena ; therefore, 
we have the assertion that time is the idea of all 
phenomena or, otherwise expressed, the subjective aspect 
of motion. But we are told that space is a condition, 
a priori, of external phenomena. Now, by external, 
Kant means external to the mind, or phenomenal, so 
that the phrase 'external phenomena,' means all phenom- 
ena. Therefore, according to Kant, the difference be- 
tween time and space is that relative difference existing 
between subject and object. Hence time and space 
are, respectively, the subjective and the objective aspects, 
or ideas of all phenomena. 

t"Time," continues Kant, "is simply a subjective 
condition of our (human) intuition (which is always 
sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), 
but by itself, apart from the subject, nothing. Never- 
theless, with respect to all phenomena, that is all things 
which can come within our experience, time is neces- 
sarily objective. We cannot say that all things are in 
time, because, if we speak of things in general, nothing 
is said about the manner of intuition, which is the real 
* Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 33, 34. f P- 35. 



170 The Evolution of Knowledge 

condition under which time enters into our repre- 
sentation of things. If, therefore, this condition is 
added to the concept, and if we say that all things 
are phenomena, (as objects of sensuous intuition) are 
in time, then such a proposition has its full objective 
validity and a priori universality." 

This definition mentions "external intuition" (or 
thought) and external phenomena or nature. Mind is 
a part of nature and the ultimate fact in both mind 
and nature is motion. What Kant meant to say was 
that the mind forms space and also time out of motion, 
and, hence, if there were no mind there would be neither 
space nor time, only motion. 

From the above it is evident that Kant obtained a 
deep insight into the nature of time and space. Had 
he maintained that time is the subjective and space 
the objective aspect of motion, the question of their 
reality would not have been raised, for motion and 
reality mean the same thing. 

There is no denying that the fundamental facts of 
consciousness may be gleaned, although with great dif- 
ficulty, from Kant's psychology. It is the opinion of 
many competent authorities, however, that the Kantian 
philosophy declares against the possibilities of a unifica- 
tion of knowledge. 

The most subtle, illusive and the simplest of all ques- 
tions is the meaning of time and space. Sooner or later 
philosophy will be reduced to this problem for its 
solution supplies the connecting link between mind and 
matter. It is generally conceded that the most original 
part of the Kantian doctrine is the subjectivity of time 
and space. By postulating the subjectivity of these op- 
posite aspects of existence Kant did not mean that all 



German Philosophy 171 

reality is in the mind. Although he erroneously re- 
garded mind as the cause of the order of nature* he 
nevertheless acknowledged the reality of objective change 
as well as of subjective inherence. 

All our theories of the constitution of matter are gov- 
erned by our conceptions of time and space, for these 
opposite aspects of existence are our only means of count- 
ing and of measuring phenomena. 

The Paradoxes of Zeno and the Antinomies of Kant 
are similar in conception, for they show the futility of 
attempting to reduce nature to absolute number and 
quantity. 

Both the Paradoxes and the Antinomies are attempts 
to reduce phenomena to an absolute unity in variety, 
or in other terms to an immutable one and an im- 
mutable many, whereas, phenomena or nature means 
mutability or change. 

Motion is unity in variety or existence expressed in 
terms of time and space. The difficulty with the ideal- 
ists and the atomists alike is that they endeavor to ex- 
press the nature of God and of substance, in numerical 
instead of in geometrical terms, the former indicating 
discontinuous quantities, while the latter denote the con- 
tinuity of nature. 

The greatest achievement of Kant, therefore, was not 
the subjectivity of those conceptions known as time and 
space, for all conceptions are subjective. His greatest 
logical achievement was rather his reduction of all uni- 
versals to the single category of relation, for the ulti- 



* "The very thing that Kant thought he had proved beyond 
all power of contradiction was that the orderly arrangement of 
nature is the product of the human mind." — Ladd. 



172 The Evolution of Knowledge 

mate relation is what in mathematics is known as mo- 
tion and in religion as God. 

Having measured the understanding by the rule of 
the absolute, Kant regarded the mind as an island in a 
sea of mystery, which, although subject to criticism^ 
cannot be comprehended or known. Instead of being 
a solution of the problem of consciousness, this is in 
effect the same doctrine as that of the ancient skeptic, 
who saw no real harmony between mind and environing 
nature. 

The assertion of Kant that we have ideas that are 
not derived from sensation conflicts with the facts of 
consciousness. Modern psychology has made clear 
the connection between sensation and thought, but 
Kant, unfurnished with these researches, concluded that 
the objective world, of which, let it be remembered, every 
mind except our own is a part, although existing, is 
quite unknowable. 

Since the test of every philosophy is its theory of 
Knowledge, we are justified in accepting what, even in 
Germany, outside of the direct influence of transcen- 
dentalism is becoming a general opinion that Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, although a monument of dia- 
lectic sublety, is at the same time an incorrect and 
hopelessly confused explanation of mind. 

And yet, the enthusiasm of some of those who have 
learned philosophy under the influence of the Kantian 
dialectic is unbounded. Prof. Noire, in the introduc- 
tion to Max Muller's translation of the Critique, after 
giving evidence of the broadest philosophic culture, 
closes his examination of the pre-Kantian systems with 
this daring eulogy: *"Kant alone succeeded in solving 
* Kant's Critiqxie, tr. by Max MuUer. Vol. I., p. 359. 



German Philosophy 173 

all the contradictions and paradoxes in which the reason 
was entangled, and in explaining them completely in 
accordance with their own nature, as he dropped the 
sounding-line into depths which as yet no mortal mind 
had dared to fathom, and brought up from thence to 
the light of day news of the primary conditions and 
eternal postulates of reason. It is, therefore, not too 
much to say that Kant is the greatest philosophical 
genius that has ever dwelt upon earth, and the Critique 
of Pure Reason the highest achievement of human 
reason," And Max Muller adds to this questionable 
example by declaring that the Critique anticipates and 
resolves all the ontological and dialectical difficulties of 
humanity.* 

Kant himself was not without a lively sense of the 
inadequacy of transcendentalism. His Critique of 
Practical Reason, which appeared in 1790, is generally 
admitted to be a search for a sounder basis of ethics 
and religion than the Critique of Pure Reason could 
afford; but the Kantians of the present day deny to 
their master the privilege of enlarging his view, or of 
developing his opinions. They are unanimously per- 
suaded that the first edition of the Critique, which was 
written in a few months, represents what ought to have 
been the final teachings of Kant. In brief they refuse 
to concede that his mental development was continuous 
and suffered no serious relapse during the period of his 
literary activity. 

The Critique of Practical Reason, as the name implies, 
deals with ethics. The difficulties which an Ethical 
system presented to Kant were insuperable, because 

* "The whole result of Kant's philosophy is absolute slsepti- 
cism with regard to ontology." — G. T. Ladd, 



174 The Evolution of Knowledge 

transcendentalism leads inevitably to skepticism, whereas 
morality is a form of faith. 

Since the true and the good are inseparable, it is im- 
possible to evolve from an incorrect theory of mind a cor- 
rect theory of duty. The leading thought of the Kantian 
Ethics is that the will, not reason, is the basis of our 
faculties. According to Kant the reason is lost in anti- 
nomies or contradictions, but the will reveals the path 
of duty. The "Categorical Imperative" which Kant de- 
rived from the will is simply the law of nature sanctioned 
by experience. The theories of The Practical Reason re- 
garding the moral instincts are profound and beautiful, 
but the moment Kant attempts to reconcile these basic 
intuitions vv^ith his transcendental dialectic, contradic- 
tions arise on every hand. 

The Critique of Practical Reason defines God as the 
supreme good, the idea of moral perfection framed by 
the reason a priori. It teaches that there is "a supreme 
and unconditional good" voiced in an absolute "good 
will," which justifies itself. According to Kant the will 
is not justified by its purpose, but by its form, or in other 
terms, because it is an idea. To use his own words, 
"To be moral an action must be from the maxim, not 
the intention or inclination."* 

Especially did Kant proclaim that there is no moral 
quality in inclination or sympathy, for the a priori 
principle is formal whereas inclination and sympathy 
are only material.* Hence according to Kant "example" 
or "imitation finds no place in morality."! Now the 
underlying principle of ethics is the sublime and im- 
perishable example set us by the order of nature, which 
is the source of volition as well as of thought. 

* Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 17, f p. 19^ 
t P. 31. 



German Philosophy 175 

"Everything in nature," continues our author, "works 
according to law. Eational beings alone have the faculty 
of acting according to the conceptions of laws, that is 
according to principles, i. e., having a will. Since the 
deduction of action from principle requires reason, the 
will is nothing but practical reason."* 

The difficulty with this theory of Kant is that it 
regards the will as a purely mental phenomenon, where- 
as it is largely instinctive, or unconscious. 

According to the view of Kant, justice is an absolute 
entity, an innate a priori faculty of the human mind, 
present alike in all races and individuals. This theory, 
however, he afterwards modified, affirming that justice 
is a universal principle. 

The conception of justice has grown up from the 
simplest experiences. It is aptly symbolized by the 
device of the balance, for it is a balance of social forces 
or of rights and duties. As society develops, rights and 
duties become more and more definite. Hence our 
idea of justice is evolved from experience, and is not 
absolute or a priori. Kant's original theory that justice 
is a priori, not an evolution of experience, undermines 
the Avhole structure of jurisprudence, because the only 
enduring foundation of civil law is the order of 
nature. 

Morality is rightly reasoned conduct, or the culmina- 
tion of experience. In order to understand the nature 
of mind and duty, it is necessary to harmonize the prin- 
ciples of intellectual and physical life, or of thought and 
nature. Transcendentalism takes the stand that 
thought is not relative, but absolute, that is to say, it is 

* Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 36. 



176 The Evolution of Knowledge 

a supreme good in itself, instead of a natural develop- 
ment. 

The transcendental theory that the true and the good 
are unconditioned or unevolved is the opposite of moral 
because it enthrones thought as an absolute and, there- 
fore, an irresponsible power. It is impossible to sustain 
Kant's theory that the a 'priori idea is the Supreme Good 
in itself, independent of conditions, for, as previously ex- 
plained, the deepest meaning of good is that type of 
existence which we call species and all species are 
mutable. 

If, therefore, we would appreciate the genius of Kant 
and the inimitable spirit of his writings we must make 
allowance for many contradictions. As is the case with 
other geniuses, his works are full of contradictions as 
well as of invaluable suggestions. Notwithstanding all 
his defects, however, the chief value of Kant, and that 
which won for him the lasting affection of his country- 
men, was the earnestness and greatness of his Ethical 
conceptions. 

All recognized German philosophy subsequent to 
Kant has been a more or less consistent development of 
transcendentalism. The theories of Fichte, Schelling, 
and Hegel, as well as of all the principal post-Kantian 
writers, were influenced to an extraordinary degree by 
the Critique. 

In the foregoing brief exposition of the Kantian phi- 
losophy, the main conclusions of that system are com- 
pared with the facts of consciousness as explained by 
psychology. The defenders of the system maintain 
that no argument which is based on psychology — that is 
to say, upon the facts of consciousness as now under- 
stood — can possibly reach the meaning of the Kantiaa 



German Philosophy 177 

criticism. Professor Hugo Miinsterberg, of Harvard, in 
a critical review of this chapter writes : 

"As soon as you interpret Kant psychologically, the 
whole Kantian philosophy must appear as a great nonsense." 

In an accompanying letter, the Professor reiterates: 

"I agree with 3^ou that from a scientific standpoint the 
Critique of Pure Reason is pure nonsense, but from a cate- 
gorical standpoint it is consistent " 

The aim of the present work is to gauge the chief sys- 
tems of thought from a scientific standpoint in order to 
show how near each school has come to an ultimate 
analysis of existence. There is no reason why Kant's 
philosophy should be exempted from this test. If the 
great authorities admit that Kant's categorical sys- 
tem of thought cannot be reconciled with the facts 
of consciousness as now known, of what value is the 
system? The Critique of Pure Reason is a labyrinth 
of introspection through which, by dint of a prodigious 
amount of labor, one can find one's way, but when its 
devious paths are at last made out it is discovered that 
the effort required is out of all proportion to the benefit 
derived. 

In describing Kant's categorical position. Prof. Ladd, 
who is an acknowledged authority, and to whom I am 
indebted for a criticism of these chapters, writes, 
"The very thing that Kant thought he had proved be- 
yond any possible contradiction was that all phenomena 
must subject themselves to the constitutional forms of 
functioning of sense and intellect, or in other words, 
that the orderly and interconnected arrangements of 
nature must be the product of the human mind." This 
categorical position of Kant simply means that mind. 



178 The Evolution of Knowledge 

instead of being a product of universal order, is the cause 
of nature, which, to say the least, is an erroneous basis 
for a system of philosophy. 

My intention has been to show, what is admitted by 
many of the most devoted followers of Kant, that 
his philosophy cannot be reconciled with the facts of 
consciousness as shown in psychology. 

FICHTE 

In turning from Kant to his three great contem- 
poraries and expounders, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, 
it should be with a spirit of appreciation, lest in defin- 
ing their errors we lose sight of the sublimity of their 
thought. 

The German idealists refused to confine themselves 
to psychology. They strove to enlarge thought so that 
it might include all life and nature. Impatient of the 
incomplete science of mind they pressed forward to 
that of existence in general, aiming at nothing less 
than a true conception of God. Almost all modern 
philosophic schools have been halted by the conviction 
that it is necessary first of all to ascertain the nature 
of consciousness. Thus Locke maintained that "we 
must try the length of the line with which we are to 
sound the ocean of truth." It is necessary to formulate 
a true psychology before attempting to comprehend 
divinity, for how can we understand the principles of 
being before we are able to distinguish variety from 
unity or the human from the divine. 

It was to Kant that Fichte owed his first enthusiasm 
for philosophy, and ever afterward the pupil remained 
faithful to the dialectic of the master, even more faith- 
ful than did the master himself. 



German Philosophy 179 

Fichte was bom in 1762 at the Saxon village of 
Lnsatia. At the age of eighteen, he began a theo- 
logical course at Jena. After leaving the university 
he served for a time as private tutor, and then engaged 
in miscellaneous literary work. It was only in subse- 
quent years that, for the first time, he encountered the 
Kantian philosophy, which he said had the effect of 
completely changing his point of view, on account of 
the prominence given to the question of the moral 
nature of man. 

Although a theologian, Fichte had become what is 
now known as a liberal. He had adopted a Spinozistic 
Determinism, which means that he had come to regard 
life, not as a miracle, but as a development of nature. 

Kant had long aimed to prove that "there is an ab- 
solute moral law which is the essence of free in- 
telligence," which really means that righteousness is 
obedience to the order of nature. The difficulty with 
this theory of Kant is that it regards righteousness 
as absolutely dependent upon conscious reason, whereas 
by no means is all reasoning conscious, much of it being 
instinctive and, therefore, indissolubly connected with 
unconscious impulse. To obtain strength, to do right, 
therefore, we need more than intellectual ideals or the 
stimulation of reason ; we are in constant need of those 
physical ideals known as example, which insensibly ele- 
vate us. If we penetrate deeply into human life it will 
be seen that the conditions from which we have sprung 
are making for righteousness; or, in other terms, the 
order of the universe is constantly setting us the sub- 
limest of examples. 

These broad principles are in harmony with the de- 
terminism of Spinoza, adopted by Fichte, but that 



i^o The Evolution of Knowledge 

thinker was also attracted by the theory of an absolute 
moral law, because it recalled the transcendental theory 
of the absolute will of God which had been the motive 
of the orthodox training of his youth. 

The influence exerted by the Kantian philosophy is 
largely due to the appeal it makes to absolute authority 
or transcendental justice. This theory is inseparable 
from that of a personal deity. Society will continue for 
a long time to believe in God as an absolute ruler of faith 
as well as of works. How could it be otherwise, after 
all these years of residence under a theocracy? Think 
of the civil and intellectual development which will be 
necessary before we can transform our dependence upon 
that absolute ego known as Jehovah into a sublime trust 
in nature. 

Kant sought to avoid the difficulties arising from 
the theory of an absolute moral law by making reason ab- 
solute, whereas it is by nature relative. In the endeavor 
to establish a criterion of right and of truth he main- 
tained, and with justice, that duty and reason are one, 
but he made the fatal error of believing that both are 
absolute. It is easy to see that duty is relative because 
the first of all obligations is the preservation of species, 
and species are mutable. Only within the limits of race 
can might be modified by right, for within this sphere 
alone have the weak a claim upon the strong. Morality, 
therefore, is the adjustment of individual and general 
rights within each species. 

Pichte realized the difficulty into which the Kantian 
dialectic had fallen, but instead of trying to remove it 
by evolving both consciousness and justice from nature, 
he took the opposite course, and sought to prove that 
both mind and duty are functions of an absolute ego. 



German Philosophy iSi 

The aspect of the Kantian philosophy which Fichte 
confronted is now turned away from us by the move- 
ment of time. We compare the theories of the 
Critique with an advanced psychology and ethics, but 
Fichte lived at a time when the ideas of Kant were 
an innovation, confronting the narrowest of orthodoxy. 

Orthodoxy has always held that the highest intelli- 
gence and virtue are supernatural; or in other words 
that they are gifts of a personal deity, or of an absolute 
ego. Kant reasoned that the matter of thought and feel- 
ing are thrown into the form of cognition from without, 
or by empirical forces. His whole influence was ex- 
erted on the side of a natural, as distinguished from a 
supernatural, theory of knowledge, but with all Tran- 
scendentalists he endeavored to depose the conception 
of a personal deity from the position it had so long 
held in religion, only to re-enthrone it under the form 
of an absolute ego. 

This theory of an absolute ego would be difficult 
to deal with had not sociology revealed the fact that man- 
kind may be considered as a vast living being composed 
of a multitude of egos acting and reacting upon one an- 
other through the medium of language. Before the 
light of evolution the theory of an absolute personality 
disappears. Language is the medium through which 
the relations of individuals to one another are main- 
tained. This medium may be viewed objectively as well 
as subjectively, for what to the individual possessing 
them are feelings and thoughts, are to others only ac- 
tions; that is to say, internal excitations of an objective 
organism. 

Transcendentalism is the transition which the theory 
of a personal ruler of the imiverse undergoes in be- 



1 82 The Evolution of Knowledge 

coming that of an absolute ego. In due time this idea 
will develop into faith in the order of nature. 

Soon after his first visit to Konigsberg, Fichte wrote 
a hurried treatise entitled, Essay Toward a Critique 
of Every Possible Revelation, and sent it to Kant, who, 
recognizing in it a high order of ability, interested 
himself in securing a publisher. jSTotwithstanding some 
opposition from the theological censor of Halle, who 
did not like to see miracles rejected, the book was pub- 
lished at Easter, 1793. By an accident the author's 
preface, in which he acknowledged himself a beginner 
in philosophy, was omitted from the first edition, nor 
did his name appear on the title page. Some of the 
German newspapers, jumping at the conclusion that 
it was a production of Kant, accorded it unbounded 
praise. When the mistake came to light Fichte's repu- 
tation was made, and an invitation was extended him 
to fill the chair of philosophy at Jena (1793). Here, 
according to the critical method of the times, he was 
assailed as an advocate of atheism, and declining to make 
any retraction, resigned the chair in 1799. Soon after- 
ward he was made professor of philosophy at the new 
university at Berlin, where his career was short and dra- 
matic. The enthusiasm with which the campaign of 
1813 began carried him from the lecture room into 
the ranks of the assembling army, and within a year he 
was taken with fever and died. 

The principal theme of the Fichtean philosophy was 
elaborated during the few stormy years which its au- 
thor passed at the university of Jena. Here he en- 
deavored to develop the practical or ethical side of the 
Kantian philosophy; for it was to expound this system 
that he had been invited to the chair. A revolution in 



German Philosophy 183 

Kant's own views, however, had taken place. His 
Critique of Pure Reason had been partially modified by 
his Critique of Practical Reason, and as these works ap- 
peared only six j^ears apart, the latter shortly before 
Fichte began lecturing at Jena, it will be readily 
seen that the first attempt to expomid the a priori 
philosophy was not without its difficulties. 

Fichte exaggerated the idealism of Kant by advo- 
cating what is now known as the theory of subjective 
idealism, which means that the objects of perception 
do not exist externally but only internally or sub- 
jectively, that is to say all reality inhabits the mind. 
The illusion by which this belief is brought about 
has been exposed in the foregoing review of Greek 
Thought. It is a form of trance brought about by 
an excessive contemplation of the ego. If we con- 
template our own minds long enough, forgetting all 
other minds, we become self-hypnotized. We imagine 
that the ego is not only the center of the universe, but 
that it is the universe itself. If we could only realize 
that there are other minds as well as our own, we would 
reject Pichte's belief that the objects of perception, which 
include all conscious nature excepting ourselves, are 
functions of our own consciousness. The illusion would 
vanish when we realize that the consciousness of all 
other intelligent beings is objective or external to our- 
selves, for then it would be evident that individual minds 
are simply parts of nature. 

SCHELLING AND HEGEL 

Schelling and Hegel were fellow students at Tiibin- 
gen, where they pursued the study of theology, re- 
ceiving such enlightenment concerning the nature of 



184 The Evolution of Knowledge 

deity as was then possible. In the certificate granted 
by the university authorities to the young theologian 
Hegel he was described as of good ability, middling 
industry, but especially deficient in philosophy, 

Schelling was five years younger than Hegel, having 
matriculated below the required age, and for a long 
time after leaving the university looked up to his fellow 
student as a guide in philosophic thought. The idea 
of God formed by these young theologians is of his- 
toric interest, for all their subsequent progress was a 
development of that fundamental conception. 

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant taught that 
God is an idealization of our own personality, but 
in the Critique of Practical Reason deity was conceived 
as the essence of all being, or as the ultimate reality. 
In some of his writings, therefore, Kant defined God as 
a person and in others as a principle, but he generally 
conceived deity as the absolute ego or individual. Over 
the Kantian system as a whole presides the theory that 
the ultimate reality is an individual mind. 

Ontology springs from the distinction between vari- 
ety and unity or between individual and general exist- 
ence. Neither Kant, nor Fichte, nor Schelling, nor even 
Hegel ever made clear this all important distinction. 

Strictly speaking, all mind involves memory. In 
other terms, consciousness is a reproduction, because all 
perceptions and conceptions are copies of an original. 
Although the mind is a phenomenon, or a part of nature, 
and therefore real, its images are alw-ays unreal in the 
sense that they are not the original. Philosophy begin- 
ning with an imperfect conception of deity culminates in 
the identification of this conception with the order of 
nature, which is the ultimate reality. Schelling 



German Philosophy 185 

and Hegel, as well as their immediate predecessors, 
conceived God as the essence of all being or as the 
ultimate reality. Throughout the writings of the 
I Transcendentalists the acknowledgment is often found 
that mind and nature are forms of one universal prin- 
ciple. 

The capital error of transcendentalism is not that it 
separates mind and matter respectively as the subjec- 
tive and the objective aspects of existence, but that it 
attempts to make this separation absolute. 

Of course, by neglecting all other existences except 
our own we can view the ego or mind as absolute or 
unconditioned, which view of the ego is equivalent to 
the conception of time. We can also view nature from 
co-existent points of resistance, which gives us the con- 
ception of space. 

To put it briefly, the Transcendentalists confuse mind 
with the conception of time. They deny that con- 
sciousness occupies space, whereas mind is a form of 
motion, and therefore implies both space and time. 

Fichte held that mind is pure action, that is to say 
motion. He maintained that all existence can be re- 
duced to this single law or principle. But, following 
the Kantian dialectic, he further held that the law or 
principle of motion recognized as ultimate alike in 
mind and nature, must be wholly personal. Thus he 
degenerated from a general view of mind to one so sub- 
jective that matter, which is our symbol of the objective 
universe, seemed to him only a reflection of a conscious 
personality. 

The religion of the subjective idealist, therefore, may 
be summed up in the sentence, I am the ego, and the ego 
is everything, including God. How much better would 



1 86 The Evolution of Knowledge 

this sound were it written, God is nature, including that 
ego known as humanity, of which I am an infinitesimal 
and a transient part. 

The subjective idealist insists that because we know 
things only through consciousness, mind is everything. 
The fallacy of this theory arises from the failure to 
comprehend the fact that thinking is relationing and 
that all relations are of coexistence and sequence or of 
space and time, the aspects of motion. 

Fichte felt the force of these objections and gradu- 
ally modified his extreme subjectivism, but although 
acknowledging finally that mind is pure action, which 
means that it can be accounted for by motion, he could 
not conceive of motion as an existence independent 
of personality or the ego. 

Schelling, on the other hand, resolved space and time, 
the Kantian categories of sensation, into the matter 
and form of thought, thus uniting mind and matter 
as different aspects of a single principle. 

In his Philosophy of Identity Schelling asserts that 
the ultimate fact is the absolute and infinite existence 
(Sein), which forms of itself the whole real essence of 
the universe, and that this fact is appreciated by in- 
tellectual intuition. 

The difference between Schelling and Hegel is dis- 
tinct. Schelling evolved reality from nature, in which 
he included mind, recognizing as ultimate, in both 
spheres, the principle which he denominated law or 
power. But Hegel insisted that nature has no exist- 
ence apart from thought. In other terms, all being 
is intellectual. According to Hegel, therefore, the most 
general fact is the movement of mind. 

Briefly, therefore, Schelling evolved mind from na- 



German Philosophy 187 

ture, while Hegel maintained that mind springs from 
nothing outside itself because there is nothing beyond it. 
This is the absolute idealism of Hegel. 

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant took the same 
position of extreme subjectivism, which, however, was 
modified in his subsequent writings. 

Schelling made no synopsis of his philosophy. Its rul- 
ing principles have to be deduced from his writings taken 
as a whole. He was always alive to the importance 
of scientific discoveries, and constantly sought to dis- 
cern their application to philosophy. He saw that 
social development springs from the mechanical and 
chemical energies of organic life. It can be said, there- 
fore, that he at least dimly foresaw the synthetic phi- 
losophy of Herbert Spencer. 

The Hegelean philosophy is so profound that its chief 
postulate, the insistence that nature is mind and noth- 
ing else, can be regarded as a misfortune that befell an 
otherwise great theory of the universe. 

Hegel objected to Schelling's method of evolving con- 
sciousness from nature because he denied that there is 
any existence not sublimated into thought. Once hav- 
ing taken the stand of absolute idealism, Hegel 
was obliged to represent all phenomena as a logical 
process. He maintained that philosophy begins by 
gaining a clear conception of the laws of thought. It 
never occurred to him that a study of the functions 
and structures of the sensorium was necessary to a know- 
ledge of the laws of thought. Pure sensation, he tells 
us, aifords only feeling. The first step in the attain- 
ment of knowledge, he continues, must be a state where 
there is a complete blending of subject and object. At 
the next step sensation becomes perception and we 



1 88 The Evolution of Knowledge 

refer our feeling to some real outward existence as a 
cause. In the third step we perceive the object as a 
product or a process of our own mind. According to 
Hegel, therefore, feeling begins as a part of nature. 
Then perception or the idea springs from feeling, and 
afterwards all nature becomes the idea, for we are told 
that nature disappears (aufgehoben) in the "infinite 
self" and hence the understanding or the reason (Ver- 
nunft) triumphs.* Now it is well known that the 
"infinite self" is a contradiction in terms, for self im- 
plies individuality or the limited, and the infinite means 
space or the unlimited. 

With the exception of this basic fault, which as- 
sumes that all reality is mind, Hegel is sublimely logi- 
cal. He says that both subject and object owe their 
existences to each other, forming a relation which is 
universal; that God realizes himself in human con- 
sciousness by a process which is synonymous with him- 
self. All nature, all mind, all history, and all religion 
are but pulsations of this movement, and God is the 
universal law or fact. In the absence of a more exact 
terminology these words of Hegel will answer the pur- 
pose of an ultimate generalization. 

The fact is that Hegel's Logic teems with intuitive per- 
ceptions of an ultimate analysis of existence. He tells us 
that "Essence is being unfolded or expanded so that its 
aspects reflect each other." The Categories, therefore, 
follow in pairs, which it will be found are the equiva- 
lents of the subjective and the objective aspects of ex- 
istence or of time and space. " The man who wrote that 

* As set forth in Ideen zu einer Phil, der Natur and in the Neue 
Zeitschrift fuer Spec. Phil. 



German Philosophy 189 

"activity is synonymous with reality/' (Wirklichkeit) ; 
or that "Nothing is active except what is real, and 
nothing is real except what is active/' knew that mo- 
tion is the ultimate reality. 

With Hegel the ultimate reality was not substance 
as with Spinoza, or the subject as with Fichte, or the 
"thing in itself" as with Kant, but a process without be- 
ginning or end. This generalization would be fault- 
less were it not for the unfortunate insistence that the 
universal process or relation is exclusively mental, 
for otherwise the imiversal -process could be identified 
with motion. 

In his better moments Hegel acknowledged that 
thought is a form of motion and therefore identical in 
nature with the underlying principle of all existence. 
The nothing from which he evolved all existence is that 
relation which is the end of analysis and the beginning 
of synthesis. In obedience to the demands of the Kan- 
tion dialectic, however, he tortured this sublime idea of 
universal unity into a futile subjectivism. 

Of the Hegelean philosophy the most original feature 
is the treatise on sesthetics. The reason why the Ger- 
man transcendentalists have exerted so wide an influ- 
ence is because they strove to define not only the true 
and the good, but also the beautiful. They felt with the 
ancient Greeks that an adequate revelation must har- 
monize these inseparable elements of knowledge. Thus 
the Germans advanced naturally from psychology to a 
philosophical criticism of art. 

In the opinion of Bosanquet,* Kant's attention 
was turned to art as related to human genius and to 

* History of ^Esthetics, p. 255. 



190 The Evolution of Knowledge 

nature by the essay of Burke. Fichte further elabor- 
ated these theories, but it was Schelling who first gave 
them a definite form. Hegel began his contribution to 
the science of the beautiful by expounding Schelling's 
philosophy of art. 

In his criticism of art Hegel laid aside, as far as was 
possible for him, that dialectical method which is the 
chief difiiculty of all his other writings. He identified 
the evolution of beauty with that of nature as a neces- 
sary progressive movement, but instead of acknowledg- 
ing form as ultimate, or as identical with motion, he 
insisted that beauty was the idea expressed in form. 

The great question of art has always been to what 
extent can genius, which means the soul, take form? 

Hegel contended that beauty was the idea which has 
attained expression in form. He had not discovered 
that beauty and form have the same ultimate meaning; 
namely, proportion or the universal method of nature.* 
He had, however, an intuition of this great truth, and 
the way he expressed it was by affirming that the idea of 
beauty does not necessarily imply consciousness, but that 
it is a universal principle. 

In the absence of an ultimate analysis this intuition 
of Hegel was marvellous, for he conceived beauty as the 
idea expressed in form, with the proviso that the idea 
is not limited to individual consciousness, but that it is 
universal. f This is in effect an identification of beauty 
and motion. 

Hegel insisted that, although beauty is inherent in 

* The Greeks are the only race that have mastered the law 
of natural proportion, and they are first in art. 
t ^Esthetic 1,141. 



German Philosophy 191 

nature, it exists only for perception, or in other terms, 
it is purely subjective. Of course, the Hegelean 
way out of this difficulty was to explain that perception 
is not necessarily limited to individual consciousness 
but that it is universal. But why should he use terms in- 
dicating mental life, and afterward explain that they are 
used in a universal sense? Would it not be simpler 
to employ terms that express universal action? 

From the foregoing it is evident that the great Ger- 
man dialecticians were men of extraordinary genius. 
They strove unceasingly to define the prime elements 
of knowledge, which are the true, the good and the 
beautiful. They attempted to develop an imperfect con- 
ception of deity until it included mind and nature. 
They perceived intuitively that the trend of social 
progress is toward an ultimate generalization which they 
endeavored to identify with the order of the universe. 

HERBART 

Of the German thinkers of the Nineteenth Century 
one of the clearest was Johann Friederich Herbart, who 
studied under Fichte at Jena and succeeded Kant in the 
chair of philosophy at Konigsberg. Although Herbart 
realized that the problem of existence demands solution, 
he despaired of the solution. He maintained that the 
more definite our conceptions of ultimates become, the 
more distinct appear the contradictions between them. 

According to Herbart, quantity cannot be the end of 
analysis, because the ultimate must be absolutely 
simple, whereas quantity implies parts. In order to 
escape this difficulty, he reasoned that there must be 
a plurality of ultimate realities. His theory of the 
universe, therefore, is called pluralistic realism. Now 



192 The Evolution of Knowledge 

what excuse can there be for seeking more than one 
ultimate reality when we consider that the opposite as- 
pects of this universal relation are time and space or 
number and quantity ? Herbart's plea that there can be 
no quantitative aspect of the universal relation because 
quantity implies parts, and is, therefore, incompatible 
with simplicity, reveals the crux of the metaphysical 
problem. The only ultimate which is separable from 
co-existence is the sequence called time. The separation, 
however, is not absolute, but relative, because it is the 
function of that system of relationing called conscious- 
ness. 

Many centuries ago Zeno proved that it is impos- 
sible to imagine a quantity so minute that it cannot be 
divided or so great that it cannot be increased. Hence 
the necessity of acknowledging as ultimate both co-exist- 
ence and sequence or variety and unity. Herbart's en- 
deavored to prove the incompatibility of variety and 
unity. He felt the necessity, however, of correlating ob- 
jective change with subjective inherence, or, in other 
terms, of relating coexistence and sequence, but he failed 
to perceive that these terms represent simply the ob- 
jective variety and the subjective unity of existence. 

Herbart skilfully avoided the entanglements of the 
Kantian dialectic. He denied that motion, or reality, 
is merely a product of our psychological mechanism, a 
theory which the Kantians deduced from the fact that 
consciousness produces those aspects of motion known 
as time and space. Herbart never wavered in the be- 
lief that objective semblance is reality. 

There is no field of inquiry where ambiguity Kas 
greater sway than in assthetics, for the science of the 
beautiful is still in its infancy. Bosanquet remarks that 



German Philosophy 193 

"the crux of true sesthetics is to show how the combina- 
tion of decorative forms in characteristic presentations, 
by an intensification of the essential character immi- 
nent in them from the beginning subjects them to a 
central significance which stands to their complex com- 
bination as their abstract significance stood to them 
in isolation."* This means that the significance of a 
combination of form is the result of the combination. 
For it goes without saying that the central significance 
of the whole bears the same relation to the meaning of 
the parts that the abstract significance of the former 
bears to that of the latter. 

The central significance of all combinations of form 
is the sphere, which is the unit of motion. In the mul- 
tiplication and division of the sphere we have the defini- 
tion of form or beauty. 

There is a legend that Alexander the Great, when in- 
vading Egypt, had Euclid in his train, and endeav- 
ored to persuade the priests to impart to the Greek 
mathematician the secrets of their geometry. Uipon 
the refusal of the priests to violate the oath of their 
order by receiving one uninitiated, Alexander threat- 
ened them with death. Euclid was then admitted to the 
.,temple and instructed in geometry. The priests, how- 
ever, withheld the secret of the sphere, which is the 
law of natural proportion or beauty. Twenty-three cen- 
turies afterward Bolyia and Lobacheoski rediscovered a 
geometry based upon the refutation of Euclid's chief 
postulate concerning parallels. What impressed them 
most was the "marvelous beauty" of the resulting system 
in which the sphere is the ultimate of form as well as of 
motion. 

* History of Esthetics, p. 372. 



194 The Evolution of Knowledge 

The architecture of Egypt proclaims a knowl- 
edge of the law of natural proportion. This method of 
"the divine architect/' so sedulously guarded by the 
Egyptian priests, descended to the secret religious orders 
of the Greeks and thence to the mediasval Masonic 
Guilds who built the Gothic Cathedrals. Wherever it 
has been systematically employed, this law of natural 
proportion has evolved a school of architecture. 

Herbart instinctively approached an ultimate analy- 
sis of form. He realized the importance of a nu- 
merical and a physical basis of harmony, for he said 
that "the combination of elements belongs to the doc- 
trine of art." 

Kant postulated a pure form, pure in the sense of 
being separated from all significance, just as his 
pure reason was separated from all sense. This ar- 
bitrary separation of form from meaning was rejected 
by Herbart, who strove to prove the objective validity 
of the Eesthetic judgment. In other terms, he held 
that beauty consists in elementary relations of co- 
existence and sequence, or in relations of space and 
time — the aspects of motion. If motion is the ultimate 
reality, it must be the ultimate significance of form or 
beauty. 

The fashionable mysticism of Europe, which took its 
rise in the writings of Schopenhauer, is a modern form 
of skepticism. It is a protest against the failure of 
philosophy to justify itself by defining the ultimate 
reality. Society is still demanding a criterion of the 
true, the good, and the beautiful. 

Schopenhauer opposed the Hegelean postulate that 
the idea is the deepest reality, for he insisted that 
will is ultimate. He hastened to explain, however, 



German Philosophy 195 

that will is not limited to consciousness or to organic 
life, but that it is universal. Hegel made the same 
explanation with regard to the idea which he held to 
be ultimate. Would it not be less confusing to de- 
fine these universals as motion? 

HAECKEL 

At the present time in Germany the problem of mind 
is yielding to physical rather than to metaphysical 
analysis. Prof. Ernst Haeckel did not become a psy- 
chologist in the halls of the metaphysicians, but in 
the laboratory. In his recent work. The Riddle of the 
Universe, the principles of consciousness, as derived 
from biology, are so ably generalized that the conclu- 
sions reached are in the highest degree philosophical. 
In the chapter on the Law of Substance this author 
comes very near to an ultimate analysis, nearer in fact 
than any of the other great German tliinkers, because 
he realizes that although there is no mind without 
nature there is nature without mind, or, in other terms, 
that consciousness is a form of motion. 

Aware of much that has been accomplished in intro- 
spective analysis, Haeckel also possesses an intimate 
knowledge of the functions and structures of the sen- 
sorium. This knowledge has enabled him to trace 
the development of the intellect of the higher animals 
and of man to its source in the simplest forms of 
life, an analysis which brings into view that centraliza- 
tion of sentient energy called the soul. Every intelligent 
being possesses in some degree that sublime power of ex- 
pression known as genius or soul. "It seems impossible," 
says the translator of the Riddle of the Universe, "to 
follow Haeckel's broad survey of the psychic world with- 



196 The Evolution of Knowledge 

out bearing away a conviction of the natural origin of 
every power and content of the human soul."* 

When compared with the intervening ethereal spaces, 
the celestial spheres shrink to mere points of resist- 
ance. The cosmic individual is the sphere and its en- 
vironment is infinity. The physicist is unable to 
attribute any positive qualities to that extension called 
ether in which the cosmic masses revolve, except 
such far-reaching energy as light, radiant heat, elec- 
tricity and magnetism. According to Haeckel, ether 
is neither gaseous, nor fluid, nor solid, and as far as 
known it is structureless. It can be inferred, therefore, 
that it is infinite and ever active. One of the aspects 
of motion is infinity and the other eternity, the very 
quantity and quality attributable to ether. 

Haeckel tells us that the universe is divided into 
potential and actual energy, which terms are mutually 
convertible, just as all life springs from a reciprocity 
of force, a correlative change of material. Thus the 
drama of nature, including life and mind, displays an 
alternation of movement and repose, the sum total 
of force remaining constant for it is infinite and 
eternal. 

All competent physicists now recognize the persist- 
ence of substance and of force as the fundamental law of 
nature, the ultimate principle known to mathematics 
as motion. 

Had Haeckel extended his researches to religion he 
could have shown us the beauty of this phase of human 
development, just as he has displayed the entrancing 
forms and colors of microscopic life. If faith in im- 

♦Preface of the translator of the Riddle of the Universe. 



German Philosophy 197 

mortality is a stage of intellectual development, Haeckel 
must have known that the worship of persons precedes 
that of principles, or, in other words, that mankind be- 
lieves in absolute individuals before it is guided by 
ultimate truths, for the mind rises naturally from 
variety to unity or from the individual to the divine. 



CHAPTEK VIII 

The Eclecticism and Positive Philosophy of 
France and the Scotch School 



Gassendi — Mdlebranche — Condillac — Cabanis — QaXl 

Boyer-Collard — Cousin — Comte — Beid 

Hamilton 



After the religious fervor of Europe had exhausted it- 
self in the Crusades, there remained the three great 
orders of chivalry known as the Teutonic Knights, 
the Knights of St. John and the Templars. About 
fifty years after the last crusade the Templars were 
disbanded. The Knights of St. John continued their 
organization by a long and valiant defense of South- 
ern Europe against the Turks, while the Teutonic 
Knights undertook to christianize what was then 
known as pagan Prussia. This invasion almost ex- 
terminated a brave and hardy people who clung to 
their rude mythology, in opposition to the alien Chris- 
tian worship, and the rule of the Empire. 

In the meantime, Paris had become the foremost 
seat of learning in Christendom. Its university was a 
congeries of schools, gathered about famous teachers 
connected with monasteries and the cathedral, but lack- 
ing that corporate unity which later on made it the 
model of nearly all the great schools of Europe. As an 
example of its early importance Henry II. of England, 



The Eclecticism of France 199 

in the year 1164, offered to refer his dispute with 
Becket to the arbitration of the Peers of France, or to 
the Nations of the University of Paris. Early in the 
Fourteenth Century Pope Gregory IX. conferred upon 
the several faculties the privilege of regulating their 
own laws, which amounted to the right of self-gov- 
ernment. In the middle of the Fifteenth Century the 
University was attended by over twenty-five thousand 
students from all parts of Europe, a number, at that 
time, equal to about half of the population of the 
French capital. It was at Paris that the chief battles 
of Scholasticism were waged. There William de Cham- 
peaux, Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, 
lived and taught. 

Luther's proclamation of the independence of thought 
had the effect of freeing the learned world from the 
domination of Eome, that is to say, from the authority 
of the sacred versions of Plato and Aristotle. At this 
juncture Loyola inaugurated the Society of Jesus, in 
the hope of producing, by the aid of ecclesiastical 
schools, a counter reformation. The purpose was to pre- 
serve the Catholic faith in its entirety, including the 
orthodox versions of the ancients ; but with the irony of 
fate, the favorite pupil of the Jesuits, Descartes, dealt a 
blow to Scholasticism, which resulted in permanently 
freeing science from the tyranny of the Church. 

Thus it was in the turmoil of theological war rag- 
ing throughout England, France and Germany, and cul- 
minating in Protestantism, that modern philosophy was 
born. This new philosophy first appeared in the writ- 
ings of Descartes and Spinoza, and was therefore an 
avewed attempt to define not motion but the nature of 
God. 



200 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Strange as it may seem, in severing connection with 
the Church, thought was exalted. Freed from obsolete 
dogma, man found himself again able to form a natural 
conception of the universe. As intellectual liberty was 
gradually restored, humanity resumed its task of har- 
monizing mind and nature by determining the most 
general of all principles, which is the ultimate reality. 

While Europe was struggling for spiritual liberty, 
science through its own methods was unconsciously ap- 
proaching an ultimate generalization, for knowledge 
was becoming rapidly centralized. In England, Bacon 
had chosen the scientific method. Although he had no 
hope of performing a complete analysis of being, he 
felt that the rule of induction, if adhered to, would 
finally succeed. In France, there was but feeble resist- 
ance to intellectual progress, for there the thoughtful 
world, wearied of the uncertainties of dialectics, had 
united in demanding demonstrations. 

Such, however, is the craving of the mind for the 
repose of ultimate truth, that the brilliant achieve- 
ments of Descartes in the sciences were neglected, public 
attention being riveted upon his attempt to reduce 
thought and extension, not to universal unity, but to a 
futile duality. 

GASSENDI 

The Cartesian philosophy was strenuously opposed by 
Gassendi, who inaugurated in its stead a comparison of 
the various schools of thought. This system, known 
as eclecticism, was afterwards adopted by Eoyer-Collard, 
Jouffroy and Cousin. 

Pierre Gassendi, astronomer, mathematician, and 
theologian, was born at Provence, France, in 1592. At 



The Eclecticism of France 201 

the age of twenty-five he received the appointment of 
professor of theology at Aix, the scene of his academic 
studies. His first work (1624) was a polemic entitled 
Paradoxical Essay Against Aristotle. In this treatise 
he opposed the Aristotelian astronomy, but nevertheless 
proclaimed his fidelity to the Church. He also main- 
tained, and with justice, that Christianity is in no wise 
dependent upon the orthodoxy of either science or phi- 
losophy. 

In 1645, through the influence of the Archbishop of 
Lyons, brother of Cardinal Eichelieu, Gassendi was 
appointed to the chair of mathematics in the College- 
Eoyal of France. His lectures, from that chair, at- 
tracted wide attention, and, according to the chronicle, 
were crowded by the elite of Paris. 

A treatise upon Epicureanism and a philosophical 
system of his own were Gassendi^s principal works. It 
was in the latter that he compared the various schools of 
antiquity. 

Like Descartes, the chief power of Gassendi lay in 
scientific research, where he had such coadjutors as 
Kepler and Galileo. To the idea of atoms he added that 
of substance as taught by the Cartesians, but rejected 
the absolute separation of thought and extension. The 
weight of the atom he identified with its motion or 
energy, denying the ancient theory of imponderability, 
which, however, still has adherents even among physi- 
cists of the present day. 

Gassendi maintained that the related activity of atoms 
is the underlying fact both of mind and matter. This 
principle he preferred to the ultimate substance of 
Descartes. "The atoms," says Gassendi, "which God has 
created and set in motion are the seeds of all things; 



202 The Evolution of Knowledge 

from them, by generation and destruction, everything 
has been formed and fashioned and still continues so to 
be." He recognized the fall of bodies by the earth's 
attraction, but, like Newton, held action at a distance to 
be impossible. 

Eeference to the teachings of Democritus and Epi- 
curus will disclose the origin of many of the tenets of 
Gassendi, for those ancients were convinced that all 
phenomena are reducible to the activities of atoms. 

MALEBRANCHE 

Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) was the last of 
those Oratorian priests who gave so great an impetus 
to the devotional thought of France. Being subservient 
to the Church, he inclined to the mystical side of 
Cartesianism. None of the French metaphysical authors 
has been more read and admired. His principal work. 
Recherche de la Verite, published in 1673, received 
immediate recognition, not only for literary, but 
for philosophical merit, and yet all the writings of 
Malebranche are so mystical as to be of little value 
to the modern thinker. So involved and obscure was his 
theory of mind that a later generation called him the 
Kant of his country. 

Being an orthodox Christian, Malebranche main- 
tained that all knowledge arises from communication 
with deit}^ In his unfaltering faith in a personal 
ruler of the universe he followed St. Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas, who believed that the soul and the 
body are absolutely independent one of the other. This 
theory implies that knowledge cannot emanate from 
the senses, for according to the orthodox theory truth 
is not an emanation of experience but of the personality 



The Eclecticism of France 203 

of God, an influence which the soul receives as a gift 
and preserves untainted by the sinful body. The diffi- 
culty with this theory is that it ignores the great truth 
that, like knowledge, personality is not absolute but 
relative.* 

Although an orthodox believer and therefore lacking in 
independence of thought, Malebranche was far too fine 
a writer to be neglected in a sketch of modern phil- 
osophy. A philosophic temperament enabled him to 
approach the source of all revelation, which is the con- 
ception of the order of nature. This sublime sentiment 
found expression in his endeavor to harmonize the Car- 
tesian dualism with the teachings of the Church. 

CONDILLAC 

The interest aroused in France by the philosophy of 
Locke was largely due to Etienne de Condillac, the 
successor of Gassendi. Locke endeavored to prove that 
mind is the product of sensation and reflection. Con- 
dillac proposed an advance upon this theory by main- 
taining that since sensation and reflection are interde- 
pendent all sensation must be in some degree a 
thought. There are psychologists who oppose this 
theory upon the ground that thought is exclusively an 
activity of the brain. The parallelists say that it 
depends upon the activity of the brain. Lewes proves 
that thought is an activity of the sensorium. His method 
is to show that the complex structure of the brain is 
necessary for the completion of thought which is the 
highest or the most elaborate form of sensation. 

* It follows from the discovery that consciousness is an organic 
activity, that there is no absolute ego. 



204 The Evolution of Knowledge 

There is no denying that Condillac and his pupils 
gave to thought a wider meaning than strictly belongs 
to it, but it is only by showing the elasticity of the 
meaning of terms that their most subtle relationships are 
disclosed. 

The saying "To think is to feel" (penser c'est sentir) 
is called an absurdity of the Sensational School. This 
aphorism, however, emphasizes the fact that it is im- 
possible to determine where sensation ends and thought 
begins. Thought is a co-ordination. Its field is the 
nervous system centering in the brain. Psychologists 
are now convinced that the whole organism co-operates 
in mental activity ; or, in other terms, that the operations 
of the mind are not confined to the brain. As muscle 
and nerve are nowhere absolutely separate one from the 
other, so feeling and thought are always interdependent. 
Condillac endeavored to show that sensation and reflec- 
tion are different aspects of the same thing, which was 
an improvement upon the psychology of his time. 

"Locke," says Condillac, "distinguishes two sources 
of ideas, sensation and reflection, but it would be more 
exact to recognize only one; first, because reflection is, 
in principle, nothing but sensation; secondly, because 
it is less a source of ideas than a canal through which 
they flow from sense." 

"Locke recognized," says Condillac, "that the soul 
perceives, thinks, doubts, believes, reasons, wills, re- 
flects; that we are convinced of the existence of these 
operations, because we find them in ourselves, and they 
contribute to the progress of our knowledge, but he did 
not determine their origin, that is to say, their generic 
principle. Evidently he did not suspect that they might 
be only acquired habits. Locke seems to have regarded 



The Eclecticism of France 205 

them as innate faculties, admitting, however, that they 
are perfected by exercise." 

At first sight this criticism may appear severe, because 
Locke always contended that we have no innate ideas. 
The exception of Condillac, nevertheless, is well taken, 
for, although Locke frequently referred to mental facul- 
ties, which really mean the same thing as ideas, he of- 
fered no explanation of their origin. 

The psychology of Condillac was singularly prophetic ; 
that is to say it foreshadowed the progress of the 
science. His first work, written at the age of thirty-one 
(1746), was entitled Essay on the Origin of Human 
Knowledge. This was followed in 1754 by his Treatise 
on Sensation^ which brought him prominently before 
the world. 

The Cours d'Etude was written for his pupil, the 
Prince of Parma. Among the names of his literary 
associates were Eosseau, Grimm and Diderot. In 1768 
he was elected to the French Academy, but never after- 
ward appeared at its sittings. 

The chief merit of Condillac was the discovery of the 
interdependence of thought and language. He con- 
tended that the development of the mental faculties 
is due to the use of verbal and written signs, or, in 
other words, he maintained that the development of 
thought is coincident with that of speech. It would be 
difficult to over-estimate the value of this psychological 
principle. 

CABANIS 

Comparative psychology, or the study of the intellec- 
tual functions and structures of organisms, received a 
powerful impetus from Cabanis, a French physician, 
born at Conac, in 1757. 



2o6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Cabanis said that the mental life of all organisms 
was reducible to activities akin to sensation, but he 
asked. What after all is sensation? Is it feeling — 
the name we give to those sensations of which we are 
conscious; and, if so, what degree of consciousness does 
the word feeling imply? What, on the other hand, are 
we to call those numberless changes constantly going on 
within us of which we are unconscious ? If we apply the 
name feeling only to those activities which are so obtru- 
sive as to arouse attention, how are we to distinguish 
them from internal activities in general, whether con- 
scious or unconscious, for are there not all degrees of 
attention ? This question will be examined in the review 
of Lewes' Psychology, chaps XIII- XVI. By inaugurat- 
ing these inquiries, Cabanis opened up the science of 
comparative psychology, which is co-extensive with that 
of organic life, for it is now evident that psychical are 
distinguishable from physical states only by their higher 
complexity. 

In the ascending complexity of organisms we find 
greater and greater sensitiveness to remote influences, 
more and more perfect co-ordinations of impressions, 
more thought, because more feeling. Function and 
structure are the opposite aspects of every fact of de- 
velopment. They imply each other. In their deepest 
meaning feeling and thought are inseparable, for in 
every stage of their development they result from the 
interaction of organism and environment. 

If taken in its strictest sense the activity called 
thought requires a highly complex nervous organism. 
The structure necessary to ideas, however, is not wholly 
that of the individual ; it is also partly the environment. 
The name of this intellectual evironment is language. 



The Eclecticism of France 207 

Tims Cabanis enlarged the scope of psychology by 
showing that both volition and intelligence are evolved 
from physical movements. Somewhat later Augnste 
Comte built upon this foundation the beginnings of 
sociology, that science which demonstrates the inter- 
dependence of thought and action or of mind and duty. 

In 1796-1797 Cabanis published, in the Transactions 
of the Institute, his principal work, Relations Between 
the Physical System and Mental Faculties of Man. He 
warned his readers that he would attempt no discussion 
of ultimate principles, for he found ample occupation 
in the study of mind as the function of an organism. 

Among the friends of Cabanis were Diderot, Con- 
dorcet and Franklin. During the great struggle he as- 
sisted with his pen, the revolutionary leader Mirabeau 
and attended at his death as physician. 

It was the privilege of Cabanis, therefore, to aid in 
founding the science of comparative pschology, and also 
to encourage the political reforms of his age, a period 
fraught with such unrest that a calm philosophy was 
out of Question. 

GALL 

A new departure in the study of mind was due to 
Francis Joseph ©all (1758-1828), a German physician, 
known for his original researches in cerebral phenom- 
ena. The innovation was called phrenology, a system 
based upon the assumption that the strength of the 
intellect can be estimated according to the mass of 
brain tissue, or, in other terms, that bulk is a measure 
of brain power. About 1805 Gall, with his coadjutor. 
Dr. Spurzheim, began the propagation of this theory 
through lectures in Germany and in Paris. In 1808, 
he submitted *to^ the -French Institute his Researches 



2o8 The Evolution of Knowledge 

into the Nervous System in General and in the Brain in 
Particular, which, however, was reported upon adversely. 
Soon afterward he began the publication of his principal 
work, The Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous 
System in General and the Brain in Particular. Al- 
though it has never been demonstrated that the power of 
the intellect can be measured by the mass of brain 
tissue, the efforts of Gall in this direction had the effect 
at least of stimulating researches in neural phenomena, 
Hamilton, who is an acknowledged authority, denies 
that the external shape of the skull indicates the power 
of the mental faculties. This assertion, if proved, would 
render all phrenology unreliable, even if Gall's funda- 
mental postulate were established. This postulate is, 
that, other things being equal, size is a measure of brain 
power. '^But the other things," says Lewes, "never are 
equal, and consequently their dictum, *size is the measure 
of power,' is without application. There never is equality 
in the things compared, because two brains exactly 
similar in size and external configuration will, never- 
theless, differ in elementary composition. Nerve tissue, 
for example, contains both phosphorous and water as 
constituent elements, but the quantities of these ele- 
ments vary within certain limits; some nerve tissues 
have more phosphorous, some more water; and accord- 
ing to these variations in the composition will be the 
variation in the nervous force evolved. This is the 
reason why brains differ so enormously, even when 
their volumes are equal." "The brain," says the same 
author, '^differs at different ages and in different indi- 
viduals. Sometimes water constitutes three-fourths of 
the whole weight, sometimes four-fifths, and sometimes 
even seven-eighths. The phosphorous varies from 0.80 



The Eclecticism of France 209 

to 1.65 and 1.80; the cerebral fat varies from 3.45 to 
5.30 and even 6.10, These facts will help to explain 
many of the striking exceptions to phrenological obser- 
vations, such, for example, as the manifest superiority 
of some small over some large brains." 

Phrenology has failed as a science chiefly on account 
of the anatomical conclusion that the seat of mental 
activity is the grey matter constituting the cortex of the 
brain, and that its extent and refinement varies with 
the convolutions of the brain, to which neither size, 
weight nor shape give any index. 

It is to be remembered, however, that the efforts of 
Gall helped to place psychology on a physiological basis. 
Unfortunately his followers neglected the psychological 
aspects of the subject for what is called cranioscopy, 
an inquiry so unreliable in its conclusions as to be 
denied rank as a science. 

THE REVOLUTION 

The progress of philosophy in France was retarded by 
the Eevolution. The Eeign of Terror invaded even the 
citadel of thought. The brief rule of passion and 
ignorance was reactionary, for the people, dreading 
all further innovation, hastened to re-instate supersti- 
tions which had just begun to yield to the advance 
of knowledge. One of the most conspicuous effects of 
the political upheaval in France was the restoration of 
occultism. At that time any one venturing to rationalize 
concerning the principles of existence would have been 
classed with the demons of the Eevolution. As a conse- 
quence literary and philosophic criticism alike suffered. 
Ignoring the approach to an ultimate analysis of exist- 
ence achieved by the best intellects of the nation, society 



2IO The Evolution of Knowledge 

relapsed into mysticism. In philosophy this retrogres- 
sion took the form of a revival of the theory of an un- 
knowable. 

EOYER-COLLARD 

When the Imperial Government made the University 
of France the centre of the educational system of the na- 
tion the legal advocate, Eoyer-Collard, was called to the 
chair of philosophy (1809), and adopted the Electicism 
which had been inaugurated by Gassendi. At first this 
system was merely a comparative study of philosophy, 
but under Victor Cousin it assumed the pretensions of 
a distinctive method. 

In attempting to reconcile the extremes of sensa- 
tionalism and idealism, Eoyer-Collard rejected Con- 
dillac's analysis of consciousness, which evolved thought 
from feeling. In place of this analysis he advocated an 
agnosticism similar to that of the Scotch school, which 
held that consciousness is a product, not of feeling, but 
of certain imknowable mental categories — ^this was the 
system so highly elaborated by Immanuel Kant. 

The influence of Collard in favor of wide and tem- 
perate philosophical research, has been perpetuated by 
his pupils, chief among Avhom were Guizot, Ampere, 
Eemusat and Cousin. 

VICTOR-COUSIN 

Among the philosophical writers of the Nineteenth 
Century no more striking figure appears than Victor 
Cousin. Instead of creating a system of his own, his 
originality took the form of a wide and searching criti- 
cism of existing thought. 

Influenced by his master, Eoyer-Collard, Cousin in- 
vestigated the then difficult Scotch school, but was soon 



The Eclecticism of France 211 

attracted by the Kantian dialectic. He then reviewed 
the doctrines of Proclus of Alexandria; advocating his 
theories and re-editing his works^, but afterwards turned 
to the transcendentalism of Schelling and Hegel. In 
addition to these investigations he edited a complete 
edition of the writings of Descartes, composed essays 
on Abelard, Pascal and Locke, translated Plato in 
thirteen volumes and wrote his History of Philosophy. 

The ambition of Cousin was to advance philosophy by 
assembling in a school the thought of the world. Orig- 
inality, however, is a personal prerogative. Discoveries 
are made by individual effort, which is the soul of orig- 
inality. In attempting to found a school of com- 
parative thought. Cousin made himself eminent in the 
art of criticism. Born in sight of the ruins of the Bas- 
tille, with its tragic associations, and educated in an 
atmosphere of violent political reactions, he began the 
public teaching of philosophy under singular auspices. 
His career was identified with the great struggle of 
France for civil and intellectual liberty. Although in 
sympathy with this aim, the revolution really had re- 
tarded it, and as a consequence the deepest wish of 
Cousin was to demonstrate that enlightenment and so- 
cial order are aspects of one development, or in other 
terms that the highest meaning of progress is Justice 
for all. 

When an illiberal government deposed Guizot from 
the chair of history. Cousin shared his fate, but the 
consequent exile only increased his powers, for he again 
sought out the teachers of Germ.any. At this time he 
met Schelling and Hegel, whose ideas he had already 
compared with those of Kant. 

The salient feature of Cousin's thought was his 



212 The Evolution of Knowledge 

theory of reason, which he conceived not only as a 
conscious determination but also as an instinct. It was 
important to enumerate the principles of mind, but of 
still more importance to comprehend them. According 
to Cousin, reason is a "spontaneous apprehension," a 
consequence of the actions and reactions of individual 
and environment. The superiority of this definition 
over that offered by the transcendental school is mani- 
fest, for the idealist holds that reason is a prerogative 
of the absolute ego, an ego so absolute, indeed, as to 
monopolize all objects perceived, denying to unconscious 
nature the essence of existence. 

In the opinion of Cousin, causality and substance 
are different expressions of one ultimate. When its 
most general terms are once understood, philosophy 
becomes sublimely simple. Cousin's reply to Kant was 
that reality is the cause of mind, not its effect, or, in 
other terms, that reason is a form of motion. Con- 
sciousness is not exclusively the function of an indi- 
vidual; it is the interaction of humanity and nature. 
From this position it was not far to an ultimate analysis. 

The restoration of Cousin to the Sorbonne was an 
event in the intellectual life of France. The lectures 
that followed still linger in the memory of Parisian 
society, a community always distinguished for its sym- 
pathy with intellectual progress. ISTo such interest had 
been aroused since the days of Abelard and William 
de Champeaux. It was indeed a privilege to listen to this 
scholar, equally at home in the schools of the past and 
the present, and possessing the rare gift of grouping 
facts so as to disclose principles. Of Cousin it can be 
said that he appreciated the scholastic requirements of 



The Positive Philosophy 213 

his time, and offered invaluable suggestions for the 
development of psychology and ethics. 

COMTE 

While Cousin and Jouffroy were lecturing at the 
Sorbonne, Auguste Comte was laying the foundations 
of sociology. One of those most interested in the ideas 
of Comte was John Stewart Mill, an interest which re- 
sulted in introducing Positivism in England. The 
fundamental doctrine of the Positive Philosophy, as 
given by Mill, admirably defines the theory of agnosti- 
cism or of the unknowable. "We have,'^ says Mill, "no 
knowledge of anything but phenomena; and our knowl- 
edge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. We know 
not the essence nor the real mode of production of 
any fact, but only its relation to other facts in the way 
of succession or of similitude. These relations are 
constant, that is, always the same in the same cir- 
cumstances. The constant resemblances which link 
phenomena together, and the constant sequences which 
unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed 
their laws. The laws of phenomena are all we 
know respecting them. Their essential nature and 
their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are un- 
known and inscrutable to us.'' 

Comte's theory of knowledge, now widely known as 
agnosticism, takes for granted that there is an unknow- 
able essence more real than phenomena. The theory 
of the unknowable will be dealt with in the review of 
Spencer's psychology. Chap. IX. 

In England Comte's writings had an immediate in- 
fluence. Naturally the English were interested in 
the offer of a positive basis of belief. Doctor Thomas 



214 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Brown, J. S. Mill, Spencer, Lewes, and Harriet Mar- 
tineau, all expounded the Cours de Philosophie Positive. 

In his own ceuntry, during his life time, Comte had 
but a limited following. The French were too well 
entertained by the brilliant Cousin to accord him their 
attention. The example of England, however, and the 
influence of Littre, at last brought the Positive Philoso- 
phy into notice in France, where it still survives as a 
system of humanitarianism. 

As the basis of knowledge, Comte postulates an im- 
knowable existence. Employing the language of Plato 
and the skeptics, he denominates this mysterious ex- 
istence noumena. Comte's reason for insisting that 
knowledge springs from the unknowable is that 
phenomena are relative, while noumena are absolute. 
Since absolute means without conditions, is it con- 
scientious in Comte to impose upon noumena the condi- 
tion of existence? As for phenomena being relative, 
how could it be otherwise when we remember that all 
reality consists of relations of coexistence and of se- 
quence ? 

The reason why our knowledge is only of phenomena 
is that there is nothing but phenomena. The meaning 
of phenomena has grovsTi until from the changing or the 
ephemeral it has come to denote existence itself. All 
events, including changes of consciousness, are phe- 
nomena. Whether considered objectively or subjec- 
tively, existence is one. But if the above described infeli- 
city of Comte is overlooked, the remainder of his 
psychology, that is to say, his theory of the relativity of 
knowledge is beyond praise. The relativity of knowledge 
has been admirably explained by Herbert Spencer, as 
well as by his eminent expounder, John Fiske. Both 



The Positive Philosophy 215 

of these writers, however, adopted Comte's belief in an 
unknowable. 

The great merit of Comte's system is his theory that 
civilization is an evolution instead of, as Eousseau 
taught, an artifice, or a divergence from nature. 

In constructing a theory of society, Comte found it 
necessary to organize the sciences. In other terms, he 
saw that in order to establish the principles of govern- 
ment, it was necessary to unify knowledge. There can 
be no reliable theory of government until we have de- 
fined those elements of knowledge known as the true, 
the good, and the beautiful. To use Comte's own words, 
"The aim of positivism is a social doctrine, a scientific 
doctrine its means.'' He wrote the "Organon of the 
Sciences," and the "Religion of Humanity" in the en- 
deavor to create a philosophy of the sciences as a basis 
for a new social faith. The central feature of this 
scheme was "the predominance of the moral point of 
view," that is to say, "the rigorous subordination of the 
intellect to the heart." This leading principle of the 
Comtean system distinctly foreshadowed the philoso- 
phy of evolution. 

Although his ideas were partly derived from such 
authors as Cabanis, Gall and Condillac, there is no 
doubt that Comte founded sociology. His theory of 
society has been greatly enlarged by Spencer, who 
created a coordinated system out of what were scarcely 
more than germs of thought in the Positive Philosophy. 
A comparison of the two theories, however, will satisfy 
every candid inquiry that Comte's scheme of the sciences, 
severely as Spencer criticised it, was the precursor of the 
Synthetic Philosophy. 

In the opinion of Comte, all methods of investigation 



2i6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

are alike in principle; that is to say, philosophy is the 
organization of the various departments of knowledge 
in one harmonious whole. He taught that the progress 
of humanity has three stages : the theological, the meta- 
physical and the positive. Beginning with supernatural, 
and advancing to metaphysical, speculation finally re- 
poses in scientific explanations. Comte did not, there- 
fore, regard his metaphysical theories as by any means 
conclusive. This is not to be wondered at when we con- 
sider that he entertained the belief in an unknowable. 

Comte freely acknowledged the debt of humanity to 
religion, which he defined as veneration for universal 
order. Of the three stages of progress above alluded 
to he maintained that the theological is reached "when 
one being is substituted for many as the cause of all 
phenomena.'' The metaphysical stage ensues "when all 
forces are brought under one general force called na- 
ture," and positive or scientific development is attained 
"when all phenomena are represented as particulars of 
one general view." Now to bring all forces under 
one general force (called nature), and to represent all 
phenomena as particulars of one general view are prac- 
tically the same thing. Hence, there is no reason why 
metaphysics should not be scientific. 

The greatest achievement of Comte was the concep- 
tion of society as an organism or as a natural growth. 
He realized that the human race can be viewed as an 
aggregate or as a vast living being evolved from nature, 
its welfare depending upon the adjustment of individual 
and general rights. This leads to the still larger con- 
ception of the inter-relationship of society and the cos- 
mos, which means that we are the children of nature, 
and derive all our benefits from obedience to its laws. 



The Positive Philosophy ' 217 

This idea awakened in Comte the longing for a cere- 
monial to express adoration of nature's God. Ail 
religious ceremonies spring from the worship of that 
greatest of ancestors, known as nature. These cere- 
monies celebrate the order of the universe conceived as 
the will of an individual. Only the highest religious 
consciousness perceives that individuality is relative, or 
that it is a function of the cosmos. In devising one for 
his own use Comte seemed to forget that religious cere- 
monies are not a conscious literary production, but a 
natural growth, beginning with the first attempts of 
man to appreciate governing principles. The culmina- 
tion of religious sentiment is the conception of uni- 
versal order. The reason why we are so deeply moved 
by devotional ceremonies is because they are survivals 
of a once living faith. Little resemblance as exists be- 
tween a personal deity and the modern conception of the 
order of nature, all religion was originally and still is 
worship of nature's God. In other words, the idea of a 
personal deity is becoming less and less religious, be- 
cause it is becoming more and more evident that 
it is unnatural. It will be a long time, however, before 
the sciences convince us that our feelings and thoughts, 
including devotional sentiments, are products of evolu- 
tion. 

Comte pointed out that the only hope of social prog- 
ress is through moral improvement along lines of 
economic reform. Unaffected by the Utopians he saw 
that violent redistributions of wealth or of power are 
futile because unscientific. In the opinion of this great 
thinker the cardinal principle of reform is the improve- 
ment of civil and industrial organization through the 
education of its units. The social unit being the family, 



2i8 The Evolution of Knowledge 

it is the elevation of the home that conduces to higher 
forms of government culminating in the establishment 
of justice for all. The constitution of a state is only an 
expansion of home government, for the individual is the 
direct product of the family. To maintain our liberties, 
therefore, it is necessary to train youth to respect the 
fundamental social institutions of family and property, 
because only those who are taught to respect the rights 
of others can be depended upon to maintain their own. 
These are the cardinal principles of Comte's great theory 
of society. 

The ancients conceived the universe as an organism 
palpitating with life; such was their rude simile of 
divine order. Comte viewed the human race as a natural 
growth or as an evolution. He perceived that the bal- 
ance of the individual and the social will is the cri- 
terion of right or the deepest meaning of good. 

THE SCOTCH SCHOOL 

The Scotch school arose as a reaction from the skep- 
ticism of Hume, its period being from the middle of the 
Eighteenth to that of the Nineteenth Century.* The 
theories of Thomas Eeid, the leader of the school, were 
expounded by Dugald Stewart. Dr. Thomas Brown 
elaborated the ideas of both Eeid and Stewart, and Sir 
William Hamilton edited their works. 

The first system of idealism which appeared in Eng- 
land was that of Bishop Berkeley. From Berkeley's 
theory Hume deduced skepticism. The idea of Hume 
was that since our knowledge of reality is limited to the 

♦Thomas Reid (1710-1796), Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), 
Thomas Brown (1778-1820), and Sir William Hamilton (1788- 
1856). 



The Scotch School 219 

■world of phenomena, which, is revealed to us by ex- 
perience, it is impossible for man to discover the ultimate 
qualities of his own nature. This implies that he be- 
lieved in an unknowable, or in an existence beyond the 
power of human comprehension. 

Apparently Thomas Eeid rejected Hume^s skepticism, 
but his admission of an unknowable amounted to 
an indorsement. When asked whether the difference 
between Eeid and Hume was not chiefly one of words. 
Dr. Thomas Brown replied, "Yes, Eeid says we be- 
lieve in an outward world, although we can give no rea- 
son for the belief, while Hume affirms that we can give 
no reason for such a belief but cannot get rid of it." 
Thus one of the chief metaphysicians of the Scotch 
school held that Eeid was an agnostic, which means 
a skeptic, although he professed to have refuted both 
skepticism and idealism. 

Dugald Stewart came very near the truth when he 
said that "faith in an external world or space, is one of 
the fundamental laws of human belief;" or in other 
terms, that without consciousness of space, consciousness 
itself is impossible. Eeid said that although we be- 
lieve instinctively in an external world, it is impossible 
to account for instinct. Biology teaches that instinct 
and thought are interdependent activities of the sen- 
sorium. 

"It is an evident mistake," says the Quarterly in its 
review of Stewart's Second Dissertation, "to talk of 
Dr. Eeid as if his vrritings opposed a barrier to skeptical 
philosophy. Eeid refuted the principles by which Ber- 
keley and Hume endeavored to establish their conclu- 
sions; but the conclusions themselves he adopted 
as the very premises from which he reasons." The 



220 The Evolution of Knowledge 

question underlying all schools of philosophy is that of 
the validity of knowledge or the nature of belief. There 
would be no question as to the validity of knowledge 
were mind recognized as a part of nature, for then 
mind and matter would be recognized as opposite aspects 
of the ultimate reality. 

Sir William Hamilton was one of the clearest of modern 
writers upon metaphysics. He kept constantly before 
him three questions; namely, the perception of the ex- 
ternal world, the nature of necessary truths, and the 
law of causation. The discussion of these questions 
can lead to no definite result unless an agreement can 
be had concerning the meaning of universals. The 
infinite and the absolute are terms of the highest gen- 
erality. They are called by Hamilton the "two incon- 
ceivables/^ but since he employs them so frequently they 
must have stood in his mind for important facts and 
were, therefore, not wholly inconceivable. These uni- 
versals known as space and time, or the infinite and 
the absolute, he employed in conflicting senses. For 
instance, he affirmed that space and extension mean 
the same thing, but, if there is any difference at all 
between them, space is a priori and extension a pos- 
teriori: or, the idea of space is implied in the fact of 
mind and the idea of extension is the result of the experi- 
ence of the individual. He also affirmed that although 
both mind and matter appear in time, matter alone ap- 
pears in space, which is equivalent to saying that mind 
does not occupy space. If space is a priori it must ap- 
pear in mind, and yet it is affirmed that mind does not 
occupy space. If space appears in mind, and if mind 
does not appear in space, what becomes of the room oc- 
cupied by space when it appears in mind ? To put this 



The Scotch School 221 

question in more definite form, it is well known that 
Hamilton frequently employed the word matter in the 
Kantian sense of force as a necessary element of 
consciousness. If matter is a necessary element of con- 
sciousness and if mind does not occupy space, what be- 
comes of the space occupied by matter when it appears 
as an element of mind? Biology, which is the science 
from which psychology is evolved, settles this question 
once for all when it assures us that there is no function 
without structure. 

How can we hope to determine the question of the 
"Perception of externals," or the perception of matter 
and of space, and the question of "Necessary truths," 
which signifies the nature of certitude, or again the 
question of "causation," by which is meant the ultimate 
reality, if there is no general agreement as to the mean- 
ing of ultimate terms? 

To return to the development of English thought. 
Bacon exemplified the Anglican love of the real as dis- 
tinguished from the mystical. Newton's great work 
was a natural result of the Baconian empiricism which 
has gradually expanded into the modern scientific 
method. Proceeding upon the principle of investigation 
and verification, science in England has culminated in 
the study of mind as the function of an organism. In- 
augurated by Hobbes and Locke, and further developed 
by David Hartley, the elder Darwin and James Mill, 
the scientific movement has steadily advanced, producing 
finally the evolutionary systems of Herbert Spencer and 
George Henry Lewes. As these works are among the 
most notable achievements of modern thought, they will 
receive attention in the following chapters. 



222 The Evolution of Knowledge 

THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE 

Since the interdependence of thought and language is 
the crux of psychology, let us consider the dimensions 
of this problem before proceeding to the evolutionary 
systems of thought. 

It will be found that language, which is a system 
of symbols, is inseparable from thought. The simplest 
symbols belong to mathematics because that science 
discloses the most general aspects of existence. These 
symbols are the numeral, the letter, the point, the 
straight line and the curve, all of which represent 
actions, to wit : the operation of counting, the grouping 
of the results of counting, the separation of wholes into 
parts, the shortest movement between two points, or the 
movement of a point in relation to a centre. 

The primitive form of communication or the genetic 
beginning of language is action or gesture. Animals 
comprehend gestures more readily than sounds which 
are themselves movements. Deaf-mutes and savages rely 
for language upon gestures. The interdependence of 
thought and language is illustrated by Kruse (himself a 
deaf-mute and a well-known teacher of deaf-mutes) in 
his description of the formation of gesture language. 
The deaf and dumb must have a language, without 
which no thought can be brought to pass. Here nature 
soon comes to his help. The most striking characteristics 
of objects become at once signs by which he knows these 
objects. While he describes their forms for himself in 
the air, or imitates them with hand, fingers and gestures, 
he develops for himself suitable signs to represent ideas 
and recall them to his memory. And thus he makes him- 
self a system of symbols or a language, the so-called 
gesture-language. With these few scanty and imperfect 



The Nature of Language 223 

signs a way for thought is broken;, and, with his thought 
as it BOW opens out, the language cultivates and forms 
itself further and further/' 

The deaf-mute borrows, as we do, symbols of space, 
to express time * * * "The present tense of the 
verb can be expressed by an action indicating Tiere' with 
the two hands held out palms downward; the past tense 
by the hand thrown back over the shoulder, 'behind;' 
the future by putting the hand out "^forward/* 

Quoting from Quintilian, Tyler says: "As for the 
hands indeed, without which action would be maimed 
and feeble, one can hardly say how many movements 
they have, when they almost follow the whole stock of 
words; for the other members help the speaker, but, I 
may almost say, the hands themselves speak." For tell- 
ing a simple story, and making simple comments on it, 
spoken language stands far behind acting. The deaf- 
and-dumb pantomime calls to mind the 'action, action, 
action' of Demosthenes." 

From the above it is evident that thought and its 
expression are different views of one activity. ''Think- 
ing is talking to one's self; talking is thinking aloud.'* 
"Language shapes itself in mind and mind in language." 
To reduce language to an ultimate analysis the sentence 
is the molecule of thought centering in the verb, which 
is the symbol of action or being, terms of the same 
final significance. All other parts of speech, either 
directly or indirectly, denote time and place (space), 
the opposite aspects of existence. Thus language is an 
activity or a form of motion extending the range of 
sentiency, relating the individual and the general, or the 
human and the divine. 

* E. B. Tyler: Early History of Mankind. 



PART II 
THE EVOLUTIONAEY PHILOSOPHY 



CHAPTEE IX 

Herbert Spencer 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 



Before the appearance of Herbert Spencer's Synthetic 
Philosophy, the term evolution was applied almost ex- 
clusively to the development of organisms as sho-vvn in 
biology. About a century after the word came into use 
Darwin established the theory of the mutability of spe- 
cies, which, in its broadest sense, means that the animate 
world is one vast family with numberless branches origi- 
nating in cosmical conditions. In other terms, we have 
sprung from inorganic phenomena. We are the children 
of nature, related to the sunlight and to the storms as 
well as to the trees and flowers. Life and force are akin. 

Darwin was a naturalist rather than a philosopher. 
Although he broadened the meaning of life he did not 
attempt to reduce it to a universal principle. The 
progress of science has enabled us to evolve mind from 
nature. Lavoisier discovered the indestructibility of 
matter; Meyer and Helmholtz, the conservation and 
equivalence of the physical forces, making it possible for 
psychologists, such as Spencer and Lewes, to extend 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 225 

Darwin's theory of the mutability of species to a philoso- 
phy of evolution. 

There is no hard-and-fast line between the science of 
the past and present. The profoundest thought of the 
ancients suggests the unity of all things, and that is 
all that evolution means, but, in order to bring this great 
unifying principle into view, it is necessary to show the 
connection between ancient and modern theories of 
knowledge. In other words, Avith the aid of an ultimate 
analysis, we can follow, step by step, the development of 
scientific principles from the time of their inception, 
until they reveal the interdependencies of the universe. 

The main purpose of Herbert Spencer is to demon- 
strate by means of an ultimate analysis the interdepend- 
ence of inorganic and organic phenomena. ISTo system 
of thought has done more to widen and deepen our con- 
ception of life; and yet, to master the Synthetic 
Philosophy is to discern certain errors which interfere 
with its aim. 

It is worthy of note that an intimate friend of Spencer 
and a worker in the same field, George Henry Lewes, in 
his Problems of Life and Mind, has provided an instru- 
ment by which the errors of the Synthetic Philosophy 
can be laid bare. A comparison of the theories of these 
two great thinkers will illuminate, to an extent hitherto 
unknown, the field of introspection. 

Spencer's philosophy attempts to prove that all 
phenomena, physical, psychical and social, are mani- 
festations of one ultimate denominated "the persistence 
of force." The method adopted is to reduce life to its 
simplest conditions in order to show that the organic, 
the mental, and the civil worlds, are concomitant de- 
velopments. 



226 The Evolution of Knowledge 

The aim of Lewes' philosophy is to prove that thought 
is a development of feeling. By this method he demon- 
strates the identity of mind and matter, proving that the 
functions and structures of the nervous system centering 
in the brain, constitute consciousness. 

Notwithstanding the vast extent to which the litera- 
ture of metaphysics has grown, no department of re- 
search will eventually require less space for the record 
of its truths, for ontology is doomed to absorption by 
the sciences. All that will remain of this great strug- 
gle to comprehend the nature of being, will be a defini- 
tion of the ultimate reality. 

In the near future, to determine the meaning of 
life, biology will be consulted. The nature of the soul 
will be revealed by psychology, for this science will 
eventually explain the functions and structures of the 
individual and the social organism, in relation to feeling 
and thought. The origin of authority will be disclosed 
by the philosophy of law, or by the science of ethics. 
All that will remain of metaphysics proper will be the 
reduction of the categories of thought, or the most gen- 
eral terms of existence to a single principle. 

The innumerable works upon ontology have not, 
however, appeared in vain. Every imaginable con- 
struction of the questions involved had to arise before 
the mind could arrive at stable conclusions. Individual 
beliefs have coalesced into orders or schools. From 
the conflicts of these philosophical parties definite con- 
ceptions have arisen. This is the history, not alone of 
metaphysics, but of all the sciences ; it is the only way 
that opinion has grown into settled belief. 

The Synthetic Philosophy of Herbert Spencer begins 
with the work entitled. First Principles, which is in 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 227 

effect an epitome of the whole. Then come two volumes 
devoted to Biology, and two to Psychology, followed by 
a system of Sociology, which includes The Data of 
Ethics. 

The purpose of First Principles is to define evolu- 
tion. As the argument progresses, the application of 
this term is enlarged, or the restrictions to its meaning 
are one after another removed, until its universality 
becomes apparent. 

The position here taken with regard to universals 
is now familiar to the reader. There can be but 
one ultimate, give it what name or names we please, 
for ultimate means final. A final relation is dis- 
tinguished from all others by its simplicity. If it were 
complex, it would be divisible into more general rela- 
tions, but if it is simple, resisting further analysis, it 
is a common property of every phenomenon. That 
Spencer employed the term evolution as a universal, will 
be evident to those who examine First Principles. At 
the close of the second chapter on the law of evolution, 
our author says : 

"As we now understand it. Evolution is definable as 
a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent 
heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion 
and integration of matter."* In the chapter entitled 
"The Interpretation of Evolution," and referring to the 
above described law, we find the following: "Is this 
law ultimate or derivative ? Must we rest satisfied with 
the conclusion that throughout all classes of concrete 
phenomena such is the course of transformation? Or 
is it possible for us to ascertain why such is the course 

* First Principles, p. 360. 



228 The Evolution of Knowledge 

of transformation? May we seek for some all-pervad- 
ing principle that underlies this all-pervading process? 
* * * It has to be shown that the redistribution 
of matter and motion must everywhere take place in 
those ways, and produce those traits, which celestial 
bodies, organisms, societies, alike display. And it has 
to be shown that this universality of process results from 
the same necessity which determines each simplest 
movement around us, down to the accelerated fall of a 
stone, or the recurrent beat of a harp-string. In other 
words, the phenomena of Evolution have to be deduced 
from the Persistence of Force. As above said, *to this 
an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a 
rational synthesis must build up.' This being the 
ultimate truth, on which the widest generalizations 
stand, these widest generalizations are to be unified by 
referring them to this common basis."* 

A law is a method of action. If, as Spencer says, 
*'The Persistence of Force" is a universal law, and if 
evolution is a universal method of action, surely evolu- 
tion, and, "The Persistence of Force," are the same 
law. I maintain, therefore, that evolution and motion 
are synonymous terms, for, as will be shown, the per- 
sistence of force can be reduced to motion. Nothing 
could simplify philosophy more than this recognition of 
evolution as a universal law or principle. 

One of the objections raised to the theory that evolu- 
tion is universal is that it is a process, not a principle, 
A process, however, is in the deepest sense a form of 
action which is precisely the definition of a law or a 
principle. It will be found that the fact of evolution 

*First Principles, pp. 397, 398. 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 229 

is the most general in nature, which includes life. 
Now, where under the new light of organic chemistry 
are we to find the limits of life ? 

Again it will be objected that evolution is only one 
aspect of the ultimate relation, because the opposite is 
involution. This is an objection worthy of careful 
scrutiny. 

The sense in which the term evolution is employed 
in mathematics is distinct from its broad philosophical 
sense where it denotes the serial development of all 
things, "the evolution of ages." To say that evolution 
is not used by Spencer as a universal because its 
reverse process is involution, is equivalent to saying 
that because dissolution is, in a restricted sense, the 
opposite of evolution, the term cannot denote the ulti- 
mate relation. 

It is impossible to conceive of evolution without in- 
cluding the idea of dissolution, in the same manner 
that it is impossible to conceive of life without includ- 
ing that of death. It will be found, however, that dis- 
solution or death is a change and therefore an aspect 
of life or evolution. 

Although Spencer did not consciously employ evolu- 
tion as a universal, he endeavored to account for all 
phenomena by this process. Hence the inference is irre- 
sistible that he employed the term in the sense of a 
universal form of motion. If, as Spencer says, "evolu- 
tion is the redistribution of matter and motion," what 
event in time and space is independent of this cause? 
The manner in which our author employs the term will 
satisfy all candid inquiry that it stood in his mind for 
the highest generalization of existence. 

According to Spencer, "life is the definite combina- 



230 The Evolution of Knowledge 

tion of heterogeneous changes^ hath simultaneous and 
successive, in correspondence with external co-existences 
and sequences."* Upon examination it will be found 
that this definition can be simplified, for it denotes the 
principle of universal activity and connotes the charac- 
teristics of an organism. The connotation asserts that 
life consists of motions or activities within an organism, 
adjusted to, or co-ordinated with, outward motions. The 
only inference to be found in the definition, therefore, 
is that of an organism ; for, according to the biologists, 
organism means that separation of internal from ex- 
ternal motions consequent upon a limiting membrane. 
Without this inference, the sense of the definition is 
lost among the echoes and re-echoes of universal change. 

Spencer affirms that the indestructibility of matter, 
and the continuity of motion, are necessary inferences 
from the "Persistence of Force," which he describes as 
*'the sole truth which transcends experience by under- 
lying it. * * * The cause which transcends knowl- 
edge, * * * that unknowable which is the neces- 
sary correlative of the knowable.^t IsTow to "transcend 
truth by underlying it" is to surround it. A cause 
which is so general as to surround all truth, must be 
an inseparable part of knowledge, and cannot, there- 
fore, be entirely unknowable. 

The indestructibility of matter is now generally ad- 
mitted to be an axiom or a self-evident fact. Of this 
truth Mr. Spencer says: "Our inability to conceive 
matter becoming non-existent is immediately conse- 
quent on the nature of thought. Thought consists in 
the establishm^ent of relations. There can be no rela- 

* Biology, Vol, I, p, 90. 

t First Principles, p. 19, id. 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 231 

tion established, and, therefore, no thought framed, 
when one of the related terms is absent from conscious- 
ness. * * * It most concerns us to observe the nature 
of the perceptions by which the permanence of matter 
is perpetually illustrated to us. These perceptions, 
under all their forms, amount simply to this — that the 
force which a given quantity of matter exercises remains 
always the same. This is the proof upon which 
common sense, and exact science alike rely. * * * 
Thus we see that force is our ultimate measure of 
matter; * * * by the indestructibility of matter, we 
really mean the indestructibility of the force with which 
matter affects us. * * * This truth is made manifest 
not only by analysis of the a posteriori cognition, but 
equally so by analysis of the a priori one."* Since Spen- 
cer admits that "we cannot conceive of matter as being 
non-existent," it is to be inferred that we must con- 
ceive it as being existent. In other words, as "force is 
oui- ultimate measure of matter," both terms of the rela- 
tion known as force are constantly present in conscious- 
ness. Now the terms of force are space and time. 

Force and the persistence of force mean the same 
thing, for all force is continuous, or persistent. The 
ultimate reality, therefore, is not unknowable, for knowl- 
edge is a form of force or motion. 

Eespecting force, we are told in the chapter follow- 
ing, entitled the "Continuity of Motion," that "This 
existence may cease to display itself as translation; 
but it can do so only by displaying itself as strain. 
And the principle of activity, now shown by translation, 
now by strain, and often by the two together, is alone 

* First Principles, p. 179. 



232 The Evolution of Knowledge 

that which in motion we can call continuous. * * * By 
pushing and pulling we get feelings which, generalized 
and abstracted, yield our ideas of resistance and tension. 
Now displayed by changing position, and now by un- 
changing strain, this principle of activity is ultimately 
conceived by us under the single form of its equivalent 
muscular effort. So that the continuity of motion, as 
well as the indestructibility of matter, is really known 
to us in terms of force."* 

And yet this force from which all our physical 
and psychical experiences emanate, which, to use 
Spencer's language, is "displayed" and "shown" to us, 
which is "inferential" "appreciable" and "conceivable" 
is still said to be unJcnoivahle. Or, perhaps this is saying 
too much. Perhaps a principle may be termed unTcnow- 
able, and still be known in some degree. The term un- 
hnowahle may not be used in an exact sense. It may be 
simply a figure of speech employed by philosophers in 
order to conform to the ancient canons of skepticism, 
or to modern rules of agnosticism, which theories would 
be contradicted were there no unknowable. 

As we proceed, it will become apparent that the idea 
of an unhnowable cannot be reconciled with a true 
theory of knowledge. 

In analyzing any phenomenon or change, such, for 
instance, as a weight falling to the ground, we have as 
a result the elements of existence known as space, time, 
matter, force and motion. Thus far philosophy has gone 
and no farther, for heretofore no successful attempt has 
been made to unify these categories. Spencer's analyses 
of these universals are among the most original and 

* First Principles, pp. 187, 188. 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 233 

valuable contributions to modern thought. It will be 
shown, however, that the result of the analysis cannot 
be reconciled with his theory of an unknowable. 

"Our conception of matter," says Spencer, "reduced 
to its simplest shape, is that of co-existent positions 
that offer resistance as contrasted with our conception 
of space in which the co-existent positions offer no re- 
sistance. * * * Hence the necessity we are under of 
representing to ourselves the ultimate elements of mat- 
ter as being at once extended and resistant. * * * 
Experiences of resistance being those from which the 
conception of space is generated, the resistance-attribute 
of matter must be regarded as primordial and the space- 
attribute as derivative. Whence it becomes manifest 
that our experience of force is that out of which the idea 
of matter is built."* 

Space is defined as an inference from matter, matter 
in turn as an inference from force, and force as that re- 
lation, both terms of which are constantly present in 
consciousness. Kow, how is it possible for a conception 
to be unknowable when it is evolved from a relation, 
both terms of which are present in consciousness ? 

Spencer's definitions of space and timef make it 

* First Principles, pp. 166, 167. 

f'That relation is the universal form of thought, is a truth 
which all kinds of demonstration unite in proving. * * * 
Now, relations are of two orders — relations of sequence and 
relations of co-existence, of which the one is original and the 
other derivative. The relation of sequence is given in every 
change of consciousness. The relation of co-existence, which 
cannot be originally given in a consciousness of which the states 
are serial, becomes distinguished only when it is found that 
certain relations of sequence have their terms presented in con- 
6ciousnes3 in either order with equal facility; while the others 



2 34 The Evolution of Knowledge 

difficult to believe that their author was not aware 
of an ultimate reality, all the aspects of which are 
comprehensible or Jmowable. It is difficult to under- 
stand how so penetrating a mind could declare that force 
is an experience from which all thought is evolved, 
"that relation is the universal form of thought," "that 
relations are of two orders, namely, of sequence and of 
co-existence," or of time and space, without seeing that 
the ultimate relation, both subjective and objective, is 
that union of time and space called motion. 

And yet, in the opening volume of his Synthetic Phil- 
osophy, Spencer declares that those conceptions known 
as universals are utterly inconceivable, although further 
on in the same volume he demonstrates that these very 
conceptions are evolved from a relation, both terms of 
which are constantly present in consciousness.* 

are presented only in one order. Kelations of which the terms 
are not reversible become recognized as sequences proper, while 
relations of which the terms occur indifferently in both direc- 
tions become recognized as co-existences. Endless experiences, 
which from moment to moment present both orders of these 
relations, render the distinction between them perfectly defi- 
nite, and at the same time generate an abstract conception of 
each. The abstract of all sequences is Time ; the abstract of all 
co-existence is Space." * 

* "It results, therefore, that Space and Time are wholly in- 
comprehensible. The immediate knowledge which we seem to 
have of them proves, when examined, to be total ignorance. 
While our belief in their objective reality is insurmountable 
we are unable to give any rational account of it. And to posit 
the alternative belief (possible to state but impossible to real- 
ize) is merely to multiply irrationalities." "^Matter, then, in 
its ultimate nature, is as absolutely incomprehensible as space 
and time. Frame what suppositions we may, we find, on trae- 

* First Principles, pp. 163-5. 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 235 

In its widest sense, knowledge is life, and life is 
a form of motion. All activities are expressions of 
this principle, whether they display the structures 
and functions of consciousness or the statical and 
dynamical aspects of inorganic nature. Structure and 
function are the opposite aspects of every activity; they 
correspond to the more general terms, matter and force 
or space and time, using the term force, as the physicists 
do, to denote motion considered apart from its space- 
aspect. 

To perceive that knowledge is a form of life and life 
a form of universal activity or motion, one has only to 
analyze perception. If a weight falls to the ground a 
fact is expressed. Wherever there is expression there is 
perception, because the response of a phenomenon to its 
conditions, or of an organism to its environment, is 
simply the adjustment of one set of changes with an- 
other. Consciousness has no deeper meaning than 
highly organized changes. 

ing out their implications, that they leave us nothing but a 
choice between opposite absurdities." 

"Thus neither when considered in connection with Space, 
nor when considered in connection with Matter, nor when 
considered in connection with Rest, do we find that Motion is 
truly cognizable. All efforts to understand its essential nature 
do but bring us to alternative impossibilities of thought." 

"While, then, it is impossible to form any idea of Force in 
itself, it is equally impossible to comprehend its mode of 
exercise." 

And lastly : "Hence, while we are unable either to believe or 
to conceive that the duration of consciousness is infinite, we are 
equally unable either to know it as finite, or to conceive it as 
finite." * 

*First Principles, ch. III. 



2^6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

To those who have not familiarized themselves with 
psychological analyses the proposition that the deepest 
meaning of perception is change will hardly prove in- 
telligible, because perception is generally regarded as ex- 
clusively mental, and yet this principle is plainly to be 
seen in every phenomenon. Every activity is a response 
to other activities. There is no final difference between 
the response of the simplest object to its conditions, and 
of a mind to its surroundings. 

If thought is an activity, to comprehend it we have 
only to state its conditions. The theory that thought 
is absolute or unconditioned means that mind is ab- 
solutely independent of matter, or that it acts inde- 
pendently of space, which is an absurdity. Absolute is 
a much-used term in metaphysics. Its deepest meaning, 
as before stated, is time, which apparently moves 
independently of all conditions. Whenever the word 
absolute occurs its equivalent, time, should be under- 
stood. To regard thought as an absolute entity, or an 
unconditioned fact, is to select, as the Kantians do, the 
subjective aspect of consciousness and to reject the 
objective, in the endeavor to account for mind with 
time and without space. 

If thought is an activity it has structure as well as 
function; it has a space as well as a time-aspect; 
it is a form of the universal relation. Thus the aspects 
of existence known as the conscious and the unconscious, 
or as subject and object, are, in the last analysis, iden- 
tical. 

The theory of evolution is that every phenomenon is 
the function of its conditions, — every change the expres- 
sion of its terms. The relation called knowledge has 
for its terms subject and object, or individual and en- 



Knowledge a Form of Motion 237 

vironment. Its conditions are those of individual life, 
which are only relatively separable from the conditions 
of universal activity. If from an infinity of relations 
we would single out an ultimate relation, or from all 
conditions, ultimate conditions, we have as a result the 
ultimate relation, motion ; the ultimate conditions, time 
and space. 



CHAPTER X 

Herbert Spencer (Continued) 



The Interdependence of Thought^ Feeling and Action 



Psychology will not become a science until conscious- 
ness is recognized as an evolution of nature. Both 
Spencer and Lewes regarded thought as a development 
of feeling, and, therefore, approached consciousness 
through the functions and structures of the sensoriura. 
As shown in the previous chapter, a broad view of their 
theories leads to the conclusion that consciousness con- 
sists of relations of co-existence and sequence, or, in 
other terms, that knowledge is a form of motion. 

As employed by the Greeks the term philosophy de- 
noted all mental culture. Sopfa, the word from which it 
is derived, was applied to skill in every art and every 
kind of knowledge. The Sophists were the first to re- 
strict the meaning of the term, but after the time of 
Plato it was further narrowed until at last philosoph}^ 
came to mean a diiferent kind of knowledge from that to 
which the sciences belong. This belief that the mind is 
an absolute entity, independent of the body, continued to 
gain ground until the intellectual faculties, such as 
memory, will, perception and reason, were conceived as 
occult powers, the interdependencies of which are in- 
scrutable. The confusion arising from this arbitrar}' 
separation of mind and matter is beginning to yield 



Thought, Feeling and Action 239 

to the advance of psychology or the study of conscious- 
ness as a part of organic nature. 

"Psychology," says Lewes, "investigates not only an 
individual's thoughts and feelings, but the mind of 
humanity, which it considers as the product of the indi- 
vidual organism, for man is distinctively a social being; 
his impulses are profoundly modified by social influences, 
and his higher faculties evolved through social needs. 
By this recognition of the social factor as the comple- 
ment to the biological factor, this recognition of the 
mind as an expression of both organic and social condi- 
tions, the first step is taken toward the constitution 
of our science." The conclusion reached by Lewes was 
that language and civilization develop together, forming 
a structure of which intelligence is the function. Occu- 
pying the medium called language individual minds 
develop, just as physical organisms derive their susten- 
ance and growth from a physical medium. 

*^An organism when in action," says Lewes, "is only 
to be understood by considering both it and the medium 
from which it draws its materials, and on which it 
reacts. Its conditions of existence are, first, the struc- 
tural mechanism, and secondly, the medium in which it 
is placed. When we know the part played by the 
mechanism and the part played by the medium we have 
gone as far as analysis can help us; we have scientifi- 
cally explained the actions of the organism. This, which 
is so obvious in reference to vital action that it is a 
physiological commonplace, is so little understood in 
reference to the mental class of vital actions that it may 
appear to be a psychological paradox which no explana- 
tion can make acceptable, so long as the mind is regarded 



240 The Evolution of Knowledge 

as an entity inhabiting the organism, using it as an in- 
strument; and so long as society is viewed as an artifi- 
cial product of man's mind, in which case society cannot 
be one of the conditions of mental evolution/"* 

According to Lewes, therefore, the prime factors of 
mind are the individual and society. From the first 
vague communications of living beings the representa- 
tive faculty has been slowly evolved. Methods of living 
and thinking have imfolded together, forming more 
and more general principles, until a climax in the 
development of the race has been reached by the evolu- 
tion of a single term to express the interdepend encies 
of the universe. 

The simplest definition of life, is the interaction of 
organism and environment, and of mind, the interaction 
of subject and object. The individual considered as an 
aggregate is the subjective factor; while society con- 
sidered as an aggregate is the objective factor of mind. 
The difficulty is to understand the influence exerted by 
these factors as aggregates. In every perception and 
conception, however simple, the perceiving individual, 
as a whole, is a determining influence. Thus it will be 
seen that the simplest of all conceptions, namely, that 
of time, is determined by the individual organism taken 
as a whole. 

"The consciousness of Time," says Spencer, "must 
vary with size, with structure, and with functional activ- 
ity ; since the scale of time proper to each creature is com- 
posed primarily of the marks made in its consciousness 
by the rhythms of its vital functions, and secondarily of 
the marks made in its consciousness by the rhythms of 

* Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I., pp. 105-111. 



Thought, Feehng and Action 241 

its locomotive functions^ both which sets of rhythms are 
immensely different in different species. Consequently, 
the constitution derived from ancestry settles the general 
character of the consciousness within approximate limits. 
In our own case, for example, it is clear that there are 
certain extremes within which our units of measure for 
time must fall. The heart-beats and respiratory actions, 
serving as primitive measures, can have their rates 
varied within moderate ranges only. The alternating 
movements of the legs have a certain degree of slowness 
below which we cannot be conscious of them, and a 
certain degree of rapidity beyond which we cannot push 
them. The rule applies also to measures of time, fur- 
nished by sensible motions outside of us. There are 
motions too rapid for our perceptions, as well as motions 
too slow for our perceptions; and such consciousness of 
time as we get from watching objective motions must 
fall between these extremes."* 

It is clear that the same argument applies to the 
genesis of our idea of space, namely, that consciousness 
of space springs from the experiences of the perceiving 
organism, and is determined by its size. Our ideas of 
the large and of the small, the near and the distant, 
are determined by our dimensions. We may conclude, 
therefore, that the size and duration of each individual 
organism governs its perceptions of time and space. 

The most direct route to a comprehension of the re- 
lation of mind and matter, is through the relation of 
thought and feeling. TEe restricted sense in which 
the term feeling is generally used obscures our view 
of the material aspect of mind. In order to disclose 



^Psychology, Vol. II., pp. 213, 214. 



242 The Evolution of Knowledge 

the connection between the conscious and the luicon- 
scious, it is necessary to show that the meaning of feel- 
ing can be expanded until it includes tJiougJit, or, in 
other terms, we must realize that there is no absolute 
dividing line between conscious and unconscious activi- 
ties. 

Feelings and thoughts are what we know of our own 
lives; actions are what we know of the lives of others. 
As a matter of convenience, let the word feeling repre- 
sent all the changes that take place within the organism. 
These changes include the vast complex of internal 
activities, making up the sum of individual existence, 
and of which we are, for the most part, unconscious. Feel- 
ing is usually understood to mean sensation, but by far 
the greater part of those internal activities from which 
sensations are evolved are unconscious. Sensibility 
emerges from insensibilit}^, just as thought emerges 
from unconscious cerebration. 

For the present we will use the term feeling to 
represent all internal activity, both physical and psychi- 
cal. From the beginning to the end of life, the human 
organism teems with unconscious activities. Only a 
small proportion of the changes taking place within the 
organism, ever arrest the attention. Whenever we move 
a muscle, or exercise a thought, a disturbance disperses 
throughout the entire system. These changes which are 
expressed in heat and other forms of motion* constitute 
attention only when they are to a certain degree central- 
ized. Attention consists of the centralization of these 
internal changes; consciousness itself being a co-ordi- 



*This incessant internal activity is said to produce a tone. 



Thought, Feeling and Action 243 

nation, or, otherwise expressed, a moving equiiibrium 
with well-defined physical conditions. 

Thus we perceive that feeling has a much wider mean- 
ing than is generally understood. Only by recent dis- 
coveries in neural phenomena, has it become known that 
there is no absolute dividing line between the aggregate 
called thought and feeling and that vast plexus known 
as internal change. 

Now that we have agreed upon a term to denote tem- 
porarily that class of movements distinguished as inter- 
nal or subjective, what shall we call external or objective 
changes ? It is understood that from the point of view 
of each individual the word feeling shall represent all 
internal change ; but what are we to call the same phe- 
nomena as viewed by others ? Using the word feeling in 
its broadest sense to signify all changes taking place 
within the organism, it is clear that what are feelings to 
one's self, are activities to others, or what are feelings 
subjectively are from the opposite point of view the 
activities of an objective organism. If from the point 
of view of others all feelings and thoughts are ac- 
tivities of an objective organism, it follows that feeling 
can be separated from action only ideally, because the 
terms are applied respectively to the internal and to the 
external aspects of the same thing. In other words, we 
are compelled to regard the feelings, thoughts and ac- 
tions of society as forming in the aggregate a medium 
which constitutes the environment of each individual. 
Thus the actions and reactions of the individual and its 
environment constitute life, including mind. 

When light strikes the eye and produces sight, the 
sensorium or the most active part of the organism, is 
said to react, in response to the stimulus. The term re- 



244 T-I^e Evolution of Knowledge 

action is used to describe all responses to stiniidation ; 
such as hearing to sound, sensitiveness to temperature, 
and resistance to strain. Again, when a bar of iron is 
struck with force sufficient to produce perceptible heat, 
the heat is said to be a reaction of the iron to the blow. 
When we place certain chemical substances in juxta- 
position, the changes observed are called reactions. In 
a wider, but no less exact sense, all the changes observed 
around us, from the subtle relations known as electric 
and magnetic, to the evolutions of the celestial spheres ; 
from vegetal and animal life to the panorama of hu- 
man history; from the convulsions registered in the 
structure of the planets, and repeated on a larger scale 
in distant systems, to the comparatively gentle changes 
of the seasons and momentary variations in temper- 
ature; — all are instances of action and reaction. This 
law has many names. It is known to philosophy as evo- 
lution; physicists term it the conservation and equiva- 
lence of forces; mathematicians describe it as motion; 
but of one thing we may be certain, namely, that the 
word action brings its nature truly before us. This 
law means that the universe is a system of interde- 
pendent changes, each the result of other changes; the 
procession of events in which our lives appear and dis- 
appear being a form of one universal relation. 

Since thought or psychical life is a relation having 
for its terms the aggregates known as the individual 
and its environment, the question arises. What is it that 
demarcates mind from matter or from objective nature ? 
What gives to intelligence a sphere of its own, distin- 
guishing the conscious from the unconscious ? Humanity 
has slowly evolved methods of communication. Begin- 
ning with the vaguest notions, each race and indi- 



Thought, PeeHng and Action 245 

vidual has, through the medium of language, developed 
definite ideas. During a measureless past society has 
been profoundl}^ modified until it has become an intel- 
lectual medium, making possible all the complicated 
adjustments of civilization. In a structural sense, this 
medium is language ; in a functional sense, it is thought. 
Mind is distinguished from matter, therefore, by means 
of language, but the distinction is only relative. 

Viewing thought from within, we classify it as in- 
ternal change or as feeling taken in its widest sense; 
from an outward point of view, it is action, and thus its 
identity with universal change becomes apparent. 

The unity of mind and matter, therefore, is the inter- 
action of organism and environment, or the related vibra- 
tions of subject and object. 

The generalization called time is sequence considered 
apart from co-existence. Space is the generalization of 
co-existent points of resistance. Considered objectively, 
time and space are inseparable, because they are united 
in motion. From this simplest of all relations language 
derives its terms. To comprehend consciousness, there- 
fore, its terms must be distinguished and generalized, 
and the psychoplasm, or the medium through which these 
terms act and react, must be identified with the cosmos. 
As above stated, in a structural sense this psychoplasm 
is language, and in a functional sense it is thought. 

It may be affirmed that although the last difference 
existing between subject and object is vibration, this 
movement is also the chief mystery of life. If by 
mystery is meant the ultimate relation, I cordially 
assent that life is a mystery. I deny, however, that 
mind can be one mystery, and matter, another, or 
that human life can be a separate and distinct mystery 



246 The Evolution of Knowledge 

from universal existence, or that organic changes are 
either more or less mysterious than cosmical changes. 

Philosophy will have achieved its object, when it has 
indicated a universal principle, the opposite aspects of 
which are the infinite and the absolute, or space and 
time. Whether this principle be regarded as mysterious, 
or as the simplest of all ezperiences, is largely a mat- 
ter of temperament, for there are many persons so 
constituted that they would be unhappy if not per- 
mitted to live in an atmosphere of mystery. All that 
philosophy requires of these uncentered souls is that 
they shall reduce their mysteries to unity. 

To recapitulate, we have the following important re- 
sults. The primordial relation* or difEerence of which 



*In case any objection should be raised to the use of the 
words relation and difference as synonyms, we quote the fol- 
lowing as one of the many authorities for the statement that 
these words are practically identical in meaning: "Suppose 
an incipient intelligence to receive two equal impressions of 
the color red. No other experience having been received, the 
relation between these two impressions cannot be thought of 
in any way; because there exists no other relation with which 
it can be classed, or from which it can be distinguished. Sup- 
pose two other equal impressions of red are received. There 
can still exist no idea of the relation between them. For 
though there is a repetition of the previously-experienced re- 
lation, yet since no thing can be cognized save as of some 
kind; and since, by its very nature, kind implies the establish- 
ment of difference; there cannot, while only one order of re- 
lation has been experienced, be any knowledge of it — any 
thought about it. Now suppose that two unequal impressions 
of red are received. There is experienced a second species of 
relation. And if there are afterwards presented many such 
pairs of impressions, the members of which are severally equal 
and unequal, it becomes possible for the constituents of each 



Thought, Feehng and Action 247 

intelligence consists is that subsisting between subject 
and object, or self and non-self. In other words, con- 
sciousness is a form of the interaction of organism 
and environment. Thinking is relationing; it is group- 
ing and separating relations. Every thought expresses 
a relation in terms of time and space. When we com- 
pare two or more existences, or become conscious of co- 
existence or space, — we contrast the objective terms of 
two or more relations by dropping, or not attending 
to, the subjective terms. When we become conscious 
of abstract sequence or time, we contrast the subjec- 
tive terms of two or more relations by dropping, or not 
attending to the objective terms. Hence we have space 
or co-existence considered as objective relatively distin- 
guished from time or abstract sequence considered as 
subjective. Through the medium of language the pri- 
mordial adjustments of organism and environment have 
developed into the highly complex relations of civili- 
zation, and as a result we have the inestimable truth that 
justice is made possible by intelligence or developed 
feeling. 

new pair to be vaguely thought of as like or unlike, and aa 
standing in relations like or unlike, previous ones." Spencer's 
Psychology, Vol. II., p. 212. 



CHAPTEE XI 
Heebeet Spencer 

(Continued) 



The Analysis of Reason 



In the second volume of Principles of Psychology, 
Spencer endeavors to prove that reason is an irreducible 
mental act. It will he shown that reason is comparison, 
and that all its processes can he reduced to simple and 
comprehensible steps. Spencer's attempt to prove that 
the act of reason originates in a fundamental mystery 
exemplifies in a striking manner how much unneces- 
sary trouble the theory of an unknowable is capable of 
giving. 

According to Spencer, reason springs from an axiom 
which is neither decomposable into steps, nor capable of 
proof. This axiom, in his opinion, is the beginning of 
intelligence; that is to say, it is an "irreducible in- 
tuition," or an "organized consolidated conception," 
which defies analysis. The theory that reason springs 
from a fundamental mystery otherwise expressed is 
that knowledge springs from the unknowable. I hope 
to show that there are no "irreducible intuitions," no 
"axioms incapable of proof," no conceptions that can 
not be analyzed or traced to their source in reflex action. 



The Analysis of Reason 249 

Of Spencer's Principles of Psychology, the first 
words of the second chapter are these : "Of intellectual 
acts, the highest are those which constitute Conscious 
Keasoning — or, called conscious to distinguish it 
from unconscious or automatic reasoning that forms 
so large an element in ordinary perception. Of con- 
scious reasoning, the kind containing the greatest 
number of components definitely combined is Quantita- 
tive Eeasoning. And of this, again, there is a division, 
more highly involved than the rest, which we may class 
apart as Compound Quantitative Eeasoning. * * * 
Even in Compound Quantitative Eeasoning itself, there 
are degrees of composition, and to initiate our analysis 
rightly, we must take first the most composite type. 
Let us contemplate an example." 

The example given is the method of reasoning, pur- 
sued by an engineer in estimating the comparative 
strength of bridges. The question of the comparative 
strength of materials is simplified by selecting an iron 
bridge, and the problems of strain are limited by confin- 
ing the example to the tubular class of bridges. By 
this means, the joint application of certain problems in 
mechanics to the building of bridges is made to rep- 
resent "the most composite type of reasoning." The first 
of these problems can be stated as follows : The bulks 
of masses are to each other as the cubes of their linear 
dimensions, and consequently, when the masses are of 
the same material, their weights also are to each other 
as the cubes of their linear dimensions. This problem 
can be stated more simply, as follows : To compare the 
size and weight of masses, agree upon a unit of measure- 
ment, the most convenient form of which has been found 



250 The Evolution of Knowledge 

to be the cube, or a solid of equal linear dimensions. 
The problem states that the niunber of linear units in 
each dimension multiplied, will equal the number of 
cubic units in the respective masses, or that the masses 
are to each other, as the cubes of their linear dimensions. 
Hence the steps in the former of the two problems, the 
joint use of which is said to furnish an example of "the 
most composite type of Eeasoning," are progressions 
from one equality to another, beginning always with 
those equalities which are so simple as to be evident to 
the senses. 

Savages who are unable to count, may, nevertheless, 
form very good notions of the comparative bulks of 
masses ; but until they learn to count and measure, they 
cannot understand how numbers represent bulk. It re- 
quires no special mathematical training, however, to see 
that they do; for the foregoing problem means simply 
that by multiplying the length, breadth and thickness, 
of a mass, we get a number which expresses the volume 
of the mass in any desired units. This is the extent of 
the question; for it goes without saying, that if a 
number expresses the volume of a mass, variations in 
volume imply variations in number. 

The second problem is not so readily reduced through 
steps of equivalence, to its conclusion. It is stated as 
follows : In similar masses of matter which are subject 
to compression or tension, the power of resistance varies 
as the squares of the like linear dimensions. 

Here we have two things compared, which are widely 
different, namely, the power of resistance of a mass, 
and its superficial measurement. In order to institute 
a comparison between objects, it is necessary that they 
ehould have some property in common. In this case. 



The Analysis of Reason 251 

the squares of the like linear dimensions of the com- 
pared masses, are said to vary with the power of resist- 
ance of the masses. Therefore, the squares of the linear 
dimensions must in some way be made to represent the 
power of resistance of the respective masses. How is 
this done? There is, in mechanics, a law of least 
resistance, which locates the point of the greatest strain 
in any given structure. In the case of a tube of iron, 
or any homogeneous substance subjected to a trans- 
verse strain this law locates in a plane, the place at 
which the tube would break, if the strain exceeded its 
strength. This plane of fracture would be a transverse 
section of the tube. Now this transverse section is 
measured by multiplying the transverse linear dimen- 
sions of the tube. Here, then, a relation is established 
between the strain which a tube can bear, and its trans- 
verse linear dimensions. In the first problem, a num- 
ber was made to represent the bulk as well as the 
weight of compared masses. In the second, a surface 
or plane is made to represent the power of resistance to 
compression or strain of the compared masses. 

In these two problems, therefore, the final comparison 
is between the process of estimating the number of 
cubic units in a solid, and of estimating the number of 
superficial units in a surface. In one case the process 
consists of multiplying the linear units contained in 
three straight lines, and in the other, of multiplying 
the linear imits contained in two straight lines. The 
net result of the problem can be summed up in the 
statement that the cube of a given quantity will be 
more than the square of the same quantity. To this 
simple comparison can be reduced the complex proposi- 
tion that the weight and the masses of like substances 



252 The Evolution of Knowledge 

are to each other as the cubes of their like linear 
dimensions; and that the poAver of similar substances 
to resist a transverse strain varies as the squares of 
their like linear dimensions. The difference between 
the two problems grows out of the fact that the opera- 
tion by which the mass and weight are estimated is 
performed twice, while in estimating the power of resist- 
ance the same operation is performed but once. The 
result is a comparison so simple that it can be regarded 
as a sensation. 

Speaking of the above problems, Spencer says : 
"But now, leaving out of sight the various acts by 
which the premises are reached, and the final inference 
is drawn, let us consider the nature of the cognition 
that the ratio between the sustaining forces in the two 
tubes must differ from the ratio between the destroying 
forces; for this cognition it is which here concerns us, 
as exemplifying the most complex ratiocination. There 
is, be it observed, no direct comparison between these 
two ratios. How, then, are they known to be unlike? 
Their unlikeness is known through the intermediation 
of two other ratios to which they are severally equal. 

"The ratio between the sustaining forces (or the power 
of resistance) equals the ratio 1^:2^. The ratio be- 
tween the destroying forces (or the weight) equals the 
ratio 1^ : 2^. And, as it is seen that the ratio 1^ : 2^ is 
unequal to the ratio 1^ : 2^, it is by implication seen 
that the ratio between the sustaining forces is unequal 
to the ratio between the destroying forces. What is 
the nature of this implication? or, rather, what is the 
mental act by which this implication is perceived? It 
is manifestly not decomposable into steps. Though in- 
volving many elements, it is a single intuition, and, if 



The Analysis of Reason 253 

expressed in an abstract form amounts to the axiom : 
'"'Eatios which are severally equal to certain other ratios 
that are unequal to each other, are themselves unequal."* 

The foregoing analysis of the problems of the com- 
parative strength of bridges explains how the axiom 
or intuition which Spencer believed, to be undecom- 
posable, can be evolved from direct comparisons between 
simple quantities to which the compared ratios are re- 
ducible. It will be found that all forms of reason are 
similarly evolved from comparisons so simple that they 
can be regarded as sensations. 

In the chapter entitled "The Final Question," second 
division of the same volume, the admission is made 
that, in the present state of human culture, a complete 
theory of knowledge is impossible. By a "complete 
theory of knowledge" Spencer means a comprehen- 
sion of the principles of mind. "A true theory of 
knowledge," says Spencer, "is impossible without a true 
theory of the thing knowing, and a theory of the thing 
known, which is true as far as it goes." "Such a theory 
can be reached only after the theories of that which 
knows, and of that which is known have reached their 
ultimate forms; and the assumption that this ultimate 
form has been reached is declared to be an absurdity." 
This, of course, is equivalent to saying that a true theory 
of Knowledge is at present impossible. 

We are told that "Developed intelligence is framed 
upon certain organized and consolidated conceptions of 
which it cannot divest itself; and which it can no more 
stir without using, than the body can stir without help 
of its limbs."* These organized and consolidated con- 
ceptions, which, according to Spencer, are essential to 

^Principles of Psychology, Vol. II,, p. 309. 



254 The Evolution of Knowledge 

the activity known as intelligence, are space, time, mat- 
ter, force and motion. Now if the mind is incapable 
of acting without them, whence the power that organ- 
ized and consolidated these conceptions? How did 
they become ideas ? It will be remembered that in the 
chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas" these five con- 
ceptions are declared to be utterly inconceivable. 
Spencer assures us that any attempt to understand 
them leads to absurdities. These five principles are 
united in a sixth denominated consciousness. As con- 
sciousness springs from these unknowable elements of 
knowledge it is declared to be a mystery, which, it 
must be admitted, is a fair conclusion. It is not sur- 
prising that a theory of knowledge which evolves con- 
sciousness from inconceivable conceptions should be in 
some degree incomplete. 

The assertion that "organized and consolidated con- 
ceptions," are a primary condition of thought is true 
only in a limited sense. In a broad sense it is equiva- 
lent to saying that the activities which have evolved 
fundamental ideas are of a totally different order from 
those which constitute the functions of the mind. The 
vital defect of Spencer's psychology is his dictum that 
"Eeason is absolutely incapable of justifying its assump- 
tion; an assumption it is at the outset; an assumption 
it must remain to the last."* 

From other parts of Spencer's system it can be in- 
ferred that reasoning is an organic activity extending 
from those automatic procedures known as reflex action 
to the highest achievements of the mind. His theory that 
reason absolutely depends upon organized, consolidated, 
and irreducible conceptions, is, therefore, in conflict 

* Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., p. 317. 



The Analysis of Reason 255 

with his best definition of mind. In another 
part of the same work, Spencer says that "reasoning 
is the act of co-ordinating states of consciousness 
already co-ordinated in certain simpler ways." "Now in 
all past times/' says the same author, "men of science 
subordinate the deliverances of consciousness reached 
through mediate processes to the deliverances of con- 
sciousness reached through immediate processes; or, 
to speak strictly, they subordinate those deliverances 
reached through prolonged and conscious reasoning to 
those deliverances reached through reasoning that has 
become so nearly automatic as no longer to be called 
reasoning."* In short, the highest achievements of the 
mind are finally submitted to the arbitration of the 
senses, or to those automatic co-ordinations which, be- 
cause they are too simple to be classed as mental, axe 
known as activities of the physical organism. 

If reasoning can be traced back to the simplest or- 
ganic co-ordinations, and if the re-coordinations (or 
higher reasonings) cannot give to the results reached a 
validity independent of that possessed by previously co- 
ordinated states, there is a manifest continuity be- 
tween sensation and reason. 

Lest the reader should surmise that Spencer makes 
a difference between the operations of the mind in gen- 
eral and those operations called reasoning, we have but 
to revert to the chapter on "^Eeasoning in General," 
where we find it admitted that knowledge gained 
through the senses, or, as Spencer terms it, hy percep- 
tion, differs from that gained by the reasoning facul- 
ties, not in its nature, but only in the directness of the 
apprehension. 

*Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., p. 316. 



256 The Evolution of Knowledge. 

"Let us consider," says Spencer, "what is the more 
specific definition of Eeasoning. Not only does the 
kind of proposition called an inference assert a relation, 
but every proposition, whether expressing mediate or 
immediate knowledge, asserts a relation. How, then, 
does knowing a relation by Reason differ from knowing 
it by Perception? It differs by its indirectness. A 
cognition is distinguishable as of one or the other kind, 
according as the relation it embodies is disclosed to the 
mind directly or indirectly. Eeasoning, then, is the 
indirect estahlishment of a definite relation hetween 
two things. But now the question arises. By what 
process can the indirect establishment of a definite re- 
lation be effected? There is one process, and only one. 
If a relation between two things is not directly know- 
able, it can be disclosed only through the intermediation 
of relations that are directly knowable, or are already 
known.-"* 

Eeasoning, then, which is admitted to signifiy, in its 
widest sense, all intelectual activity is declared to be the 
indirect establishment of a definite relation between 
two things. "If this relation between two things is 
not directly knowable, it can be disclosed only through 
the intermediation of relations that are directly know- 
able, or are already known." 

If all reasoning is relationing and if the only differ- 
ence between the simplest and the most complex forms 
of reason is the degree of directness, it is manifest that 
the development of sensation into reasoning proceeds 
from definite relations to definite relations, and that 
there is no room in this sequence for the unknowable, 
for, if knowledge is relationing the unknowable is the 

*Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., p. 115. 



The Analysis of Reason 257 

imrelatable. Thus, after all, Spencer leads us so near 
to the ultimate relation that his theory of knowledge 
is very nearly complete. 

Notwithstanding the inevitable contradictions of his 
theor}'' of the unknowable the psychology of Herbert 
Spencer is in the main a demonstration of the unity of 
knowledge. It reduces all mental phenomena to one 
ultimate; namely, "the persistence of force/' and it 
analyzes the conceptions of space and time, showing that 
they are the opposite aspects of this ultimate relation. 

Involved as are the operations of the mind, in analyz- 
ing them we encounter no "insoluble mystery," no 
"irreducible intuition," no fact that cannot be traced 
to the simplest sensations. The distinction between sen- 
sation and thought, or between facts of consciousness 
having objective factors and those remaining wholly 
subjective, is only relative. Once a train of thought 
is set going, the mind works out its comparisons with 
relative independence of surroundings, A course of 
reasoning may occupy years, continuing through both 
waking and sleeping, during all manner of diverting 
occupations, and in some cases culminating with scarcely 
any effort on the part of the thinker. 

Sensation differs from thought in that the former 
connects us with externals, while the latter proceeds 
within. But this distinction, as above indicated, is only 
relative. The sensorium responds to impressions from 
without, each of which produces its modification, that is 
to say, its memory. As impressions are repeated they 
become deeper ; i. e., the modifications become more and 
more marked. Each modification of structure implies 
a modification of function. Thoughts are molecular ad- 
justments, which are invisible; but they result in more 



258 The Evolution of Knowledge 

definite perceptions, or in more accurate adjustments 
of the organism and its environment. 

Sensation is more nearly connected, and thought fur- 
ther removed from external excitation. Between these 
extremes there are all degrees of directness, varying 
from the simplest reflexes to the most involved co-ordi- 
nations, but a definite relationship is maintained 
throughout. 

Thus, when viewed superficially, reason and sensation 
appear entirely distinct; but analysis reveals their com- 
munity of nature. Since reason is a form of organic 
action, there are no circumscriptions to conscious- 
ness except the moving limits of individuality. The 
mind has no absolute demarcations; the universe holds 
nothing back from thought. Throughout the receding 
simplification of analysis, and the advancing complexity 
of s}aithesis, no fact or principle, however general, is 
encountered, to which the individual does not definitely 
respond. 



CHAPTEE XII 

Herbert Spencer 
(Concluded) 



The Principles of Sociology 



The most original part of the Synthetic Philosophy 
is its theory of society, which completes the system. As 
before mentioned, the opening volume, entitled First 
Principles, is an epitome of the whole. The succeeding 
four volumes, two of Biology, and two of Psychology, 
set forth the progressive stages of organic develop- 
ment and culminate in an explanation of the physi- 
cal basis of mind. Change from the simple to the 
complex is shown to be the trend of organic growth. 
The application of the theory of evolution to physical 
and mental phenomena is crowned by a definition of 
life, which being reduced to its simplest terms signifies 
that vitality, including mind, is the interaction of or- 
ganism and environment. 

Spencer's hypothesis that "Function makes Struc- 
ture," has been objected to in a previous chapter on the 
ground that fimction and structure are opposite views 
of every phenomenon, neither having precedence as a 
cause. 

The Synthetic Philosophy is built upon the postulate 
that the "deepest knowable truth" is the Persistence 
of Force. It is true that at times this "deepest knowable 



26o The Evolution of Knowledge 

truth'' is declared to be unknowable, but for the most 
part, with remarkable consistency, our author avoids 
placing this universal among the inconceivables. 

The theme of the first five books above mentioned is 
that of individual life. Then comes the theory of super- 
organic phenomena, or the science of society, for 
which Spencer is so justly renowned. Society is pic- 
tured as a vast living organism, the aim being to show 
that social, like individual, development is to be ac- 
counted for by the interaction of organism and environ- 
ment, or of society and the cosmos. 

In order to show the evolution of humanity or of 
justice, the development of human instinct is traced 
from the primitive family or tribe to the race formed 
into a confederation of nations. 

With the exception of Darwin's Origin of Species, 
Spencer's Sociology is the most notable philosophic 
production of the past century. It is a romance, for 
it recounts the story of humanity. Primitive man is 
rehabilitated. His surroundings are depicted as the 
external factors of his development, while the emotional 
and the intellectual phases of his nature constitute the 
internal factors. Through the interaction of these con- 
ditions society is evolved. 

Spencer has presented a striking picture of man's pre- 
historic life. An idea is given of the vast duration and 
extent of the struggle for existence, from which society 
has been evolved. The inestimable benefits springing 
from human co-operation on the one hand, and of in- 
dividualism on the other, are made evident. Social 
progress and the perfection of conduct along lines of 
economic reform are shown to be different views of the 
same fact of development. 



The Principles of Sociology 261 

In this book our author is at his best. The following 
excerpt from the chapter on "The Factors of Social 
Phenomena" will give some idea of the power of the 
work: 

"There remains in the group of derived factors olie more, 
the potency of which can scarcely be over-estimated. I mean 
that accumulation of sviperorganic products which we com- 
monly distinguish as artificial, but which, philosophically con- 
sidered, are no less natural than all others resulting from 
eA^olution. There are several orders of these. 

"First come the material appliances, which, beginning with 
roughly-chipped flints, end in the complex automatic tools of 
an engine-factory driven by steam; which from boomerangs 
rise to thirty-five-ton guns; which from huts of branches and 
gi'ass grow to cities with their palaces and cathedrals. Then 
we have language, able at first only to eke out gestures in 
communicating simple ideas, but eventually becoming capable 
of expressing highly-complex conceptions with precision. While 
from that stage in which it conveys thoughts only by sounds 
to one or a few other persons, we pass through picture-writing 
up to steam-printing, — multiplying indefinitely the numbers 
communicated with, and making accessible in voluminous 
literatures the ideas and feelings of innumerable men in various 
places and times. Concomitantly there goes on the develop- 
ment of knowledge, ending in science. Counting on the fingers 
grows into far-reaching mathematics; observation of the moon's 
changes leads at length to a theory of the solar system ; and at 
successive stages there arise sciences of which not even the 
germs can at first be detected. Meanwhile the once few and 
simple customs, becoming more numerous, definite, and fixed, 
end in systems of laws. From a few rude superstitions there 
grow up elaborate mythologies, theologies, cosmogonies. Opin- 
ion getting embodied in creeds, gets embodied, too, in accepted 
codes of propriety, good conduct, ceremony, and in established 
social sentiments. And then there are gradually evolved also the 
products we call aesthetic; which of themselves form a highly- 
complex group. From necklaces of fish-bones we advance to 
dresses, elaborate, gorgeous, and infinitely varied ; out of dia- 



262 The Evolution of Knowledge 

cordant war-chants come symphonies and operas; cairns de- 
velop into magnificent temples; in place of caves with rude 
markings there arise, at length, galleries of paintings; and the 
recital of a chief's deeds with mimetic accompaniment gives 
origin to epics, dramas, lyrics, and the vast mass of poetry, 
fiction, biography and history. 

"All these various orders of super-organic products, each 
evolving within itself new genera and species while daily grow- 
ing into a larger whole, and each acting upon the other 
orders while being reacted upon them, form together an im- 
mensely voluminous, immensely complicated, and immensely 
powerful set of influence. * * * The influences which the 
society exerts on the natures of its units, and those which the 
units exert on the nature of the society, incessantly co-operate 
in creating new elements."* 

In the second volume of "Biology," under the title of 
"Morphology," the forms of plants and animals are 
shown to be the inevitable result of physical conditions. 
In this manner the characteristics of the different 
races of mankind are accounted for. The ebony skin 
of the Central African tribes, and the blanched cheek of 
the Caucasian point to widely differing habitats. The 
Yakut child who devours at one meal "three candles, 
several pounds of sour, frozen butter, and a large piece 
of yellow soap," and the adult of the same race who 
consumes "forty pounds of meat in a single day," are 
contrasted with the brainworker of our zone and civili- 
zation, who subsists upon a modicum of highly con- 
centrated nourishment. 

It is demonstrated that all social progress is an ad- 
vance in the number and complexity of the adjust- 
ments of organism and environment, advancing through 
the physical to the intellectual. 

*Sociology, Vol. I., p. 14. 



The Principles of Sociology 263 

The lack of mental power, characterizing the primi- 
tive man, and the rigidity of his beliefs are shown to be 
related conditions. 

"We see less of that representativeness which simultaneously 
grasps and averages much evidence; and we see a smaller 
divergence from those lowest mental actions in which im- 
pressions cause, irresistibly, the appropriate motions. While 
the experiences are few and but slightly varied, the concrete- 
ness of the corresponding ideas is but little qualified by the 
growth of abstract ideas. An abstract idea, being one drawn 
from many concrete ideas, becomes detachable from these con- 
crete ideas only as fast as their multiplicity and variety lead 
to mutual cancellings of their differences, and leave outstand- 
ing that which they have in common. Obviously an abstract 
idea so generated implies an increase of the correspondence in 
range and heterogeneity; it implies increased representative- 
ness in the consciousness of the many concretes whence the 
idea is abstracted; and it implies greater remoteness from 
reflex action. It must be added that such abstract ideas as 
those of property and cause presuppose a still higher stage in 
this knowledge of objects and actions. For only after many 
special properties and many special causes have been thus ab- 
stracted can there arise the re-abstraeted ideas of property in 
general and cause in general. The conception of uniformity in 
the order of phenomena develops along with this progress in 
generalization and abstraction. Not uniformity but multi- 
formity, is the dominant trait in the course of things as the 
primitive man witnesses it. No two places are alike, no two 
men, no two trees, rivers, stones, days, storms, quarrels. Only 
along with the use of measures, when social advance initiates 
it, does there grow up the means of ascertaining uniformity: 
and only after great accumulation of measured results does 
the idea of law or human co-operation become possible." 

To examine this part of Spencer's system is to be- 
come convinced that independent thought is a prime 

^Principles of Sociology, Vol. I., pp. 84, 85. 



264 The Evolution of Knowledge 

necessity of social progress. Facts of development im- 
possible to understand as part of an individual's life 
become clear when viewed through the medium of ag- 
gregated social life. 

The belief that the order of nature is due to the will 
of an individual requiring propitiation, filled the mind 
of the primitive man. This belief in a personal ruler 
of the universe is an early stage of religious develop- 
ment and presides at the birth of every theory of 
existence. The study of sociology compares this prim- 
itive idea with higher types of intelligence. Ideas of 
the Animate and Inanimate — of Death and Eesurrec- 
tion — of Souls, Ghosts, Spirit? and Demons — of An- 
other Life, of Another World — of Supernatural Agents 
— Sacred Places, Temples — Altars — Praise — Prayer — 
Ancestor-worship — Idol and Fetich-worship — Animal, 
Plant and Nature-worship — Deities — these are the titles 
of the principal chapters of the "Data of Sociology." 
They constitute an intensely interesting account of the 
development of our conception of personal and of uni- 
versal authority. 

In the absence of a definite language, and, therefore, 
without recorded observations, the primitive man 
groped in utter darkness. Concerning the natural order 
of things, he was without a guide. Having no imple- 
ments to work with, thought produced only vagaries 
and phantasms. Ideas of supernatural beings sprang 
into existence, and as a consequence ancestor-worship 
appeared as the earliest stage of religious development. 

Faith in a surviving duplicate, or in a soul separate 
from the body, is almost universal among savages, and 
was the beginning of our theory of the immortality of 
the sonl. Those interested in the genesis of this belief 



The Principles of Sociology 265 

can trace it step by step through the course of the chap- 
ters above referred to. To the savage, who found his 
most powerful foe in his own species, the ghost-chief be- 
came the ideal of supreme power and consequently an 
object of worship. Civilized as well as savage men bow 
down to impersonations of power. The point to which I 
would call attention is that sentiency is the instrument 
by which all power is appreciated, and the development 
of this appreciation is identical with that of thought 
and language, or the art of generalization. 

In lower organisms, appreciation of power consists 
of the ebb and flow of physical existence. Before ex- 
periences are co-ordinated, by a complex nervous sys- 
tem, ideas are not formed. The apprehension of food, 
and the escape from danger are certainly appreciations 
of power; but there is a vast difference between these 
simple reflexes and the conception of an ultimate prin- 
ciple as the cause of all things. Likewise the percep- 
tion of universal order, — the greatest authority or 
power, — is an effort of sentiency immeasurably higher 
than the worship of a militant ancestor, a fetich, or a 
personal deity, 

Spencer reminds us that the x\frican negroes, when 
ill, go to the woods and cry for help to the spirits of their 
dead relatives, just as the Iranians, as told in the 
Khorda-Avesta, call upon the souls of their forefathers 
in prayer. The Indian or Veddah asks the ghosts of his 
relatives for aid when he goes hunting just as the 
Eomans prayed to their Lares for a happy termination 
to a projected voyage. It can be imagined with what 
force comparisons showing how our religious beliefs are 
evolved from prehistoric customs militate against modern 
superstitions. 



266 The Evolution of Knowledge 

The growth of language registers the progressive stages 
of social development. The philosophical student of the 
future will look upon our age as enigmatical. He will 
read with wonder of men who used the term God for an 
ideal of human form and feeling, and also for a uni- 
versal principle. We regard a society having no de- 
veloped mathematics as imable to form correct views of 
obscure phenomena. The student of the future will 
measure the intelligence of our age, — that is to say, 
our ability to discern principles, or to appreciate 
power, — by the standard of our language. He will find 
in the prevailing confusion in the use of general terms 
a fruitful source of injustice or misgovernment, because 
this confusion implies ignorance of ultimate relations. 

From the beginning of Spencer's writings the promise 
is held out of a scientific basis of ethics. As a step 
toward this great end our author builds up the science 
of sociology or his theory of society, showing that there 
can be no reliable definition of the true or of the good 
until mind and matter are unified. Those who believe 
that mind is one thing and matter another obstruct 
the path of spiritual progress, for they are unable to 
perceive the divine unity of existence. Strange as it 
may seem, these uncentered souls preside over our edu- 
cation. 

The great gap in our civilization, therefore, is not 
so much between science and religion as between science 
and dialectical philosophy, which trains our religious 
as well as our scientific teachers to believe, not in ulti- 
mate unity, but in a futile duality. This arbitrary sepa- 
ration of the physical and the spiritual impedes social 
progress by retarding the unification of knowledge. 

Sociology teaches that there is an aggregate human 



The Principles of Sociology 267 

life springing from the alternating competition and 
co-operation of individuals; and that the atmosphere of 
this life is language. The development of ideas, or, in 
other terms, the organization of words, is the most accu- 
rate measure of human progress, for it most profoundly 
affects each individual. Society has an interest in the 
meaning of words proportionate to the range of their 
significance. Our knowledge of authority or of govern- 
ment, therefore, depends ultimately upon our definitions 
of universals, for they are the most general principles of 
wsistence. 



CHAPTEK XIII 

George Henry Lewes 



The Principles of Psychology 



George Henry Lewes directed the best efforts of his 
life to researches in mental phenomena. He felt that 
there was no hope of understanding consciousness until 
the metaphysical problem was solved. To solve this 
most difficult of all problems is to show that mind and 
matter are forms of one ultimate principle. 

The philosophic system of Lewes bears the general 
name of Problems of Life and Mind. Two volumes are 
entitled Foundations of a Greed, and explain the nature 
of belief. The third volume deals with Mind as the 
Function of the Organism, and shows the identity of 
physical and mental energy. This volume constitutes 
an introduction to the posthumous works, entitled The 
Physical Basis of Mind, and The Study of Psychology. 

In the preface to the opening volume Lewes says : 

"In 1862 I began the investigation of the physio- 
logical mechanism of Feeling and Thought, and from 
that time forward have sought assistance in a wide range 
of research. Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Insanity 
and the Science of Language have supplied facts and 
suggestions. * * * The first result was such a 
mutual illumination from the various principles arrived 



The Principles of Psychology 269 

at separately, that I began to feel confident of having 
something like a clear vision of the fundamental induc- 
tions necessary to the constitution of Psychology. The 
second result, which was independent of the first, arose 
thus: Finding the exposition obstructed by the exist- 
ence of unsolved metaphysical problems, * * * ^^^ 
knowing that * * * the conceptions of Force, Cause, 
Matter and Mind, were vacillating and contradictory, I 
imagined that it would be practicable * * * at least 
to give such precise indications of the principles adopted 
throughout my exposition as would enable the reader 
to follow it untroubled by metaphysical difficulties."* 

Here then, at the very outset, the metaphysical dif- 
ficulty is encountered, but, as will later appear, instead 
of a positive a negative solution will be offered. 

In the opening of Lewes' argument the following sig- 
nificant quotation from Mill occurs: "England's think- 
ers are again beginning to see, what they had only tem- 
porarily forgotten, that the difficulties of Metaphysics 
lie at the root of all Science ; that those difficulties can be 
quieted only by being resolved, and that until they are 
resolved, positively whenever possible, but at any rate 
negatively, we are never assured that any knowledge, 
even physical, stands on solid foundations." Lewes was 
unable to offer a positive solution of the metaphysical 
problem because of his tentative acceptance of the theory 
of an unknowable, which implies a fundamental mys- 
tery. He was convinced, however, that both religion and 
science demand a positive solution of the problem of 
existence. In other terms, he held that so long as all 
avenues of research lead to mystery, it is impossible to 

*Probleins of Life and Mind, Vol. I., Preface. 



270 The Evolution of Knowledge 

unify knowledge. As will be shown, Lewes goes farther 
than any other writer, except, perhaps, Spencer, toward 
demonstrating the Tinity of knowledge. 

The deep conviction that both religion and science 
require a positive solution of the metaphysical problem 
Lewes expressed in the following impressive words : "As- 
suredly some mighty new birth is at hand. Not only do 
we see Physics on the eve of a reconstruction through 
Molecular Dynamics, we also see Metaphysics strangely 
agitated, and showing symptoms of a reawakened life. 
After a long period of neglect and contempt, its prob- 
lems are once more reasserting their claims. And what- 
ever we may think of those claims, we have only to re- 
flect on the important part played by Metaphysics in 
sustaining and developing religious conceptions, no less 
than in thwarting and misdirecting scientific concep- 
tions, to feel assured that before Eeligion and Science 
can be reconciled by the reduction of their principles to a 
common method, it will be necessary to transfer Meta- 
physics or to stamp it out of existence. There is but 
this alternative. At present Metaphysics is an obstacle 
in our path: it must be crushed into dust and our 
chariot-wheels must pass over it, or its forces of resist- 
ance must be converted into motive powers, and what is 
an obstacle become an impulse.'^* 

As previously demonstrated, the metaphysical problem 
or the question of existence resolves itself into that of 
motion. Lewes vainly endeavored to divide this problem 
into the soluble and the insoluble. The insoluble part 
of the metaphysical problem he denominated Metem- 
pirics, or beyond experience. Now this term means pre- 

*Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I., p. 4. 



The Principles of Psychology 271 

ciselj the same thing as metaphysics, for the physical is 
the world of sensible experience, and beyond sensible ex- 
perience is mental experience, which is the field of 
metaphysics. As explained in Chapter IX, there are 
many unsolved but no insoluble problems. All problems 
can be reduced to one final relation, in the objective and 
subjective terms of which will be found its solution. 

Those who examine the writings of Lewes will be- 
come convinced that consciousness is no longer a mys- 
tery. They will cease to regard the mind as an absolute 
entity, defying analysis, for Lewes demonstrates that 
consciousness is a phenomenon, or, in other terms, an 
individual expression of universal force. 

Lewes removes the term Cause from the list of ulti- 
mates by showing that it denotes one aspect of every 
phenomenon, the other being Effect. He thus bequeaths 
to our age five universals, namely. Space, Time, Matter, 
Force and Motion. Matter he proves to be indistin- 
guishable from space, because force in its deepest sense 
means motion ; and in its restricted sense means motion 
considered apart from its material or space aspect; or 
simply Time. These conclusions are not given in direct 
terms, but that they are fair inferences from the course 
of reasoning pursued by Lewes the reader will have an 
opportunity of judging. 

Although unable to refute it, Lewes instinctively op- 
posed the theory of an unknowable. "A traditional per- 
version,'^ says he, "makes the essence of a thing to con- 
sist in the relations of that thing to something * * 
unknowable, rather than in its relations to a known or 
knowable — i. e., assumes that the thing cannot &e what 
it is to us and other known things, but must be some- 
thing *in itself,' unrelated, or having quite other rela- 



272 The Evolution of Knowledge 

tions to other imknowable things. In this contempt of 
the actual in favor of the vaguely imagined possible, 
this neglect of reality in favor of a supposed deeper real- 
ity, this disregard of light in the search for a light 
behind the lights metaphysicians have been led to seek 
the 'thing-in-itself beyond the region of Experience."* 
Thus Lewes identifies the belief in an unknowable which 
is the root of all skepticism with the a priori philosophy, 
or the theory that all questions of phenomena are funda- 
mentally insoluble, there being no real knowledge of ex- 
ternal nature. 

"The initial condition of metaphysical inquiry," says 
Lewes, "is that of separating the insoluble from the 
soluble aspects of each problem — but the question ever)'^- 
where arises : What is insoluble ? There are problems 
which are recognized as insoluble because of their condi- 
tions. For example, it is impossible to extract the square 
root of a number which is not made by the multiplica- 
tion of any whole number or fraction by itself. To all 
eternity this must be impossible." 

Now there is no doubt of the impossibility of extract- 
ing the square root of a number not made by multiply- 
ing any whole number or fraction by itself, because the 
impossibility has been purposely imposed. If an object 
weighs one hundred pounds, the impossibility of its 
weighing two hundred pounds is a matter of construc- 
tion, it is the function of its weight, or, in other terms, 
of its conditions. This is all the impossibility and 
all the insolubility that exists in any question. No 
question rationally stated is impossible of solution, be- 
cause every question is a form of the ultimate relation 

*Prohlems of Life omd Mind, Vol. I,, pp. 58, 59. 



The Principles of Psychology 273 

and can be reduced to its simplest terms. Hence, there 
are no insoluble, there are only unsolved questions. 

Following this attempt at a metaphysical analysis 
are the chapters on the Principles of Psychology. In the 
opening chapter, Lewes says, that it would be premature 
to attempt a systematic treatise on Psychology, as there 
are still unsolved biological and metaphysical questions 
which it is necessary first to settle. In short, Lewes, who, 
on account of his great generalizing power and his fa- 
miliarity with the structural and functional aspects of 
thought, was perhaps the best equipped man of his time 
to deal with the problems of Psychology, frankly ad- 
mitted that the most important materials for the under- 
taking were lacking. He begins a "sketch of the pro- 
gramme of Psychology," with the reminder that Man is 
not simply an Animal Organism, but is also a unit in 
the Social Organism. He reminds us that Psychology 
occupies itself with the study of Consciousness : beyond 
this fact it is not obliged to look. This means that the 
psychologist feels no obligation to account for conscious- 
ness, although it is from this fact that he evolves his 
science. The psychologist regards mind ; the mathema- 
tician regards motion ; the physicist, force, and the biol- 
ogist, life, as the ultimate fact in their respective fields 
of inquiry; but, according to Lewes, these scientists 
feel no necessity of affiliating this ultimate with uni- 
versal change. 

It is scarcely necessary to say that, although the 
mathematician may profess indifference as to the mean- 
ing of motion, and although the physicists may make 
no attempt to define force, or the biologists life, all 
this indifference is assumed. The last fact in each field 
of inquiry should be understood, that is to say, should 



274 The Evolution of Knowledge 

be correlated with the ultimate reality. Nothing can 
exceed in importance this unification of knowledge, for 
it has the power of illuminating all research. 

Psychology has no firm ground to stand on until 
mind and matter are reduced to a single principle. It 
is now well known that there can be no function without 
structure, which means that mind is a part of nature. 
The relation called gravitation, suggesting activities 
which are infinite, those relatively constant types of 
energy known as the chemical elements, the adjustments 
of organism and environment, including the develop- 
ment of feeling and thought from lower forms of life, — 
this vast plexus of conditions must be correlated before 
we can perceive the meaning of consciousness. Thus 
intelligence is taxed to its uttermost to comprehend its 
own nature, but it is finally persuaded that its functions 
and structures are an inseparable part of the universal 
economy. 

It will be found that "The Programme of Psychology" 
as presented by Lewes is of commanding interest. Al- 
though the mind is an evolution of nature, it cannot 
be fully accounted for by a biological analysis, because 
both thought and feeling are more than the activity 
of a personal organism. The ordinary meaning of "per- 
son" must be greatly extended before it can be made 
to include all the phenomena of the intellect as well as 
of the emotions. The psychologist is aware that feeling 
is the source of thought, and that it is also the activity 
of a personal organism, but he is at a loss to explain 
the development of the one into the other without first 
comprehending the nature of language, that medium 
through which individuals of various times and places 
are brought into permanent relationship. Now thei 



The Principles of Psychology 275 

study of the relationship of individuals is known as so- 
ciology, an inquiry made possible by the evolution of 
language. Thus language accounts for the development 
of the life of the family into that of society. Words and 
sentences constitute the psychoplasm from which the in- 
dividual draws its sustenance, bringing it into relation 
with its surroundings. To understand the structures 
and functions of mind, therefore, it is necessary to 
resolve consciousness into its biological and its sociolog- 
ical factors, and from the isolated views thus obtained 
to reconstruct a symmetrical whole. If the biological 
factors of consciousness offer only a partial explanation 
of mind, they at least supply us with the fundamental 
conditions of its theory. Of these substructures of the 
intellect Lewes says : 

"Theoretically taking the organism to pieces to understand 
its separate parts, we fall into the error of supposing that the 
organism is a mere assemblage of organs, like a machine which 
is put together by juxtaposition of different parts. But this is 
radically to misunderstand its essential nature and the uni- 
versal solidarity of its parts. The organism is not made, not 
put together, but evolved; its parts are not juxtaposed, but 
differentiated; its organs are groups of minor organisms, all 
sharing in a common life, i. e., all sharing in a common sub- 
stance constructed through a common process of simultaneous 
and continuous molecular composition and decomposition ; pre- 
cisely as the great Social Organism is a group of societies, each 
of which is a group of families, all sharing in a common life — 
every family having at once its individual independence and its 
social dependence through connection with every other. In a 
machine, the parts are all different, and have mechanical 
significance olily in relation to the whole. In an organism, 
the parts are all identical in fundamental characters and 
diverse only in their superadded differentiations: each has its 
independence, although all co-operate. The synthetical point 
of view, which should never drop out of sight, however the 



^^6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

necessities of investigation may throw us upon analysis, is well 
expressed by Aristotle somewhere to the effect that all col- 
lective life depends on the separation of offices and the con- 
currence of efforts. In a vital organism, every force is the 
resultant of all the forces; it is a disturbance of equilibrium, 
and equilibrium is the equivalence of convergent forces. When 
we speak of Intelligence as a force which determines actions, 
we ought always to bear in mind that the efficacy of Intelli- 
gence depends on the organs which co-operate and are deter- 
mined: it is not pure Thought which moves a muscle, neither 
is it the abstraction Contractility, but the muscle which moves 
a limb."* 

The crisis of the argument then comes in these words : 
"That Life is Change, and that Consciousness is Change, 
has always been affirmed. It remains only to add that 
the changes are serial, and convergent through a con- 
sensus determined hy essential communiti/ of struc- 
ture."^ Thus Lewes reveals the identity of physical 
and mental function by pointing out the community of 
physical and mental structure. 

The aim of Psychology is to show that mental 
life is a part of nature. Tennyson's idea that "The 
thoughts of men are widened by the process of the 
suns'' means that body and mind are inseparable parts 
of the cosmos. To express this truth in the simplest 
terms, organic movements, which include all mental 
phenomena, are distinguished from inorganic move- 
ments only by their higher complexity. 

Biology follows the development of organisms from 
the monad to the man, and also from the germ to the 
adult in each type. This science, however, confines it- 
self to the individual and its physical medium. The 
psychical medium of each organism is language, the 

*Prohlems of Life and Mind, Vol. I., pp. 103-105. 
f Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I., p. 113, 



The Principles of Psychology 277 

most potent of all structural developments, because it 
brings individual minds into communication. Biology 
investigates the relation of the organism and its phys- 
ical medium; psychology the relation of the organism 
and its mental medium. The primary law of biology 
is that "Every vital phenomenon is the product of the 
two factors, the Organism and its Medium." The 
primary law of psychology is that "Every mental phe- 
nomenon is the product of the two factors, subject and 
object/' ISTow it is to be observed that these two sets of 
terms are in the deepest sense identical. They are dis- 
tinguishable only relatively, as are mind and matter. 

Thus biology and psychology are reciprocal. They in- 
vestigate respectively the physical and the mental 
aspects of life showing that the relation of the indi- 
vidual and its environment is only another name for 
that of subject and object. "Modern psychology," says 
Lewes, "replaces the old dualism in which subject and 
object were two independent and unallied existences, 
by a Monism, in which only one existence, under dif- 
ferent forms, is conceived. The old conception was of 
life in conflict with the external; the new conception 
recognizes their identity, and founds this recognition 
on the demonstrable fact that external forces instead of 
tending to destroy Life (according to Bichat's view), 
are the very materials out of which Life emerges, and by 
which it is sustained and developed."* 

Lewes reminds us, however, that a complete psychology 
is impossible "until there is something like a general 
agreement concerning many questions of fundamental 
importance, these being partly biological and partly 
metaphysical." 

^Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I., p. 113, 



278 The Evolution of Knowledge 

It is to be observed that all biological and meta- 
physical questions can be solved by the unification of 
mind and matter or of subject and object. This unifica- 
tion depends upon our ability to prove that both subject 
and object occupy space as well as time, a proof that can 
be reached only by an analysis of our ideas of space and 
time. In order to see the connection between time and 
the subjective, and between space and the objective 
aspect of existence, it is necessary to observe that the 
subject occupies space, and, therefore, has space rela- 
tions; and that the object occupies time, and, therefore, 
has time relations. The idea of space is generated by at- 
tending to co-existence or existences considered simul- 
taneously (or apart from time). The idea of time is 
generated by considering sequence, or a serial existence 
as distinguished from all other existences (or apart 
from space). It is clear that the only existence we can 
realize apart from all other existences, is our own; but 
we must remember that to each individual the power 
that others have of being conscious is a part of objective 
nature, only relatively separable from the cosmos. 

Thus we get an idea of how the primordial notions of 
time and space, the most abstract forms of subject and 
object, are formed. In forming this dual idea, how- 
ever, we have been employing symbols, or language, that 
medium which brings individuals into communication. 

Language springs from the attempt to compare and 
to communicate images. Upon this subject Lewes 
says : "It was perfectly clear that in imagination 
must be sought the first impulse toward explanation; 
and, therefore, all primitive explanations are so 
markedly imaginative. Images being the subjective or 
ideal form of Sensation, the Logic (or sequence) of 



The Principles of Psychology 279 

Images is the first stage of intellectual activity ; and is, 
therefore, predominant in the early history of indi- 
viduals and of nations. The first attempt to explain, a 
phenomenon must be to combine the images of past sen- 
sations with the sensations now felt, so as to form a 
series. In the next stage, words, representatives of ab- 
stractions (of experience), take the places of both 
images and objects. Thus the Logic of Signs (or lan- 
guage) replaces the Logic of Images, as the Logic of 
Images replaces the Logic of Sensation."* By means of 
images or symbols, therefore, that higher medium called 
language is formed. In every sentence subject and ob- 
ject unite in the verb, which is the symbol of action or 
being, and separate as its aspects, time and space. Thus 
mind and matter are the unity and the variety of na- 
ture, the subjective and objective terms of the universal 
relation. 

^Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I., p. 155. 



CHAPTER XIV 

George Henry Lewes 
(Continued) 



Experience and Belief 



Such is the continuity of mind that those apparently 
widely separate phases of consciousness known as ex- 
perience and belief can be shown to have the same ulti- 
mate meaning; that is to say, they are both forms of 
feeling and therefore of universal change. 

"The absolute," says Lewes, "is known to us in feel- 
ing which in its most abstract expression is change." 
Not only are experience and belief interdependent forms 
of this ultimate relation, but the problem of proof 
or of reality which is at the very basis of psychology 
can be reduced to that of motion. 

No philosophical question is more often agitated, 
than the nature of belief. It is generally supposed 
that credence is voluntary, or, in other words, that con- 
viction is given or witheld at will, but there is no greater 
delusion, for as will later appear, belief is determined 
by influences far beyond our control. We imagine that 
faith is free because it is an evolution of feeling, and 
that the will is free because it springs from the same 
source. We have only to realize that by far the greater 
part of our intellectual activities are unconscious to 



Experience and Belief 2S1 

become convinced that opinions are formed of their 
own accord. 

Belief is never at rest. Though the movements are 
at times imperceptible, conviction rises and falls with 
the tide of investigation and verification. The only be- 
lief that is unchangeable is that of change itself. 

Belief is the voice of experience; or a result of the 
actions and reactions of individual and environment. 
To comprehend how it is formed, we must learn to 
afiiliate our experiences with universal energy; that is 
to say, we must reduce to their prime factors those 
organic actions and reactions from which both feeling 
and thought are evolved. 

Every influence affecting the organism, whether 
exerted during life, or throughout that vast series of 
lives leading up to each individual, is in the deepest 
sense a factor of mind, and, therefore, of belief. If 
experiences were always conscious, we could easily dis- 
cern their origin, but only an infinitesimal part of them 
are sufficiently centralized to constitute attention. Con- 
sciousness is an equilibrium moving over the sentient 
deep. The waves of sentiency are forms of universal 
force. 

For the same reason that there is no ultimate dif- 
ference between matter and force, there is none between 
body and mind, — terms which represent respectively the 
structural and functional aspects of the sensorium. 
There is no more direct way of gaining a comprehension 
of the nature of experience and belief than by following 
the investigations of Lewes in neural phenomena, be- 
cause they identify the activities of body and mind. 

As explained in the previous chapter, the funda- 
mental question of psychology is that of subject and 



282 The Evolution of Knowledge 

object. To correlate these opposite aspects of exist- 
ence is to unify knowledge. 

"We cannot" says Lewis, stir a step in the exposition 
of subject and object without presupposing to be already 
settled fundamental questions which are still under discussion. 
No explanation can be given of matter which does not involve 
a conception of force.'' 

What Lewes means by the above is that we cannot 
explain consciousness until we perceive that the matter 
and force of mind are identical with matter and force 
in general. 

"The main question," continues Lewes, "must remain nebul- 
ous so long as we are without a precise definition of Experience. 
The term is very variously and very laxly used. I have defined 
it as 'the Registration of Feeling.' And what is Feeling? It 
is the reaction of the sentient Organism under stimulus. 
Observe, it is not the reaction of an organ, but of the Organism 
— a most important distinction, and rarely recognized. 

"Tlie response of a sensory organ * * * is not an 
experience, unless it be registered in a modification of 
structure, alid thus be revivable, because a statical condition is 
requisite for a dynamical manifestation. Rigorously speak- 
ing, of course, there is no body that can be acted on without 
being modified; every sunbeam that beats against the wall 
alters the structure of that wall; every breath of air that 
cools the brow alters the state of the organism. But such 
minute alterations are inappreciable for the most part by any 
means in our possession, and are not here taken into accoimt. 
because, being annulled by subsequent alterations, they do not 
become registered in the structure. We see many sights, read 
many books, hear many wise remarks; but, although each of 
these has insensibly affected us, changed our mental structures, 
so that 'we are a part of all that we have met,' yet the 
registered result, the residuum, has perhaps been very small. 
While, therefore, no excitation of Feeling is really without 
some corresponding modification of Structure, it is only the 



Experience and Belief 283 

excitations which produce lasting modifications that can be 
included under Experience. A feeling passed away and in- 
capable of revival, would never be called an experience by any 
strict writer. But the feelings registered are psycho- statical 
elements, so that henceforward when the organism is stimu- 
lated it must react along these lines, and the product will be a 
feeling more or less resembling the feeling formerly excited."* 

Hence the organism as a whole responds to each 
stimulus and if the response can be revived, however, 
faintly, it can be regarded as an experience, because it 
has educated or modified, or as the psychologists would 
say, it can be remembered. Observe, however, that in 
the deepest sense, all the modifications of an organism, 
and hence all the activities of that organism, whether 
conscious or unconscious, belong directly or indirectly 
to the sum of its experiences and its beliefs. 

"Mind," says Lewes, "is commonly spoken of in oblivion of the 
fact that it is an abstract term expressing the sum of mental 
phenomena. As an abstraction, it comes to be regarded in the 
light of an entity, or separate source of the phenomena which 
constitute it. In like manner a thought, which as a product la 
simply an emhodied process, comes to be regarded in the light 
of something distinct from the process; and thus two aspects 
of one and the same phenomenon are held to be two distinct 
phenomena. Because we abstract the material of an object 
from its form, considering each apart, we get into the habit 
of treating form as if it were in reality separable from ma- 
terial. By a similar illusion we come to regard the process 
(of thinking) apart from the product (thought), and, gen- 
eralizing the process, we call it Mind, or Intellect, which then 
means no longer the mental phenomena condensed into a term, 
but the source of these phenomena. * * * 

"It is experiment and verification which convince us that the 
air is a material object capable of being weighed and measured. 

*Problem,s of Life and Mind, Vol. I., p. 188, 



284 The Evolution of Knowledge 

It is experiment and verification which convince us that thought 
18 an embodied process, which has its conditions in the history 
of the race no less than in that of the individual."* 

The prevailing method of teaching psychology is 
dwelt upon with no little scorn by Lewes. Everything, 
says this author, is prepared in advance for the student. 
The physical activities are carefully demarcated from 
the mental. These demarcations are more than ana- 
lytical; they are made to appear fixed, if not absolute, 
and they are never removed in order to aSord a syn- 
thetic view of the operations of the sensorium as a 
whole. 

In the analysis of feeling, thought and action given 
in a previous chapter, the artificiality of the distinc- 
tions made between the different phases of nervous ac- 
tion was pointed out. The idea that mind means some- 
thing wholly different from body has become so prev- 
alent that, until the futility of the distinction is ex- 
posed, too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the error. 
For instance, some psychologists believe that the cere- 
bral hemispheres are the seat of combination for all 
the senses. That is to say, all the co-ordinations of sense 
resulting in consciousness are believed to take place 
in the brain. It is said that only in these brain struct- 
ures are sensations transformed into thoughts. 

"The cerebral hemispheres," says Lewes, "considered as 
organs, are similar in structure and properties to the other 
nerve-centres; the laws of sensibility are common to both; 
(and) the processes are alike in both; in a word, the Brain 
is only one organ ( a supremely important one ! ) in a complex 
of organs, whose united activities are necessary for the 
phenomena called mental. * * * The assignment of even 

^Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I., pp. 193, 195. 



Experience and Belief 285 

Thinking (exclusively) to the cerebral hemispheres is purely 
hypothetical. Whatever may be the evidence on which it rests, 
it must still be acknowledged to be an hypothesis awaiting 
verification. This may seem incredible to some readers, accus- 
tomed to expositions which do not suggest a doubt — expositions 
where the course of an inexpression is described as progressing, 
from the sensitive surface along the sensory nerve to its gang- 
lion, from thence to a particular spot in the Optic Thalamus 
(where the impression is said to become a sensation), from 
that spot to cells in the upper layer of the cerebral convolu- 
tions (where the sensation becomes an idea), from thence 
downward to a lower layer of cells (where the idea is changed 
into a volitional impulse ) , and from thence to the motor-gang- 
lia in the spinal cord, where it is reflected on the motor-nerves 
and muscles. 

"Nothing is wanting to the precision of this description. 
Everything is wanting to its proof. The reader might sup- 
pose that the course had been followed step by step, at least, as 
the trajectory of a cannon-ball, or the path of a planet is fol- 
lowed: and that where actual observation is at fault, cal- 
culation is ready to fill up the gap. Yet what is the fact? It 
is that not a single step of this involved process has ever 
been observed; the description is imaginary from beginning 
to end."* 

Lewes does not question the fact that the grey matter 
of the brain performs by far the greater part of the work 
known as thought. Since the composition of the grey 
matter indicates that it contains the highest molecular 
multiples, competent authorities now agree that the 
mind is that part of the sensorium capable of the 
greatest molecular activity. What Lewes would em- 
phasize is the solidarity or interdependence of the whole 
nervous system. Evidence is yet to be adduced that 
any part of the sensorium is exempt from participation 
in the operation known as thought. In "The Physical 

*Problems of Life and Mind, 3rd Series, p. 65, 



286 The Evolution of Knowledge 

Basis of Mind'^ Lewes shows that after the brain of a 
certain animal has been removed, sensations, emotions, 
instincts, and even volitions are manifested. Hence it 
is impossible to sustain the theory that the brain is the 
exclusive seat of either feeling or thought. Since all 
the operations of the mind are from moment to moment 
dependent upon physical conditions, every activity of 
the organism is a more or less direct factor of conscious- 
ness. Not only are mental aberrations traceable to 
functional disorders, but all moral derelictions can be 
shown to be the consequence of abnormal conditions. 
No tissue or organ of the body is without influence in 
its intellectual and, therefore, in its moral determina- 
tions. 

Although not the sole organ of mind, the brain 
is by far the most important one. "We must," says 
Lewes, "no longer isolate the cerebrum from the rest 
of the nervous system, assigning it as the exclusive seat 
of sensation, nor suppose that it has laws of grouping 
which are not at work in the other centres. * * * The 
soul is a history, and its activities the product of that 
history. Each mental state is a state of the whole sen- 
sorium; one stroke sets the whole vibrating."* 

In the widest sense, therefore, the sensorium is the 
whole living organism. So delicately are its many parts 
adjusted that all vibrate to every stimulus. Although 
various combinations of nerve fibrils, fibres, and cells 
form nerve and ganglia, and as such are easily dis- 
tinguishable, still, considered as a whole, the nervous 
system has no absolute demarcations from the organism. 
As it is impossible to determine where nerve ends and 

*Problems of Life and Mind, 3rd Series, pp. 69, 71, 102. 



Experience and Belief 287 

muscle begins, so it is impossible to isolate nervous from 
physical excitement. In this connection Spencer says, 
"that throughout the entire fabric of Mind, the method 
of composition remains the same from the formation 
of its simplest feeling up to the formation of those im- 
mense and complex aggregates of feelings characteriz- 
ing its highest developments/'* 

From a functional point of view, therefore, the sen- 
sorium is that part of the organism capable of the great- 
est molecular activity, which definition, as above in- 
dicated, is also applicable to mind. Hence when we 
trace the development of the nervous system from rudi- 
mentary forms of life to the highest types it becomes 
manifest that the progress of thought is identical with 
that of physical organization. 

In explaining reflex action, the attempt is often 
made to isolate the nervous arc from the rest of the 
system; or, in other terms, to demarcate reflex action 
from its surrounding states. The discovery that in 
certain animals, after the removal of the brain, co-or- 
dinated movements take place in the extremities, in- 
dicates that co-ordinations do not originate in the brain. 
In fact, "when isolated from the organism, no single 
organ has a function at all." This principle, differently 
expressed, is that no activity, whether physical or mental, 
can be separated (otherwise than ideally) from the 
complex of activities known as individual life. 

"The brain," says Lewes, "is simply one element 
in a complex mechanism, each part of which is a com- 
ponent of the Sensorium or Sentient Ego. We may 
consider the several elements as forming a plexus of 

*Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., p. 184, 



288 The Evolution of Knowledge 



&^ 



sensibilities, the solidarity of which is such that while 
each in a particular way may be stimulated separately, 
no one of them can be active without involving the 

activity of all the others Hence, when we 

reduce the abstract term Mind to its concretes, name- 
ly, states of the sentient mechanism, the 'power of 
the Mind' simply means the stimulative and regulative 
processes which ensue on sentient excitation. We may 
now formulate a conclusion : Sensibility is the special 
property of the nervous tissue. Every bit of that tissue 
is sensitive in so far that it is capable of entering as a 
sensible component into a group the resultant of which 
is a feeling — i. e., a change in the state of the sentient 
organism. The Sensorium is the whole which reacts on 
the stimulation of any particular portion of the whole"* 
Now this generalization of Lewes brings into view the 
vast mechanism of thought and feeling acting and re- 
acting with the unity and the variety characteristic of 
nature. 

The aversion to the theory that all intellectual and 
moral activities are governed by mechanical laws is the 
result of a cramped and inadequate idea of the char- 
acter and extent of mechanics. For instance, the most 
devout person would not object to the assertion that all 
the activities of nature, from the evolutions of the 
heavenly spheres to the life of plants and animals, are 
guided by the hand of God, and that this same guidance 
is manifested in every feeling and thought. And yet 
these words may be interpreted as meaning that Mo- 
tion is the ultimate fact in all phenomena, whether 
subjective or objective, uniting mind and matter, or 
consciousness and nature. 

^Problems of Life and Mind, 3rd Series, pp. 77, 82. 



Experience and Belief 289 

Lewes fixed upon feeling as the ultimate of experi- 
ence, and upon experience as the ultimate of belief. 
Thus he expanded the meaning of feeling so as to in- 
clude on the one hand sensation, and upon the other 
thought. In their most abstract form experience and 
belief are changes in the sentient mechanism. This 
idea Lewes expressed as clearly as was possible without 
employing the instrument of an ultimate analysis. It 
can be seen from his argument on the "Principles of 
Certitude" that he practically rejected the unknowable 
in favor of the unknown. By rejecting the theory of 
an unknowable, he has shown that experience is infinite, 
or that the conscious and the unconscious are only op- 
posite views of universal energy. 

The Greeks evolved the science of logic from analogy, 
the moderns from identity. In the deepest sense these 
methods are one, for of all analogies the simplest is the 
identity of subject and object, or of space and time, the 
opposite aspects of the ultimate relation. Thus the 
terms of all equations can be reduced to the subjective 
and the objective aspects of motion. 

According to Lewes, "Truth is the equivalence of the 
terms of a proposition; and the equivalence is tested 
by the reduction of the terms to an identical proposi- 
tion."* Is it not clear that this "identical proposition" 
is the ultimate generalization? Spencer said that the 
final test of truth is indirect or negative; by which 
he meant that the ultimate of proof is that equilibrium 
expressed in our inability to doubt. Instead of being 
a conscious determination, therefore, belief is for the 
most part involuntary. Our opinions are formed of 

* Problems of Life and Mind, 1st Series, p. 78. 



290 The Evolution of Knowledge 

their own accord. Belief, or the satisfaction of doubt, 
is simply the balance of internal and external forces 
through the medium of language, a balance formed for 
the most part without our consent. 

"All knowledge,'' says Lewes, "begins with the dis- 
cernment of resemblances and differences; it is neces- 
sarily polar, resemblance being impossible except on a 
background of difference, and difference being impos- 
sible except on a background of resemblance. While 
knowledge begins here, it ends with the equation. The 
resemblances abstracted from all accompanying differ- 
ences, and reduced to the identity of equivalence."* 

Prom the foregoing it can be seen that consciousness 
is the evolution of identity from difference; of unity 
from variety, or of subject from object. 

The wonder concerning Lewes' philosophy is, that he 
could have been so explicit in identifying the matter and 
force of mind with matter and force in general, declar- 
ing them to be aspects of motion, and yet that he should 
never have hit upon the idea of identifying space with 
matter and time with force, thus bringing the most gen- 
eral terms of existence into interdependence. This won- 
der increases as we read such luminous definitions of 
Motion as the following: "Here arises a complication 
which will beset the whole discussion unless we form dis- 
tinct ideas of the separation of matter and force as a 
purely analytical artifice. The two abstractions are but 
two aspects of the same thing; a separation rendered 
inevitable by the polarity of Experience, which every- 
where presents Existence under passive and active as- 
pects. Force is not something superadded to Matter, 

*Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. II., pp. 79, 81, 83. 



Experience and Belief 291 

it is Eeals viewed in their dynamic aspect; Matter is 
not something different from Force, but Eeals viewed 
in their statical or passive aspect; either is unthinJcahle 
without the other. Force is immanent in Matter, and 
Matter is immanent in Force. The schoolmen called 
Matter potentia passiva, and Force virtus activa." Only 
logically can they be considered apart.* 

Here Lewes clearly recognized that Motion is the 
union of the dynamical and the statical aspects of 
nature, or the one relation of which time and space 
are respectively the subjective and the objective terms. 
Although the most advanced physicists recognize this 
principle of the universality of Motion, they are far 
from rendering it in simple and concise language. 
Thus we read in the well-known work of Thomson and 
Tait : "We cannot, of course, give a definition of matter 
which will satisfy the metaphysician, but the natura- 
list may be content to know matter as that which can be 
perceived hy the senses, or as that which can he acted 
upon hy or can exert force. The latter, and indeed the 
former also, of these definitions involves the idea of 
Force/'t 

In the treatise of Lewes on the Nature of Matter, 
in Problem IV., we have an example of the lengths 
to which these discussions are carried. Here the ex- 
tension, impenetrability, infinite divisibility, indestruc- 
tibility, gravity, and inertia of matter are considered, 
the one definite conclusion arrived at being that matter 
is the symbol of all objectivity, which is equivalent to 

*Pro'blems of Life and Mind, Vol. II., p. 206. 

•j- Thomson and Tait: Natural Philosophy, Vol. I., p. 161. 



^g2 The Evolution of Knowledge 

its identification, first, with extension, or space, and, 
finally, with motion. 

Problem V. is entitled "Force and Cause," and VI. 
"The Absolute in the Correlations of Feeling and Mo- 
tion." The former shows conclusively that Cause and 
Effect are the opposite views of every phenomenon, 
and therefore imply each other. 

In closing Problem VI., we find Lewes again tri- 
umphant over all difficulties. After many failures he 
at last reaches the universal principle, enabling us to 
overlook the futile attempts of previous chapters to co- 
ordinate universals. Although failing to perform this 
last analysis by showing the relationship of ultimate 
terms, by another route, he arrives at the same result. 
Witness the closing words of Problem VI., which is 
without doubt the best attem_pt thus far made to de- 
scribe thought without the aid of that most fundamental 
of all experiences and beliefs, our consciousness of ex- 
istence as the ultimate generalization. 

"Existence" — the Absolute — is known to us in feeling, which 
in its most abstract expression is Change, external and inter- 
nal. The external changes are symbolized as motion, because 
that is the mode of Feeling into which all others are translated 
when objectively considered; objective consideration being the 
attitude of looking at the phenomena, whereas subjective con- 
sideration is the attitude of any other sensible response, so 
that the phenomena are different to the different senses. There 
is no real break in the continuity of Existence; all its modes 
are but differentiations. We cannot suppose the physical 
organism and its functions to be other than integrant parts 
of the Cosmos from which it is formally differentiated; nor 
can we suppose the psychical organism and its functions to be 
other than integrant parts of this physical organism from 
which it is ideally separated. Out of the infinite modes of 
Existence a group is segregated, and a planet assumes individ- 



Experience and Belief 293 

ual form; out of the infinite modes of this planetary existence 
smaller groups are segregated in crystals, organisms, societies, 
nations. Each group is a special system, having forces pecu- 
liar to it, although in unbroken continuity with the forces of 
all other systems. Out of the forces of the animal organism 
a special group is segregated in the nervous mechanism, which 
has its own laws. If ideally we contrast any two of these 
groups- — a planet with an organism, or an organism with a 
nervous mechanism — their great unlikeness seems to forbid 
identification. They are indeed different, but only because 
they have been differentiated. Yet they are identical, under a 
more general aspect. In like manner, if we contrast the world 
of Sensation and Appetites with the world of Conscience and 
its Moral Ideals, the unlikeness is striking. Yet we have 
every ground for believing that Conscience is evolved from 
Sensation, and that Moral Ideals are evolved from Appetites; 
and thus we connect the highest mental phenomena with vital 
Sensibility, Sensibility with molecular changes in the organism, 
and these with changes in the Cosmos. 

"This unification of all the modes of Existence by no means 
obliterates the distinction of modes, nor the necessity of un- 
derstanding the special characters of each. Mind remains 
Mind, and is essentially opposed to Matter, in spite of their 
identity in the Absolute; just as Pain is not Pleasure, nor 
Color either Heat or Taste, in spite of their identity in Feeling. 
The logical distinctions represent real differentiations, but not 
distinct existents. If we recognize the One in the many, we 
do not thereby refuse to admit the Many in the One."* 

Here the term absolute (or time) is used in the place 
of motion or the ultimate reality, but the unity of the 
argument rises above this verbal defect. The idea 
which Lewes seeks to convey is that the most general 
terms of life and mind are modes of a single prin- 
ciple, to which they bear a definite and comprehen- 
sible relation. 

*Prohlems of Life and Mind, Vol. II., pp. 449, 451. 



CHAPTER XV 

George Henry Lewes 

(Concluded) 



The Unity of Mind and Matter 



The remaining three volumes of Lewes' system were 
written not in the attempt to find an ultimate analysis, 
but as a treatise upon physiological Psychology, They 
contain little, therefore, that is strictly metaphysical- 
The first is entitled the '"'Physical Basis of Mind," 
and presents the following problems: "The Nature 
of Life;" "The Nervous Mechanism;" "Animal Au- 
tomatism," and "The Eeflex Theory." The second 
deals with the problems: "Mind as a Function of the 
Organism;" "The Sphere of Sense and the Logic of 
Feeling;" "The Sphere of Intellect and the Logic of 
Signs," and the last is the brief work entitled "The 
Study of Psychology." 

Those who look deeply into organic life find it dif- 
ficult to avoid the theory of a design in nature. The 
form of imagery, known as design, is so closely asso- 
ciated with all human effort that we are apt to attribute 
it to the efforts of nature. 

As a rule, the theory of design has been adopted by 
zoologists. Thus Von Baer, in his great work, has 
a section entitled "The Nature of the Animal Deter- 



The Unity of Mind and Matter 295 

mines its Development." This author affirms that every 
stage in development is made possible by its pre- 
existing condition, but nevertheless the entire devel- 
opment is determined by the nature of the animal 
which is about to be. As will appear by reference to his 
work when he uses the term nature Von Baer means 
an absolute or immutable type. "The form which this 
superstition generally takes," says Lewes, "is the be- 
lief that an organism is determined by its type, or, as 
the Germans say, its idea. All its parts take shape ac- 
cording to this ruling plan; consequently, when any 
part is removed, it is reproduced according to the idea 
of the whole of which it forms a part. 

"At first the Type or Idea was regarded as an object- 
ive reality, external to the organism that it was sup- 
posed to rule. Later on this notion was replaced by 
an approach to the more rational interpretation, that 
is to say, the Idea was made an internal, not an ex- 
ternal, force, and was incorporated with the material 
elements of the organism, which were said to 'en- 
deavor* to arrange themselves according to the Type. 
Thus Treveranus declares that the seed "dreams of 
the future flower." 

Lewes characterizes this theory as "eminently meta- 
physical" (superstitious), because, as he says, it refuses 
to acknowledge the operation of immanent properties, 
— refuses to admit that the harmony of a complex struc- 
ture results from the mutual and natural relations of 
its parts, and seeks outside the organism for some mys- 
terious force, some plan, not otherwise specified, which 
regulates and shapes the parts. The meta-physiologists 
admit "that every separate stage in development is the 
necessary sequence of its predecessor, but declare never- 



296 The Evolution of Knowledge 

theless that the whole of the stages are independent of 
such relations and inherent properties." 

By attacking the "superstition of the nerve-cell," 
that theory of peculiar vital forces "wholly unallied 
with the primary energy of motion/' Lewes illumi- 
nates the whole subject of organic development. He 
points out the relation existing between the high 
molecular complexity of protoplasm, and the less com- 
plex structure of inorganic substances. He maintains 
that the difference in the activities of the two classes 
of substances represents their degrees of structural 
complexity. So far-reaching are its consequences that 
this generalization is not readily appreciated. 

Natural selection operates through assimilation and 
reproduction, and is, therefore, necessarily associated 
with the emotions, but this force reaches far beyond the 
emotions, to chemical and to cosmical attractions. In 
fact, all organic development is a selection operating 
along lines of least resistance. The struggle for exist- 
ence or the competition and antagonism of organisms 
extends to the "competition and antagonism" of tissues 
and organs for existence. The potentialities of tissues 
and organs is, therefore, inherent in their chemical and 
cosmic conditions. That is to say, cosmic or universal 
force is expressed in chemical energy, which in turn 
expressesitself in organic as well as in super-organic life. 

'When a crystalline solution takes shape,'' says 
Lewes, "it always takes a definite shape, which repre- 
sents what may be called the direction of its forces, 
the polarity of its constituent molecules. In like 
manner when an organic plasmode takes shape — crystal- 
izes, so to speak — it always assumes a specific shape de- 
pendent on the polarity of its molecules. Crystallog- 



The Unity of Mind and Matter 297 

raphers have determined the several forms possible 
to crystals; histologists have recorded the several 
forms of Organites, Tissues, and Organs. Owing to 
the greater variety in elementary composition, there is 
in organic substance a more various polar distribution 
than in crystals; nevertheless there are sharply de- 
fined limits never over-stepped, and these constitute 
what may be called the specific forms of Organites, 
Tissues, Organs, Organisms." * 

As held by the extreme school, the theory of the origin 
of living things is that all animal life has descended 
from a single organic point, and that the subsequent 
differences are the result of modifications in the en- 
vironment, resulting in differences in the descendants 
of this first organism. The less extreme school holds 
that (to use Darwin's words) "animals have descended 
from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants 
from an equal or less number." 

In examining both of these positions, Lewes asks for 
a more thorough analysis of the facts than is given by 
either school. He held Darwin in affectionate rever- 
ence, and regarded his great work as indispensable, 
inasmuch as it gave the first adequate presentation of 
that aspect of organic development now known as Nat- 
ural Selection. Lewes shows, however, that the Darwin- 
ian theory accounts for only a part of the facts. Strik- 
ing as are the points of resemblance between plants 
and animals, the differences are irreconcilable with a 
theory of common descent from a single cell at a single 
point upon the earth's surface. Throughout all stages 
of its past metamorphosis, the proportion of the prin- 

'* Physical Basis of Mind, pp. loi to 125, 



298 The Evolution of Knowledge 

cipal organic elements on the earth's surface has been 
relatively constant. There is no reason to doubt, there- 
fore, that the beginnings of terrestrial life were both 
wide-spread and multifarious. The kinship of the inor- 
ganic and the organic is a fact quite as remarkable as 
that of the plant and the animal kingdoms. Surely 
the evolution of solar and of stellar systems can account 
for the changes which have taken place upon a single 
planet, including all the phases of its inorganic, its or- 
ganic and its social phenomena. If we view the facts 
from a sufBciently remote point in the cosmos, there- 
fore, there will be no need of introducing any myster- 
ious beginning to terrestrial life, for it is manifestly a 
consequence of universal conditions. 

"Upon what principle," inquires Lewes, "are we to 
pause at the cell or protoplasm? If by a successive 
elimination of differences we reduce all organisms to 
the cell, we must go on and reduce the cell itself to 
the chemical elements out of which it was con- 
structed; and inasmuch as these elements are all 
common to the inorganic world, the only difference 
being one of synthesis, we reach a result which is the 
stultification of all classification, namely, the asser- 
tion of a kinship which is universal." 

Passing from general to intellectual phenomena, 
Lewes exposes the assumption so often made by writers 
on mental physiology. Although his explanation of this 
assumption is somewhat elaborate for so brief a review, 
it is nevertheless of sufficient importance to warrant 
the following reproduction : 

"The most abridged expression of the action observed 
in the sensorium is, by common consent, called the 
nervous arc. Anatomists note that the motor nerves 



The Unity of Mind and Matter 299 

issue from the anterior side of the spinal cord (that 
which in animals is the under side), and that the 
sensory nerves issue from the posterior side, (that 
which in animals is the upper side) . Like the cerebrum, 
the spinal cord is a double organ, but in the former 
the gray structure is mainly external, while in the 
spinal cord it is internal. In the development of the 
nervous, system from the embryo, "the outermost layer 
of the germinal membrane of the embryo develops a 
groove, which deepens as its sides grow upward and 
finally close over and form a canal. Its foremost ex- 
tremity soon bulges into three well-marked enlarg- 
ments which are then called the primitive cerebral 
vesicles. The cavities of these vesicles, known as the 
Fore-brain, Middle-brain and Hind-brain are con- 
tinuous, and the continuity of the walls and cavities 
of these vesicles is never obliterated throughout the 
subsequent changes. This continuity is also traceable 
throughout the medulla spinalis." 

"Microscopic investigation reveals that underneath all 
the morphological changes the walls of the whole 
cerebrospinal axis are composed of similar elements on 
a similar plan. The conclusions which directly follow 
from the above are, first, that since the structure of the 
great axis is everywhere similar, the properties must he 
similar; secondly, that since there is structural con- 
tinuity, no one part can he called into activity without 
at the same time more or less exciting that of all the 
rest." 

When we consider the continuity of structure and 
function throughout the sensorium and the inevitablo 
dependence of all its constituent elements upon chem- 
ical and cosmical conditions, we begin to realize tliut 



300 The Evolution of Knowledge 

our feelings and thoughts form an inseparable part of 
the rhythms of nature. There are those, however, who 
feel degraded by the thought that they are an integral 
part of the economy of the universe. They believe that 
their individuality is of a higher order than that of 
nature. 

Lewes complains of the tendency to draw absolute 
dividing lines between the various functions of the sen- 
sorium. When a stimulus is applied to the skin it is 
followed by a muscular movement or a glandular secre- 
tion accompanied by various degrees of consciousness. 
These familiar experiences are interpreted by neurol- 
ogists as neural processes. All the other processes are 
left out of account. Even in the neural process the 
organs are neglected for the sake of the nervous tissue, 
and the nervous tissue for the sake of the nerve-cell. 

Whether it be a muscular movement, a glandular se- 
cretion, an emotion, or a thought, the neurologist rep- 
resents the activity of the sensorium about as fol- 
lows: ''The nerve-cell is the supreme element, the 
origin of the nerve-fibre, and the fountain of nerve- 
force. The cells are connected one with another by 
means of fibres, and with muscles, glands, and centres, 
also by means of fibres, which are merely channels for 
the nerve-force. A stimulus at the surface is carried 
by a sensory fibre to a cell in the centre ; from that point 
it is carried by another fibre to another cell; and from 
that by a third fibre to a muscle ; a reflex action results ; 
• — this is the elementary nervous arc." The passage of 
an excitation, therefore, into the labyrinths of the sen- 
sorium and out again (until it emerges in action) is 
said to describe the nervous arc. 

Briefly stated the theory of the nervous arc is^ 'that 



The Unity of Mind and Matter 301 

one fibre passes into the spinal cord, and, that another 
passes out of it, and that a movement is produced 
usually preceded by a sensation and sometimes by a 
thought." But investigation proves that the continuity 
of the nerve-fibre, from cell to cell, through the spinal 
cord, which is supposed to separate the simpler re- 
flexes from consciousness, is purely imaginary. In 
other terms, the path of energy in the sensorium is 
governed by the same laws of polarity or attraction as 
those that prevail in the inorganic world. Hence 
whether the action is that of the formation of a crystal 
in the mother liquid, or that of a frog after the brain 
has been removed, repelling the point of the scapel 
from one leg by pushing it away with the other, or that 
of a statesman endeavoring to solve some problem of 
government, the same order of structure acts and reacts 
with the same order of environment, the same poten- 
tialities are called into play. The efforts of the inor- 
ganic, of the organic and of the social worlds are, there- 
fore, distinguished ultimately only by the degrees of 
their complexity, degrees which can be expressed in 
terms of time and space. In short, physiologists, as 
well as neurologists, are beginning to perceive that it 
is impossible to isolate reflex action upon the one hand 
from sensibility and thought, and upon the other from 
inorganic nature. 

Assuming that consciousness has its seat in the brain, 
sensation in the base of the brain (the medulla ob- 
longata), and the simplest reflexes in the spinal cord, 
the manner in which sensations mingle with conscious- 
ness is explained as follows: The most widely ac- 
cepted theory is, that the wave of excitation must pass 
onward to the central convokitions of the brain, and 



302 The Evolution of Knowledge 

that there, in the excitation of the cells, it first becomes 
sensation — consciousness is first aroused. This theory 
regards consciousness and sensation as nearly identical, 
and locates them both in the brain. In all these theories, 
however, sensation is made the middle term between the 
most unconscious actions and thought. The theories 
differ only in the distance supposed to intervene between 
the central convolutions of the brain and the seat of 
sensation. 

The following diagram will illustrate that theory 
which locates both sensation and consciousness in pre- 
sumably the same neutral 
tract in the brain. "The 
stimulus wave from the 
sensitive surface S is car- 
ried to the spinal centre 
S 1, which may either 
S Wl transmit it directly to M 3, 

and thus reach the muscle M, or transmit indirectly 
through S 2, M 2, in the subcerebral centre ; or, finally, 
it may pass upward through S 1, S 2, S 3, and down- 
ward through M 1, M 2, M 3. The reflex of S 1, M 3, is 
purely physical; that of S 1, S 2, M 3, M 3, is psycho- 
physical, there being a sentient state accompanying the 
mechanical process; while that of S 1, S 2, S 3, M 1, 
M 2, M 3, is a reflex accompanied by consciousness. The 
initial stage is a peripheral stimulation. That is to say, 
the impulse may originate in S 3, and pass through M 1, 
M 2, M 3, or pass through S 2, M 2, M 3. This is when 
an idea is said to originate a movement. Again: the 
stimulus may be some state of the subcerebral centres 
and pass from S 2, M 2, M 3."* 
*Problems of Life and Mind, 3rd Series, Vol. II, pp. 431, 432. 




The Unity of Mind and Matter 303 

All the actions of the sensorium, therefore, are Reflex 
actions ; and the degree of centralization, or dependence 
upon the brain, determines the degree of consciousness 
accompanying them. If physiologists could only agree 
concerning the facts upon which they base their theory 
of the nervous arc, the path of the student would be 
greatly facilitated. 

According to Van Deen, reflection takes place without 
Volition, but not without Sensation. Budge thinks that 
it takes place without Perception (Vorstellung). Mar- 
shall Hall and Muller divide actions into four distinct 
classes, the voluntary, the involuntary, the respiratory, 
and the purely reflex. The purely reflex actions he com- 
pares to an ordinary mechanism because they depend 
wholly upon excito-motor nerves. 

**It is needless nowadays," says Lewes, "to point out 
that the existence of a distinct system of excito-motor 
nerves belongs to imaginary anatomy ; but it is not need- 
less to point out that the Imaginary Physiology founded 
on it still survives. * * * We have already seen that what 
anatomy positively teaches is totally unlike the Eeflex 
mechanism popularly imagined. The sensory nerve is 
not seen to enter the spinal cord at one point and pass 
over to a corresponding point of exit ; it is seen to enter 
the gray substance, which is continuous throughout the 
spinal cord; it is there lost to view, its course being 
untraceable."* 

It is safe to say, therefore, that, notwithstanding its 
incompleteness, Lewes has given the clearest view of 
mental phenomena thus far offered to the world. The 
conclusion to be drawn from his work is, that mind has 

* Physical Basis of Mind, pp. 480, 481. 



304 The Evolution of Knowledge 

a basis far wider and deeper than organic life, or, in 
other terms, that consciousness is the function of uni- 
versal conditions. 

The aim of Lewes was to identify mind and matter by 
reducing thought and feeling to one principle. This 
aim was interfered with by his theory of an unknow- 
able which postulates an ultimate mystery. He -then 
turned to the study of the functions and structures of 
the sensorium in the hope of explaining the physical 
basis of mind. In this undertaking he was successful. 
The identity of mind and matter is clearly indicated 
by his great dictum, "Motor perceptions are condensed 
in intuitions and generalized in conceptions." 



CHAPTER XVI 

Conclusion 

Science culminates in religion because divinity is 
always our most advanced theory of knowledge. Those 
who reject religion for science lack a commanding view 
of nature, or of that divine harmony which explains all 
phenomena. Since this harmony is perceived through 
the emotions as well as by the reason, devotion and in- 
telligence must develop together. 

If science is less potent than religion as a moral 
teacher, it is because scientific principles are not as yet 
centralized. Eeligion teaches ultimate principles not 
through demonstration, but through the tentative pro- 
cess of metaphor. Until we are able to evolve the true and 
the good from nature the only form these principles 
can assume is that of the will of an individual. While, 
therefore, science is slowly approaching an ultimate 
generalization, religious imagery is an invaluable guide. 

The greatest achievement of knowledge is ethics. 
Moral science will unite religion and government by co- 
ordinating natural and civil law. The underlying prin- 
ciple of ethics is Justice, an ultimate which can be 
defined only by correlating sociology and ontology, or 
by demonstrating that society is an evolution of nature. 

Justice is self-preservation, using the word self in 
its widest sense, which is species. Hence good and evil 



3o6 The Evolution of Knowledge 

are only other names for life and death. From the 
jjoint of view of mankind all virtues are degrees of 
human life, all crimes are degrees of human death. 

Eeligion is the aspiration for a higher life directed 
to a supreme power, or otherwise expressed, it is the in- 
tuition of the order of nature. At the dawn of intelli- 
gence all the forces of nature are personified and wor- 
shipped. To the undisciplined mind, the sphere of con- 
scious dominion is the universe, but as knowledge ad- 
vances personal authority becomes more and more re- 
stricted to the power exercised by the individual over 
himself. 

Fate is an empty word, because its meaning is unlim- 
ited. The sense of freedom of the will arises from our 
inability to realize all the causes of our actions. Voli- 
tion springs from the interaction of individual and en- 
vironment, and is therefore for the most part uncon- 
scious. If all things are determined, volition or human 
effort is a part of the determination. Our hopes and 
fears move with the universal economy. In the words 
of Marcus Aurelius, "If all things are purposeless, be 
not thou without a purpose." The forces of evolution 
are making for righteousness, because destiny and duty 
are one. 

Organized religion has always been the surest guide 
for the masses. In its present stage of development, 
the church teaches principles through the worship of 
persons, or the idealization of character. Its power 
springs from its sublime purpose, which is to harmonize 
sympathy and intelligence, — ^the elements of righteous- 
ness. 



Conclusion 307 

The chief enemies of the church are not alone the 
atheists but the zealots. The former would transform 
our devotions into pure thought by eliminating feeling ; 
the latter would convert religion into pure emotion by 
suppressing thought. Both of these extremes are to be 
avoided, for religious sentiment is the coincidence of 
instinct and reason. 

Devotional inspiration is the appreciation of the true, 
the good, and the beautiful, — that balance of thoiight 
and feeling which engenders faith in God or a sublime 
trust in nature. The subjective and the objective as- 
pects of devotion are prayer and emulation. To the 
religionist, prayer is an appeal to deity; to the philos- 
opher, it is communion with nature. To the religionist, 
emulation is obedience to a divine will; to the philos- 
opher, it is the harmony of the universe. 

The light of the world is that refinement of sentiment 
called imagination. In his struggle for existence 
man needs the help of imagery. Without the encour- 
agement of hope and the stimulus of fear he is impotent. 

The measure of fiction necessary for education is in- 
dicated by the needs of the imagination. The proper use 
of fiction, therefore, is the central problem of education. 
This great question can be solved by ascertaining whether 
the children of our age are able to form an idea of the 
order of nature. If children can formulate even tenta- 
tively this highest of conceptions, they can emulate the 
sublimest of examples without the aid of superstition. 
That is to say, there is no need for deceit. The imagery 
necessary for their development may be employed con- 
sciously. 

Care should be taken by religious teachers to avoid 



3o8 The Evolution of Knowledge 

stimulating the imagination at the expense of truth, 
for in the end divergence of fact and fancy engenders 
insincerity. Every ordained teacher can find in his 
faith enough that is true to secure and augment his 
influence, as well as to strengthen his ability. 

If formal creeds no longer inspire us, it is because 
they have ceased to represent nature. Theology has 
always been the best explanation of the universe that 
the church could offer. What we need is a readjust- 
ment of spiritual teaching to the advance of knowledge. 
This most important of reforms will be achieved when 
our poets and artists, as well as our men of science, con- 
tribute, as of old, to the ceremonies of religion, for 
genius alone can guide us to the true and to the good 
through the beautiful. 

At the dawn of science, religion, which is only 
another name for the chief coincidence of feeling and 
thought, was an inseparable part of the study of nature, 
because it was impossible to discern universal order 
without emotion. Specialization has separated the 
forces of instinct and reason; but they will unite again 
in the evolution of knowledge. 



iAR 30. 1905 



LiBRARY OF CONGRESS 



020 199 755 



